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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

World War II: 30 Years After

Robert Dallek
Alexander Dallin
David Dilks
George Kennan
Hugh Seton-Watson

The Preconditions of Détente

Richard Pipes
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Soviet Mental Prisons

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Vladimir Bukovsky

Czechoslovak Theatre

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World War II: 30 Years After

Recently the Organization of American Historians held a symposium devoted to the problem of "Allied Leadership during World War II." Participating in the discussion were Professors Robert Dallek, Alexander Dallin, David Dilks and George Kennan. We are publishing below their papers and comments. We have asked Professor Hugh Seton-Watson to write his own reflections on this discussion which marks the 30th anniversary of the ending of World War II. Taken together, these comments, although essentially historical, are not without relevance to the present situation.

Allied Leadership in the Second World War: Roosevelt*

Robert Dallek

THE nature of Franklin Roosevelt's leadership during the second world war has been ascribed to many things: idealism and naïveté, realism, imperialism, recollections of the first world war, and even debilitating disease. These explanations are familiar to all of us: they variously describe Roosevelt's policies as resting on a faith in international co-operation and his ability to convert others to it; as proceeding from realistic assumptions about power in world affairs; as issuing from a desire to extend American control around the globe; as coming from a wish to avoid the errors of the first world war and, in the last stages of the war, as growing out of physical and mental incapacity. Central to all these explanations is the assumption that Roosevelt's personal judgments on world affairs largely determined what the United States did. This, I believe, tells us more about American views of presidential power in the 1950s, sixties and seventies than it does about Roosevelt's leadership.[1]

* The authors of this and the three following articles wish to thank Professor Samuel Wells of the University of North Carolina for arranging the session at the 1974 annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians, where these papers were read.

[1] These descriptions of Roosevelt's war-time leadership are in: Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948); William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago, 1950); John L. Snell (ed.), *The Meaning of Yalta* (Baton Rouge, 1956); Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, 1957); Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During The Second World War, 1941–1945* (New York, 1965); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York, 1968);

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Both before and during the war, what best explains Roosevelt's foreign policies was his inclination to mirror American public opinion. Both as an American idealist who shared national hopes for world peace and as a firm believer in consensus politics, Roosevelt consistently tried to reflect the public will in foreign affairs. Indeed, in all his major foreign actions, be it his role as Good Neighbour, neutrality, aid to Britain, UN activities, post-war co-operation with Russia, or his backing for a united, democratic China, FDR was as much a spokesman for the American foreign policy public [2] as he was an independent agent pursuing his own vision of America's role in world affairs.

In the earliest years of his presidency, for example, he faithfully mirrored the pacifist sentiment which so dominated American thinking about foreign relations. Viewing himself as an advocate for the millions of Americans who wanted disarmament and peace, Roosevelt made numerous public and private appeals for arms reduction and an end to war. Between 1933 and 1937, he considered several plans for achieving these goals: a disarmament agreement tied to a consultative pact; a summit conference of important heads of state; regional neutrality agreements which might prevent or limit the duration of a war; and a new world body—"The Permanent Conference on Economic and Social Problems"—which would seek to preserve world peace by reducing economic and social injustice. While the details of these peace plans originated with Roosevelt and his advisers, they had their more general origins in the American preoccupation of the thirties with eliminating war.[3]

In 1935, when deteriorating conditions abroad created a widespread demand in the United States for neutrality legislation, Roosevelt accepted this as a good idea. Like many of his countrymen, he saw a defence of traditional neutral rights as likely to drive America into another world war. Consequently, he shared the general desire to sacrifice trade and freedom of the seas for the sake of peace. But unlike Congress, he did not think this required isolation from world affairs. On the contrary, he wanted neutrality legislation which would allow him to withhold arms and trade from an aggressor state. Congressional

James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York, 1970); Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1973).

[2] The term refers to those Americans interested in foreign affairs. Public opinion analysts have concluded that this is ordinarily no more than 15 per cent of the general public. At times, this group expands in response to a special issue. The best brief discussion of the subject is: Ernest R. May, "An American Tradition in Foreign Policy: The Role of Public Opinion," *Theory and Practice in American Politics,* edited by William H. Nelson (Chicago, 1964), pp. 101-22. Cf. May, *"Lessons" of the Past,* pp. 145–46.

[3] Roosevelt's peace efforts are summarized in Dorothy Borg, *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 369–77. On American pacifism in the 1930s, see Robert H. Ferrell, "The Peace Movement," *Isolation and Security,* edited by Alexander DeConde (Durham, N.C., 1957); Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement 1941–1960* (New York, 1969), Chap. 1.

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resistance to this idea, however, coupled with widespread determination to keep the country out of war led him to accept a series of impartial or isolationist neutrality bills.[4]

This did not made Roosevelt an isolationist. Two general convictions governed isolationist thinking during these years: first, that America was secure, and second, that involvement with the world would contaminate and destroy the country's traditional way of life. By contrast, Roosevelt never saw the nation as invulnerable to attack, and, like other Wilsonians, he believed that an internationalist policy would be more likely to transform the world than the United States.[5]

Yet, in spite of his beliefs, he felt compelled to reflect the national mood. His Quarantine address of October 1937 further illustrates the point. In response to renewed Japanese aggression in China and the feeling that something should be done to counteract growing isolationist sentiment in the United States, Roosevelt decided to make a major foreign policy address in the middle west. Arguing that the country needed to engage in "positive endeavours to preserve peace," he suggested a worldwide "quarantine" of aggressor states. Though in no way proposing military or economic sanctions against Japan, Roosevelt did suggest a shift from impartial to discriminatory neutrality. When asked by a reporter, for example, whether his quarantine idea would amount to a repudiation of American neutrality, he replied: "Not for a minute. It may be an expansion," or "a stronger neutrality."

As is well known, Roosevelt did not act to implement this vague idea. This was partly because he had no specific plan in mind. The speech, he acknowledged at the time, expressed "an attitude without a programme." Another inhibiting factor, though, was isolationist opposition to collective steps of any kind. His sensitivity to this isolationist mood expressed itself in his very use of the "quarantine" idea. Whether consciously intended or not, his suggestion that an internationalist step take the form of a quarantine spoke to isolationist concerns that an involvement with other powers would poison America's democratic way of life. "I am a believer in democracy and will have nothing to do with the poisonous European mess," isolationist Senator Homer T. Bone declared. "I believe in being kind to people who have the smallpox, such as Mussolini and Hitler, but not in going inside their houses." Roosevelt's metaphor suggested international co-operation without the dangers of contamination the isolationists feared.[6]

But it did not disarm these concerns. Pacifists, businessmen, news-

[4] On Roosevelt and neutrality, see Robert A. Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality* (Chicago, 1962).

[5] On isolationist thinking, see Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962).

[6] On the Quarantine speech, see Borg, op. cit. pp. 377–86. The Bone quote is from Edgar B. Nixon (ed.), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs*, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 356.

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papers and letter writers responded to the President's speech with warnings that he was pointing the "American people down the road that led to the World War." As recent scholarship has illustrated, though, this was not the only response to the President's address. There were also substantial expressions of support from peace groups, religious leaders, labour unions, newspapers and individual letter writers. But much of this backing, especially as stated in White House mail, was for a general peace effort on Roosevelt's part, and not for a "quarantine" or economic sanctions which some of his supporters hoped he and other leaders would adopt. As the *Christian Science Monitor* pointed out at the time, those in agreement with the speech still only represented a minority, and to this one can add that only a part of that "minority" expressed itself in favour of meaningful internationalist steps. Surveys of public opinion made between October 1937 and February 1938 seem to support these points. After the President's speech in late October, 59 per cent of Americans in an opinion survey supported the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese war, but only 37 per cent of this group wanted a boycott of Japanese goods. In January, after the Japanese bombed the American gunboat *Panay*, another survey showed that 70 per cent of those questioned favoured the withdrawal of American forces from China. Moreover, in the following month, when pollsters asked a cross-section of Americans whether they agreed with arms shipments to the Chinese, 64 per cent said "no." [7]

In making his speech, therefore, Roosevelt was reflecting the anger the country felt toward the Japanese and the desire to do something to preserve world peace. In refusing to go beyond it, though, he was demonstrating his inability to set forth a new peace plan, and his sensitivity to the widespread reluctance in the United States to endorse actions which might significantly involve the country in international affairs. When the Nine Power Conference on the Far East collapsed in November 1937, he declared that the United States could not lead

[7] The response to the address is described in Borg, op. cit. pp. 386–98. While Borg definitively illustrates that the response to the President's speech was much more positive than administration leaders believed at the time, I would question the depths of that support. For example, my reading of a random sample of the positive "quarantine" mail in the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park indicates to me that a majority of the letter writers were happy to endorse Roosevelt's search for peace, but they gave little indication that they were ready to support economic or military sanctions against Japan. Secondly, at the same time, the White House received vastly more mail supporting than opposing the speech; it was also receiving a steady flow of letters urging the President to invoke the neutrality law against American involvement in the Sino-Japanese fighting. This, I believe, was the isolationists' way of saying that they wanted no part of a "quarantine" or collective steps against Japan. This body of mail is in Official File 150C at Hyde Park. For additional evidence of the strength of isolationist feeling at this time, see Warren I. Cohen, "The Role of Private Groups in the United States," in *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941*, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okomoto (New York, 1973), pp. 432–35. The survey data is drawn from *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971*, Vol. I: *1935–1948* (3 vols.; New York, 1972), polls of 24 October 1937; 16 January 1938; 18 February 1938.

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the powers into coercive steps against Japan because Congress and the American people were opposed to it.[8]

His difficulties with the isolationists, of course, continued for another four years. But however much he saw the need to ignore them and to move the country into a direct struggle with world fascism during this time, he refused to commit Americans to actions they did not care to take. He was "going to be sure, very sure," he told a group of war-hawks in 1940, "that if the United States had to enter the war, it would enter as far as humanly possible a united nation." Indeed, though he strongly believed that the United States should help defeat Nazism by aiding Britain and Russia and, if ultimately required, by directly entering the war, he only gave substantive expression to these beliefs when he felt he had sufficient public support.[9]

After the country entered the fighting, Roosevelt continued to believe it essential to reflect the public mood. Despite the fact that he now enjoyed widespread support and seemed able to move the nation in almost any direction he liked, he remained unwilling to get too far ahead of where he thought the country wanted to go. Convinced that a new round of isolationism would lead to another war and that only a national consensus or an end to the inter-war divisions in American opinion on foreign affairs would allow the country to be effective abroad, Roosevelt worked to create a domestic consensus on how post-war relations should be arranged. For the most part, he found himself in harmony with the foreign policy public on what should be done. Most importantly, they shared the conviction that post-war peace depended on avoiding the errors of the past. Almost everyone agreed that, unlike during and after the first world war, enemy power must be entirely destroyed and post-war allied co-operation assured. These aims partly expressed themselves in the unconditional surrender doctrine, the desire for Soviet-American co-operation, a unified, influential China, and a new world league.

In calling for unconditional surrender, Roosevelt was enunciating a widely held American point of view. Although he later suggested that the idea had come to him spontaneously, the truth is that the doctrine grew out of official and unofficial thinking in the United States. Before Roosevelt announced it at Casablanca in January 1943, he had received the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department's Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy. Furthermore, when American representatives negotiated a cease-fire with the Vichy French during the North African campaign in November 1942, the Americans made clear that they wanted no part of a negotiated peace such as

[8] FDR to Henry L. Stimson, 24 November 1937, PPF 20, Franklin D. Roosevelt MSS, Hyde Park, New York.

[9] The quote is from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston, 1973), p. 109. The point about public support is amply illustrated in William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937–1940* (New York, 1952); *The Undeclared War, 1940–1941* (New York, 1953).

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had ended the first world war. Roosevelt, however, had no intention of disappointing them. He fully shared the public desire to punish the aggressors, repeatedly expressing his determination to bring about "the total elimination of German and Japanese war power." Indeed, his impulse to break enemy strength even exceeded the public's. In 1944, when he endorsed Morgenthau's plan for converting Germany into a "pastoral" state, he met such strong public criticism that he felt compelled to take a more moderate stand.[10]

ROOSEVELT was also in close harmony with the public in his desire to achieve lasting friendship with the USSR. During the war, Americans largely persuaded themselves that there was no fundamental conflict of interest with the Russians. The assumption took hold that the Soviets were abandoning their communist ideology for democracy and capitalism and that Russia was becoming much like the United States. In March 1943, for example, *Life* magazine declared that the Russians were "one hell of a people . . . [who] to a remarkable degree . . . look like Americans, dress like Americans and think like Americans." The NKVD, the magazine announced, was "a national police similar to the FBI." Even the most conservative and thoughtful of Americans engaged in this kind of thinking. In 1942, a spokeswoman for the Daughters of the American Revolution declared that "Today in Russia, Communism is practically non-existent." "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism," Senator Tom Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee declared. Communism in the conventional sense, Ambassador George Messersmith told Cordell Hull, no longer existed within the Soviet Union. Professor Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard pointed to "the steady swerving of Soviet policy away from a strict and narrow Marxian ideology in the direction of ideas that we can call in very broad terms, democratic." No group in America subscribed to this viewpoint more fully than business and professional leaders who believed that Russia would provide a new mass market after the war which would save the United States from another economic collapse. By the close of the war, opinion surveys showed that most Americans expected cooperation with Russia to continue into the post-war era.[11]

Roosevelt strongly shared these hopes. He told Robert Murphy that America's most important post-war objective was cooperation with Moscow, and he told William Bullitt that if he gave Stalin everything "I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, *noblesse oblige*, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace." After Teheran, he publicly expressed the belief that Stalin was "truly representative of the heart and soul of

[10] The unconditional surrender issue is summarized in John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York, 1973), pp. 8–10, 114–21.
[11] Wittner, op. cit. pp. 115–19; Gaddis, op. cit. Chap. 2 and p. 206.

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Russia; and I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people—very well indeed." After Yalta, he was even more optimistic, believing that "the Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and farseeing and . . . that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine." [12]

In his enthusiasm for Soviet-American cooperation, Roosevelt, like the foreign policy public, was expressing the traditional American faith in a universalist approach to world affairs. Instead of the old power politics with spheres of influence and competing alliances, Roosevelt and the public wanted to guarantee each nation's safety through collective action. Under this system, all nations were to share a common interest in all the affairs of the world, eliminating the need for special security arrangements. As one historian has stated, "universalism, rooted in the American legal and moral tradition, overwhelmingly backed by contemporary opinion, received successive enshrinements in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, in the Declaration of the United Nations in 1942, and in the Moscow Declaration of 1943." Since Soviet-American cooperation was essential to this universalist plan, Roosevelt hoped that the Yalta agreements would assure its triumph. "The Crimea Conference," he told the Congress, ". . . ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed." [13]

Yet, in spite of his high hopes for Soviet-American friendship, Roosevelt maintained a healthy scepticism about reaching this goal. By 1943, for instance, he clearly understood that Moscow intended to use its pre-eminent power in Eastern Europe to dominate the area and that this would contradict American commitments to self-determination. Furthermore, as recent scholarship has pointed out, Roosevelt's wartime atomic energy policies reveal that he was not as confident of amicable post-war relations with Moscow as we have been inclined to think. Finally, we know from the President's correspondence in the last weeks of his life that he was becoming increasingly concerned by difficulties with the USSR. He still remained hopeful about good relations with Russia, however. On the day before he died, he wrote to Churchill that he wished to "minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day, and most of them straighten out." Whatever his inner thoughts on the subject, though, Roosevelt gave no public indications of doubt about cooperation. He apparently believed that public suggestions of Soviet-American differences would add to tensions and,

[12] Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City: New York, 1964), p. 227; William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," *Life*, Vol. XXV (30 Aug. 1948), p. 94; Burns, op. cit. p. 416; Sherwood, op. cit. pp. 869–70.

[13] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XLVI (Oct. 1967), pp. 26-40.

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worse still, would jar public belief and undermine national inclination to bear post-war responsibilities abroad. Judging from other examples of how he built a foreign policy consensus, Roosevelt intended to emphasize Soviet-American accord for as long as he could, or until the American public showed itself willing to adopt a less idealistic approach to foreign affairs.[14]

MUCH the same reasoning governed his China policy. During the second world war, Americans nourished the hope that China would emerge from the war as a great power ready to stand with the United States against East Asian spheres of control. This wish helped to foster extreme distortions about Chinese realities. The second world war "was a fantastic period in Sino-American relations," A. T. Steele has written, "a period of dreamy unreality, in which the American public seemed prepared to accept and believe anything and everything good and wonderful that was said about the Chinese, their Generalissimo, the Generalissimo's wife and the heroic Chinese people." During 1942, for example, when asked whether China could be depended upon to cooperate with the United States after the war, between 80 and 86 per cent of those questioned said "yes." Moreover, in May 1942, when asked whether Stalin, Chiang or Churchill had the most support from their people, 23 per cent of a sample poll chose Chiang: 1 per cent less than the 24 per cent who picked Churchill and 6 per cent less than the 30 per cent who opted for Stalin. Finally, in March 1944, when pollsters asked Americans which countries they would like to have the greatest say in an international organization, 63 per cent included China along with Britain, Russia, and the United States.[15]

Roosevelt shared in, reflected and encouraged these views. Like so many other Americans, he saw China as a potentially great power playing a major role in post-war affairs. When Churchill met with FDR in January 1942, he found the President holding an exaggerated view of China's importance. Roosevelt seemed to believe that China's military strength rivalled that of Britain and even Russia. Churchill was unable to shake Roosevelt's faith in this conviction. In April, he declared that in the future "an unconquerable China will play its proper role in maintaining peace and prosperity not only in East Asia

[14] Gaddis, op. cit. Chap. 5; Martin J. Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941–45," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 78 (Oct. 1973), pp. 945–68; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942–1946," *The Journal of American History*, Vol. LX (Mar. 1974), pp. 1003–1044; Adam B. Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II* (New York, 1971), Chap. 2.

[15] Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations* (New York, 1971), pp. 46, 48, 105, 173; A. T. Steele, *The American People and China* (New York, 1966), pp. 22-23; Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk (eds.), *Public Opinion: 1935–1946* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 369, 559, 911. Also see, Harold R. Isaacs, *Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India* (New York, 1958), pp. 164-89.

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but in the whole world." Furthermore, in 1942-43, when General Joseph Stilwell pressed him to take a *quid pro quo* approach to Chiang—"for everything we do for him, we should exact a commitment from him"—Roosevelt refused. As he explained in a famous letter to General George Marshall, "... The Generalissimo finds it necessary to maintain his position of supremacy. You and I would do the same thing under the circumstances. He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander-in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco."

To back up this picture of China as an equal power, Roosevelt negotiated a treaty surrendering America's extra-territorial rights and arranged the repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws barring Chinese immigration to the United States. More importantly, he persuaded London and Moscow to accord China equal status by including her in the Four-Power Declaration of October 1943 and in the Cairo Conference in the following month. Undoubtedly, part of this campaign for China's equal treatment was Roosevelt's way of compensating Chiang for relegating China to last place in the overall war effort. But it was also Roosevelt's way of trying to achieve the American idea of China.

He remained strongly committed to this goal to the end of his life. In 1944–45, when confronting evidence that China would emerge from the war in a state of civil disarray, Roosevelt encouraged the creation of a nationalist-communist coalition and won Stalin's backing at Yalta for nationalist predominance in such a regime. Though Roosevelt appreciated that a stable China might still be out of reach, he continued to see at least two reasons for pursuing this goal: one was the unfortunate international consequences he and other Americans saw flowing from a weak China, and the other was a concern that open recognition of China's weakness would undermine the emerging American commitment to involvement overseas. Indeed, in Roosevelt's judgment, if all he could promise his countrymen was a return to the old sphere-of-influence diplomacy in Asia, he would be in a less advantageous position to bring them through the war in a mood to assume a leading part in world affairs. It seemed better, therefore, as with Soviet relations, to pursue the popular idea of China until emerging realities revised the public's view.[16]

ROOSEVELT followed a similar pattern in calling for a world league. His initial impulse was not to create a new world body, but, rather, to organize a post-war system in which the great powers policed the world. Instead of a new league in which all nations would help keep the peace, Roosevelt wanted an international police force staffed by Britain,

[16] Burns, *op. cit.* pp. 204-10, 374-78, 539-45, 573-77, 588-90; Roosevelt's letter to Marshall, 8 March 1943, is quoted on p. 377 of Burns; Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York, 1970), pp. 291, 322-23, 353-62, Chap. 16.

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China, Russia and the United States. In his judgment, this was a more realistic way of dealing with international aggression than relying on a hundred nations. It would also have the advantages of avoiding a potential fight with isolationists over membership in a post-war league. Moreover, a great power arrangement, in which the United States was principally the policeman for the Western hemisphere, would assure an American role in the world, even if the public once more turned isolationist.

In the course of the war, however, when American opinion, as registered in polls, congressional discussions and the extraordinary success of Wendell Wilkie's *One World* and Sumner Welles's *The Time for Decision*, showed itself strongly in favour of a new version of Wilson's League, Roosevelt shifted ground and supported the creation of a new world body along old Wilsonian lines. Moreover, when the Russians sought to write great-power domination into the United Nations through an absolute veto and 16 Soviet Assembly seats, Roosevelt warned Stalin that it would have an explosive effect on American public opinion. He subsequently argued for and won modifications in the Russian demands. His agreement to three Soviet Assembly seats, however, worried him so much that he kept it a secret for almost two months after it was given.[17] Fearful of causing a split amongst the country's internationalists, Roosevelt was highly responsive to their conception of how America's post-war participation in world affairs should be arranged. In sum, Roosevelt saw the creation of an internationalist commitment at home as initially more important than the establishment of a fully effective peace system abroad.

To judge from the strong American post-war commitment to overseas involvement, Roosevelt reached his goal. It would be an exaggeration, of course, to conclude that Roosevelt singlehandedly, or even largely, produced this shift. External events, particularly Pearl Harbour and the country's emergence as the world's first power, played the central role. Furthermore, as Ernest May has observed, the movement into the foreign policy public of significantly more Jews and Roman Catholics ready to join issue with world communism played a part.[18] But Roosevelt, I would suggest, also made a major contribution to this change: by identifying himself with public opinion and refusing to act without a consensus, he disarmed isolationist fears that an activist foreign policy would mean unprecedented executive control, and he avoided a split in the internationalist movement which would have slowed down and possibly weakened the commitment to post-war involvement abroad. It was, therefore, Roosevelt the national spokesman and cautious politician, rather than Roosevelt the powerful wartime leader, who helped lead the nation towards new departures in foreign affairs.

[17] Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (New York, 1967).

[18] May, *" Lessons " of the Past*, pp. 16-17.

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Allied Leadership in the Second World War: Stalin

Alexander Dallin

JOSEPH Stalin was the most enigmatic of the Big Three. Despite the profusion of memoirs, biographies and revelations, vast gaps remain in the evidence, and the available accounts abound in contradictions. Not the least of these relate to his war-time performance—as the leader of a great people's defence against the invaders and as one of the Big Three. If the Georgian cobbler's son emerged from the war as the awesome architect of Russian victory, it is not that in adversity he had greatness thrust upon him. In war as in peace he proved capable of leading and learning, of dissimulating and role-playing, capable of insights and blunders, successes and failures. But the wartime setting made him appear in a different light, in new and unfamiliar roles, on another part of the historical stage on which he was so conscious of acting.

By what standards are we to judge his performance? One might best distinguish among his different roles, in which he earned different grades as personality and system interacted in varying amalgams.[1]

Stalin as a symbol of leadership

Popularly, Stalin became best known during the war as the symbol of national leadership. His positive image, at home and abroad, became that of the steadfast commander-in-chief, determined to withstand the German onslaught and then turn it back, uniting the people—the "brothers and sisters," as he uniquely addressed them on 3 July 1941—against the common foe, in alliance with the Western democracies. But this image of the inspiring, and inspired, defender of the fatherland, evoking the memories of Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, Suvorov and Kutuzov, had no necessary relation to the historical Stalin. It ignored his pre-war blunders, his virtual collapse in the first week after the Nazi attack, his misjudgments and intrigues, his sickly suspicion, the whole tangled skein of earlier traumas and neuroses, the deeply-ingrained "ideological" commitments and all the experiences that left an indelible mark on his outlook and his behaviour.

[1] The major biographies and relevant memoirs include Adam Ulam, *Stalin*; Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin* (rev. ed.); T. Harry Rigby, ed., *Stalin*; Roy Medvedev, *Let History Judge*; *Khrushchev Remembers*; Svetlana Alliluyeva, *Twenty Letters to a Friend*. On Stalin in World War II see especially Seweryn Bialer, ed., *Stalin and His Generals*, pp. 34–44, 179–262, 339–405, including extensive quotations from the memoirs of Soviet military Commanders. See also Matthew Gallagher, *Soviet History of World War II*; and James Douglas, "Stalin in the Second World War," *Survey*, No. 81 (Autumn 1971), pp. 179–87.

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Stalin as the symbol of war-time leadership was indeed a functional and perhaps essential image in the Soviet war effort, but it was contrived. Had the real Stalin not existed, he would have had to have been invented as an object of synthetic charisma, manipulated and advertized by the propaganda machine of the USSR for domestic as well as foreign consumption. What relation, if any, that image bore to the man in the Kremlin, at the *stavka*, in his air-raid shelter, at his dacha, at Teheran and Yalta, only a handful of people knew.

Stalin as military commander

Stalin's record as the supreme military commander is a mixed one. A retrospective assessment cannot ignore the cumulative backlog of the pre-war years. Stalin could—and did—take credit for the forced industrialization of the country, which was to prove vital in the war (even if much of its industrial capacity was destroyed and much else evacuated and rebuilt at tremendous cost). Yet Stalin also bore responsibility for the purges which had decimated the Red Army's leadership[2]; the Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 was to demonstrate its seeming incapacity. Stalin also bore substantial responsibility for the strategic doctrine which left his forces unprepared for the defence of their soil and contributed to the confusion of the first days of crisis.[3]

He was equally responsible for the misjudgments associated with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Not only had he been the ultimate—often the sole—decision-maker. More important, when confronted with the overwhelming evidence of Hitler's preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, he chose to disbelieve it, because he did not want to face facts that would have shown him up as a failure by exposing his miscalculations—a familiar manifestation of his insecurity throughout his career. Even if he had recognized the likelihood of an eventual showdown with Hitler, he preferred to believe that the time was not yet at hand, that Hitler might make demands and perhaps present an ultimatum, but would not start an all-out war against an appeasing Stalin while fighting the British in the West.[4]

Harder to weigh, there was the legacy of demoralization and latent disloyalty that stemmed from the policies Stalin had pursued in the pre-war years. In the mixture of objective and subjective elements that account for the initial setbacks of the war, Stalin's own role was by no means negligible. In Roy Medvedev's words, the problem was the system of one-man rule combined with that one man's limitations.[5] His collapse during the first days of the war added to the disorientation, costly con-

[2] On the purges of the Red Army see e.g. John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, and Alexander Nekrich, *22 June 1941*.

[3] See e.g. Medvedev, p. 456.

[4] See, in addition to Nekrich and Medvedev, also Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" to the XX Congress of the CPSU, variously published (e.g., as Appendix IV to *Khrushchev Remembers*); and Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA*, whose evidence is most impressive but with whose conclusions this writer disagrees.

[5] Medvedev, p. 454.

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fusion and incredible casualties of the army—just how much, we may never know.[6]

Later, however, Stalin's performance as commander-in-chief improved markedly, as he regained self-assurance, gained experience and as the calibre of his advisers and their advice improved: as better-trained, younger commanders were advanced to senior positions, incompetents were shunted aside and scapegoats for failure were summarily ousted or purged.

Once he took effective command, Stalin applied himself impressively to military affairs, and his mind turned out to be more at home in dealing with the hard realities of power (military power included) than in grappling with theology and teleology, with human passions and needs.[7] He revealed an active interest in military operations and spent considerable time dealing with them, often in detail. His decisions, it seems, were at times wilful and petty; he could be as stubborn and misguided here as he was in other sectors of public policy or private behaviour; and he always inclined toward over-centralization. Yet he proved himself capable of learning, and at times he even allowed conflicting views of military commanders whom he respected—a Zhukov or a Rokossovsky—to prevail over his contrary instincts.[8] Still, on balance, there is little evidence of any creative contributions on his part to operational or strategic decisions.

His greatest positive contribution in the military field, it has been suggested,[9] lay probably in the area of organization: in directing the mobilization of resources and manpower for the war effort. Being able to make decisions alone, he could act without the delays and bargaining that mark other bureaucracies and military establishments.[10]

Stalin at the head of party and government

As the dictatorial decision-maker at the head of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party, Stalin continued essentially in his pre-war role, capable of both brutal firmness and calculated relaxation. Except for those first days after the German attack, the available evidence shows astounding compliance by his closest associates and subordinates, who rarely disputed or challenged the *Vozhd*.[11]

In the use of his immense power, Stalin exhibited the same traits which had characterized his behaviour before, often reflecting his personality

[6] See Bialer, p. 40ff; Ulam, ch. 12; Montgomery Hyde, *Stalin*; Medvedev, pp. 456–62. Krushchev's accounts must be judged to contain inaccuracies.

[7] For some references to Churchill's, Hopkins' and Montgomery's observations of Stalin's astuteness in grasping strategic plans and his knowledge of weapon characteristics, see Hyde, pp. 458, 474, 485, 493–94, and sources there cited.

[8] See, e.g., Bialer, pp. 35ff, 295–96; Ulam, pp. 543ff, 553ff, 579ff; Hyde, p. 4; S. M. Shtemenko, *The Soviet General Staff*, pp. 73ff, 110–11, 187, 211–12, 218–19, 274–76, 308.

[9] Bialer, pp. 36, 43–44.

[10] Bialer, p. 341.

[11] Bialer cites various memoirs illustrating, e.g., Molotov's and Malenkov's behaviour. See also *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 169ff, 183ff.

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needs rather than the demands of system rationality. He persisted—intuitively, one would suspect—in the familiar techniques of intimidation, intrigue, ridicule and dismissal. Later he went to new ruthless extremes, exterminating entire national republics and nominally autonomous ethnic areas, purging and resettling their populations far to the east, once he had suspected them of collaboration with the enemy. He wrote off Soviet soldiers who had fallen into German hands as traitors. When his own son, Yakov, wound up a prisoner of war, Stalin refused to exchange him for a German general; instead he arrested Yakov's wife. He sanctioned some of the most arbitrary and outrageous liquidations, such as the killing of the Polish Jewish socialist leaders, Viktor Alter and Henryk Erlich.

At the same time, Stalin characteristically proved equally capable of and adept at making unprecedented "concessions" when necessary (and just as quick at withdrawing them when possible). This applied to his war-time policy both at home and abroad. He promptly recalled to active service disgraced military commanders languishing in jails and labour camps. Under the initial blows of the German onslaught, he astutely sensed the need to appeal to all possible emotions and loyalties, all the latent commitments and the staying power of his people. While the new patriotic line—the defence of the fatherland and the evocation of the Russian historical tradition—was not entirely novel, it was now pushed to new extremes. To be sure, German behaviour in the occupied areas soon cried out for a Soviet propaganda line which took advantage of elemental reactions against the cruelties and abuses of the *Untermensch* approach—against everything the "Fritzes" came to stand for in the minds and hearts of the Soviet population.[12] Here Stalin showed uncanny insight in calling forth a new spirit, for which, at a time of crisis, he had to go to unprecedented lengths and with which, as it happened, he was eager to identify himself: he craved the role of Russian national leader, precisely (one may surmise) because he had a strong sense of inadequacy regarding his suitability for such a role.[13]

But his war-time concessions went substantially further. The familiar package included the downgrading of the Communist Party's hegemony, unprecedented praise for the Red Army and accolades for its commanders, some of whom became popular heroes (to a point where censorship intervened to avoid any rivalry with the adulation of Stalin), reconciliation with the Orthodox Church and the re-establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate, and the dissolution of the Communist International—which amounted to making a virtue of necessity at a time when the national perspective was paramount, when effective control of foreign parties had broken down, and when there were advantages to be gained by such a move in terms of the reaction abroad without incurring any costs at home. And there was a calculated, though uncertain, appeal to

[12] See Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945.*

[13] Cf. Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin As Revolutionary*, pp. 430, 433.

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the new theme of a " united front " with the Western democracies, which quite recently had still been branded as predatory imperialists and implacable foes of the Soviet regime.

Indeed, many Soviet (and some foreign) observers came to believe that there could be no way back, after the war, to the controls and coercion of the 1930s; that after a victorious war, the people—who suffered immensely and died by the million, who in uniform crawled from Stalingrad to Berlin, who now dared express in poetry and essays human emotions, compassion and tenderness such as had not been voiced in Stalin's land for many a year—could not and would not be deprived of their just rewards once the fighting ended. Defeatism and confusion yielded to a new hope. Analogously, there were communist leaders abroad (and perhaps in Russia too) who took at face value the professions of concord and the appeals to the " spirit of Teheran " that foreshadowed (as Earl Browder, for instance, came to believe) lasting inter-Allied cooperation after the war.

Stalin manipulated not only the themes (Erenburg experienced Stalin's reversal with regard to the Germans) but also their human symbols. Marshal Zhukov was celebrated so long as he was needed, only to be shunted aside once the war had passed. Diplomats like Maxim Litvinov and Ivan Maisky were ousted, brought back and again dismissed, as circumstances, in Stalin's judgment, demanded it. But Litvinov's fate is illustrative of far more than Stalin's skilful manipulation of symbols of amity with the West.

Stalin and the Allies

Maxim Litvinov, the best-known Soviet spokesman for " collective security " and pre-war cooperation with the West, was ousted as Foreign Commissar in May 1939, precisely as a signal to Hitler when Stalin began seriously negotiating for a pact with Berlin. After the German invasion, Litvinov was promptly taken out of moth-balls and made ambassador to the United States. Behind the scenes he continued to be the principal advocate of a " Western " alternative to Stalin's " two-camp " view. His withdrawal from Washington in mid-1943 (after Stalingrad, once Stalin felt he could afford a tougher stance) and his final retirement early in 1946 (when the cold war came to be recognized as such) led him more than once to remark privately—not without bitterness—on Stalin's outlook.

As he told an American newspaperman, the main cause of international tension at the end of the war was " the ideological conception prevailing here [in Moscow] that conflict between the communist and the capitalist world is inevitable." [14] On the eve of his departure from Washington, he had told Under-Secretary Sumner Welles that Stalin was completely isolated from all those who sought to convey to him some alternative

[14] Richard C. Hottelet, in *New York World Telegram*, 28 January 1952.

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picture of the world, and that Litvinov and those who reasoned like him had, in effect, been put on ice. According to Welles, remarked Litvinov, "the trouble in Russia today was that everything centred in one individual, namely, Stalin himself."[15] Later, Edgar Snow and Alexander Werth reported even more pointed remarks privately made by Litvinov concerning Stalin's disbelief in peaceful coexistence.[16]

The contrasting Stalin and Litvinov "lines" only underscore the persistence and tenacity of Stalin's own fundamental outlook on the outside world. There is no reason to think that his deeply-ingrained assumptions would or could vanish with the onset of the war. There is much to suggest that he continued to take for granted the dichotomic division of the world into friends and foes, "us" and "them."[17] In the long run, "bourgeois" America and Britain could not possibly remain friends of the Soviet state. For the time being, of course, they were welcome—indeed, much-needed allies. But the answer was given in advance to the question of what Stalin would do if and when he had to choose between banking on the fickle good will (and not very good will, at that) of the Western leaders (whom he viewed, not unreasonably, as in Churchill's case, as convinced enemies of communism of long standing) and increasing the material power and the area of territorial control of the Soviet state. It would have been astounding if it had been otherwise. That he would wish to postpone making such a choice and meanwhile profit as much as possible from the spirit of war-time amity was another matter—essentially one of tactics, timing and diplomatic technique. And it remains true that he seems quite sincerely to have found cause for concern and suspicion regarding the West. Clearly, he did not wish to precipitate a showdown with Roosevelt and Churchill: quite the opposite.

Stalin's role as one of the "Big Three" was a new one to him. If we assume that his long-range purpose was to maximize Soviet power by the combined efforts of military action (which afterwards placed his forces in control of Eastern Europe) and his dealings with his allies, his performance was, on the whole, remarkably successful. Despite its enormous losses in the war, the Soviet Union emerged from the conflict not only with vastly enhanced standing in the international community, but with greatly increased *de facto* dominion over neighbouring areas in

[15] *Foreign Relations of the United States . . . 1943*, III, pp. 522–23 (Sumner Welles).

[16] See Edgar Snow, *Journey to the Beginning* (ch. 17, "Warning from Litvinov"); and Alexander Werth, *Russia at War 1941–1945*, p. 938: "Perhaps the most diehard 'softy' was Litvinov, who remained one even as late as 1947. I had a conversation with him at the reception given by Molotov on Red Army Day in February 1947. . . . He said he was extremely unhappy about the way the cold war was getting worse and worse every day. By the end of the war, he said, Russia had had the choice of two policies: one was to 'cash in on the goodwill she had accumulated during the war in Britain and the United States.' But they (meaning Stalin and Molotov) had unfortunately chosen the other policy. Not believing that 'goodwill' could constitute the lasting basis for any kind of policy, they had decided that 'security' was what mattered most of all, and they had therefore grabbed all they could. . . ."

[17] Cf. Tucker, pp. 425–61.

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Europe and the Far East. Given the weakness and vulnerability of the Soviet Union during the war, this requires some explanation, and the answer must be sought in situational as well as personal factors. As one reads accounts of Stalin's behaviour with foreigners—be they Hopkins and Harriman, Brooke and Montgomery, or Kennan and Bohlen—one is struck by Stalin's dominant role and typical control of the situation. Except for rare instances when he was upset or unnerved (usually when he felt threatened or ridiculed), he appeared to be both self-assured and remarkably knowledgeable. Some of this was undoubtedly consummate role-playing [18]; but there was more. Stalin emerges from the memoirs of the war-time conferences as more secure and more certain of his interlocutors than his British and American opposite numbers, who were still taking his measure, testing his intentions and mood. Stalin seemed to enjoy his contacts with the capitalist " whales," which to him symbolized their acceptance of him—and thereby relieved his masked sense of inferiority. These meetings appeared to provide some welcome respite from tyranny in (to him) a rare setting of co-equality. Paradoxically, some of Stalin's success in dealing with Roosevelt and Churchill may have been due precisely to the fact that he enjoyed the sessions. He skilfully manipulated his partners (or thought he did), playing them off against each other [19] and seeking to bamboozle them. Stalin was reassured by his sense of superiority over Roosevelt and Churchill, who were at times ignorant of his gambits and were usually loath to contradict and confront him, even when they patently disagreed. Indeed, only when he realized that he could no longer " play this game " did he shift gears and adopt a tougher stance.[20]

There was, of course, an objective basis for his tactics. He had essential freedom of action in dealing with his war-time allies, being able to ignore pressures and constraints at home, including " public opinion." He knew the limits of the possible in pressing for a second front and for military aid, much as he needed both. Starting from a position of weakness, he was interested in milking the alliance for all it was worth, avoiding a crisis, if need be, by practising considerable restraint when he could expect a trade-off (e.g. over Greece) and by urging similar restraint on communists abroad (e.g. in deterring the French and Italian communists from striking for power in 1944, in urging Tito not to antagonize the Allies or their non-communist partners at home " prematurely " [21], in pressuring the Chinese communists to join a coalition government with the Kuomintang, and in keeping East Euro-

[18] See George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*, p. 248; Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950*, p. 279; Charles Bohlen, *Witness to History*, p. 142ff, 183ff; Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, pp. 69–70; Tucker, pp. 436–37.

[19] He told Roosevelt that Churchill was soft on the Germans and appealed to their common anticolonialism. In turn, he appealed to Churchill's realism and their ostensible common concern about Roosevelt's fuzziness and preoccupation with domestic politics.

[20] See Ulam, p. 611.

[21] See e.g. Djilas, and Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito*.

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pean communists from promptly embarking on collectivization of agriculture or establishing a formal monopoly of power).

Stalin was eager to extend the alliance as long as there was (to him) a reasonable prospect of a pay-off from it. Perhaps it came to an end earlier than he had hoped. But, as Litvinov had well understood, Stalin always took for granted the inevitability of an ultimate clash with the capitalist "world system."

In this regard, the "revisionist" argument in Western historiography of the wartime alliance and the origins of the Cold War misses the point. To be sure, a different policy of the Western powers might have affected the timing of the rift and the circumstances under which it occurred. But, regardless of what Roosevelt and Churchill said and did—and this goes for their subordinates as well—and regardless of who is "right" in the debates of recent years over American motives and perceptions, it is hard to conceive of *any* Western conduct that would have fundamentally altered Stalin's outlook, assumptions and strategic assessment of his temporary allies and the international "correlation of forces"—any conduct which would in effect have made a Litvinov out of Stalin.[22]

Stalin: a balance sheet

In 1939, Stalin sought to keep the Soviet Union out of the war, but to take advantage of the new fluidity in the international environment to enhance the power of his state. (In Khrushchev's later paraphrase: "For our part, we knew it would be useful to become considerably stronger at the end of the war."[23]) In the former objective he failed, just as he failed to make the most of the time which the German-Soviet Pact afforded him. In his latter objective he succeeded, perhaps beyond all expectations.

When the Germans attacked, Khrushchev later recalled, Stalin despaired hysterically, anticipating that "all Lenin has created we have lost forever." Even at the end of the war, in a moment of candour, he raised his glass in a toast to the Russian people: any other people might have told its leaders at the time of the German attack, "Go!"—but not his people, and he had vindicated their trust. . . . He, indeed, provided the authority and leadership that led from the outskirts of Moscow to the raising of the Red flag over the Reichstag in Berlin in May 1945.

It would be as erroneous to argue that the Soviet Union was victorious *because* of Stalin's leadership as it would be to maintain that Russia won *despite* Stalin's role, though there is some truth in both propositions. Stalin found unwitting help in mobilizing the Soviet people for the war effort in the behaviour of Hitler's men; and in securing his gains he had found in Roosevelt and Churchill allies who sought to strike bargains, accommodate, feel their way as they groped for a better sense of Stalin's

[22] See also Philip J. Jaffe, "The Cold War Revisionists and What They Omit." *Survey*, No. 89 (Autumn 1973).

[23] *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 224.

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ambitions and intentions. But achieve the victory Stalin did—and soon was also to claim credit for himself for what his generals, his armies, and his people had done.

Whether or not the political price he paid for the gains he won—both in Eastern Europe and in dealing with the US and UK—was in the long-term Soviet national interest, is, of course, another matter. The end of the war brought no respite at home and abroad. From the devastation of the fighting, Stalin's Russia moved on to a new phase of tension and conflict at home and abroad—to a new stage of Stalinism, properly speaking.

Allied Leadership in the Second World War: Churchill

David Dilks

CHURCHILL began his career as Prime Minister from a narrow base of power, personal and international. He took office in the most dire circumstances, but with a sublime confidence in the cause and his own capacity, feeling that all his past life had been "but a preparation for this hour and for this trial. . . . I thought I knew a good deal about it all and I was sure I should not fail. . . . I slept soundly and I had no need for cheering dreams. Facts are better than dreams." [1]

For the first time, Britain had a Minister of Defence with executive authority, giving orders to the Service Ministers. Churchill had direct access to the Chiefs of Staff, whose function was to advise whether proposed operations were militarily sound; if so, whether they were technically feasible; and if feasible whether the resources could be found. Churchill's method was to concentrate on a few subjects and to hammer them out in personal conference. He supervised in detail the battle of the Atlantic and the construction of the floating harbours which made possible the landings of 1944. Although preoccupied with the detail of the moment, he felt himself to be acting under the gaze of the centuries. The sense of history, fortified by prolonged study, was not simply an element which he brought, among others, to the contemplation of each problem. Rather, it was a part of his fibre: he was incapable of looking at an issue except in its historical setting.

Churchill's disbelief in the wisdom of professional soldiers had been powerfully reinforced by the first world war. The military advice

[1] W. S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, p. 532 (Reprint Society edition).

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available to the British Government in the second world war was, on the whole, a good deal better than that tendered to Asquith and Lloyd George, and the damaging public rows between the military and the politicians did not recur. It was a well-articulated machine, excellently serviced. Churchill's Cabinet had, on balance, less ability than that of Lloyd George, but that is not to say that Churchill deliberately surrounded himself with ciphers. With no time for those who grovelled, he tested everyone mercilessly. He had courage of the highest order, not the unthinking, almost unconscious, courage of granite types, but a courage the more rare since every reverse hit him hard. It might be said of Churchill, as of Chatham, that no one ever left his Cabinet without feeling himself a braver man. Churchill and his colleagues faced, without blenching, decisions of terrible consequence. When the whole basis of Britain strategy was upset in the summer of 1940, the British shelled the French fleet. Despite the fear of imminent invasion, Churchill supported Eden's advice in the summer of 1940 to send half of the available British armour to Egypt. With self-confidence and honesty, he decreed that he would set down all his directives in writing day by day. "My object," he said in that summer, "is to preserve the maximum initiative and energy. Every night I try myself by court martial to see if I have done anything effective during the day. I don't mean just pawing the ground—anyone can go through the motions—but something effective." [2]

This was not a time when sober calculation alone was needed, but rather a time for daring, eloquence, reduction of complicated issues to their simple essence. In all those respects Churchill excelled. He hardly did himself justice to say that it was the nation that had the lion's heart and he who had the luck to be called upon to give the roar. During those weeks in the summer of 1940, Churchill built up a position of public confidence and parliamentary support which was never seriously challenged during the war. Trade unions had accepted direction of labour; the property of the citizens was placed at the disposal of the state; and while British conduct of the war was often determined by geography and by lack of resources, it was little affected by pressures of public opinion. The government was strong enough to ignore even the well-supported campaign of 1942 and 1943 for the opening of a Second Front in Europe.

The British had long been accustomed to fight their wars on a narrow margin of strength. When the French army collapsed in 1940, there collapsed with it the strategic assumptions upon which British policy in Europe was based. In the last week of May, the Cabinet considered a French request that Mussolini should be bought off. When the Foreign Secretary (Lord Halifax) asked whether, if the Prime Minister were satisfied that "matters vital to the independence of this country"

[2] J. R. Colville, in J. W. Wheeler-Bennett (ed.), *Action This Day*, p. 112.

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would be unaffected, he would discuss terms, Churchill said that he would be:

> thankful to get out of our present difficulties on such terms, provided we retained the essentials and the elements of our vital strength, *even at the cost of some cession of territory.*

And at a later meeting Churchill said again:

> If Herr Hitler was prepared to make peace on the terms of the restoration of German colonies and the overlordship of Central Europe, that was one thing. But it was quite unlikely that he would make any such offer.

Churchill added that while he would not join France in asking for terms, he would be prepared to consider them if told of them.[3] Here was Churchill, of all people, prepared to think of a peace which would inevitably leave Germany master of Europe and would also involve the loss of some British territory. The traditional belief that Churchill, from the moment of his accession as Prime Minister, was determined to fight until the whole of Europe was liberated can no longer be sustained in its pure form.

THOUGH he urged departments ceaselessly to make life more tolerable for the ordinary citizen, Churchill normally left domestic business to others: in the summer of 1940 to Chamberlain and later to Sir John Anderson. Because he had to deal constantly with Roosevelt and Stalin, who controlled the policies of their countries, Churchill treated foreign affairs as his concern. He dwelt on terms of close intimacy and almost instinctive agreement with Anthony Eden, who often played in his sphere a restraining rôle somewhat similar to that exercised in military matters by General Brooke and the other Chiefs of Staff. Whereas Churchill and Eden worked in continuous consultation, Roosevelt and Hull did not. Problems of communication within the United States administration were well known to the British and had to be accepted by them. In all probability, no more serviceable instrument for ensuring a meeting of minds than the frequent telegrams and personal meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill could have been devised. All the same, these methods had their disadvantages, for they encouraged a belief in Washington that British policy was no more than Churchill's policy. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, who secured a more complete unification of military effort than has ever been achieved by two great nations at war before or since, had no counterpart in the political sphere, a fact which enhanced the importance of the personal link between Churchill and the President.

Churchill sent to Roosevelt, in a little under 5 years, more than a 1,000 telegrams and received over 800. They met on 10 occasions during

[3] Meetings of 26 and 27 May 1940, W.M. (40) 1939, Cab. 65/13, Public Record Office.

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the war, though never in Britain. Churchill treated Roosevelt with respect, loved his gaiety and high spirits, admired his capacity for balancing the internal pressures within the United States, and never ceased to emphasise how much Britain owed to America. Roosevelt, abnormally sensitive to the aspirations of others and with a rare gift for making good by the exercise of imagination the deficiencies of his own experience, had a far less powerful sense of history than Churchill. He was more confident that the future could be moulded, less often a prey to bouts of apprehension. By no means did they always agree, but it is easy to magnify the importance of their differences, particularly before 1944. Churchill felt genuine pleasure when Roosevelt telegraphed to him: "It is fun to be in the same decade with you."

The Prime Minister's immediate object in 1940 and 1941 was to prevent the British Isles from being invaded and to do Germany the maximum of damage. Not for an instant did he relax his stalking of the United States, in which pursuit he could curb even his own impetuous and ardent nature. To him, the supreme fact of the nineteenth century was that the United States and the British Empire were found to speak the same language. "What is the good of that," he used to say, "if we cannot put our differences plainly to each other?" He felt a sense of deep underlying unities which bound the United States, Britain and the Commonwealth, and, despite the circumstances, a sense of fulfilled destiny when the United States entered the war: "When I survey their resources I cannot believe there is any other fact in the whole world which can compare with that. That is what I have dreamed of, aimed at and worked for, and now it is come to pass."

Understandably enough, Churchill used to say that he found the strain of war greater in 1942 than in the two previous years. When Tobruk fell in June, the news was given to him by Roosevelt, who simply said—which Churchill never forgot—"what can we do to help?" The Prime Minister, wounded and humiliated by the event, did not flinch for a moment. With characteristic resourcefulness, he used this unexpected crisis to argue that North Africa should constitute the Second Front. Roosevelt agreed to divert tanks to Egypt, and Britain owed a great deal to his insistence in that summer that the weight of American effort must remain in Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff were adamant against an operation across the Channel in 1942. The decision to proceed with *Torch* probably, but not necessarily, meant the postponement of *Overlord* until 1944. When we recall by how narrow a margin *Overlord* succeeded even then, in circumstances far more favourable to the Allies than any that could have prevailed in 1942 or 1943, this may be accounted one of Churchill's prime contributions to the winning of the war. Because of the special relationship with Roosevelt, Churchill was able to secure a gentleman's agreement to share information about the development of the atom bomb. The United States was to set up the research plant and proceed with all

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speed. The essential facts were known only to a handful of people in London. Numerous difficulties arose between then and the summer of 1943, when Hopkins successfully urged upon the President that he had committed himself to Churchill and must now honour the obligation. This, too, was a contribution of prime importance, not only to the ending of the war in the Far East (though that consequence could not be foreseen) but for the strength of the United States in the post-war period. There was no one else on the British side, certainly no scientist, who could have secured it.

With the tyrant in the Kremlin, by turns morose and genial, Churchill's relations were very different. His personality and eloquence lost much of their force when tediously translated into Russian. The British could not easily forget that while they had been fighting for their lives, Russia had been supplying Germany with the raw materials for her war machine. Even in December 1941, when the sound of the German guns could be heard at the very gates of Moscow, Stalin pressed upon Eden Russia's territorial demands. "I thought," he said, "that the Atlantic Charter was directed against those people who were trying to establish world dominion. It now looks as if the Charter was directed against the USSR."[4] The record does not suggest that Churchill had, in the latter half of the war, a consistent view of an overwhelming danger from Russia. His first object remained the defeat of Germany, and although he minuted to the Chiefs of Staff as early as September 1943 about the importance of having a force ready to move into Greece, and wrote to the Foreign Secretary in May 1944 about the "brute issues" developing between the Allies and Russia, he realised well enough that most areas of East and Central Europe must fall under Russian domination. By the latter part of 1944, the military balance inside the coalition had altered. Until the middle of that year, Britain and the Commonwealth had more divisions in contact with the enemy than had the United States. By the spring of 1945, only a quarter of the forces invading Germany from the west were British.

At Moscow in October 1944, Churchill went far to meet Russian demands about Poland. He railed bitterly at Mikolajczyk and apparently believed Stalin when the latter said in a long talk between the two of them that he and Molotov were the only two of those he worked with who were favourable to dealing "softly" with Mikolajczyk. "I am sure," Churchill telegraphed to his colleagues in London, "there are strong pressures in the background both party and military." Because no one could foresee how quickly the atom bomb would be ready for use, Churchill attached the highest importance to Russia's professed determination to join in the war against Japan as soon as Germany should be defeated. He told the Cabinet that he and Stalin had "talked with an ease, freedom and intimacy never before attained between our two

[4] Earl of Avon, *The Reckoning*, p. 296.

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countries. Stalin has made several expressions of personal regard which I feel sure were sincere. . . ." [5]

Just before they set off for Yalta, Churchill remarked to Eden that the end of the war in the Far East, which might be "procured by the mere fact of a Russian declaration against Japan, would undoubtedly save us many thousands of millions of pounds." The surrender to Stalin over Poland, for that is the only word which will fit the facts, was not, however, dictated simply by a calculation of interest in the Far East and a natural and proper determination to shorten the war. During the bargaining at Yalta, the Prime Minister said that he put his trust in Stalin's declaration that he too sought an independent, free Poland. Churchill told Parliament afterwards of the impression he had brought back from the Conference, namely, that Stalin and the Russian leaders wished to live in honourable friendship and equality with the Western democracies. More significantly, perhaps, he said to the Cabinet that he felt sure that so long as Stalin lasted, Anglo-Russian friendship could be maintained. He had been impressed, when a point had been several times insisted upon, to notice that Stalin had given way. Admitting that no one could tell whether the pledge to a truly free Poland would be honoured, he added: "poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I am wrong about Stalin." [6]

At Yalta, Eden and Churchill had found themselves on almost every contentious question without American support. Hopkins records that both fought like tigers for France. Roosevelt negotiated, without Churchill's knowledge, an agreement about the Far East which could not be reconciled with the Atlantic Charter and which Churchill felt that he must nevertheless sign in order to retain some influence in Far Eastern affairs. It is quite true that Churchill returned from Yalta with many doubts in his mind: "I have not the slightest intention of being cheated over Poland, not even if we go to the verge of war with Russia," and again, "what will lie between the white snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover?" All the same, his admiration for Stalin persisted. Even at Potsdam he was saying to Eden: "I like that man" and Eden, deeply anxious to place the negotiation on a more realistic basis, retorted: "I am filled with admiration of Stalin's handling of you." [7] This produced some impression. At Yalta, the cement of the coalition, fear of an overwhelming common danger, was already cracking; at Potsdam it had gone. It is easy enough to understand the conviction that relations between Russia and the West must somehow be preserved, even at a high price, and that Russia must be induced to play a full part in the new international organization; it is easier still to judge with the benefit

[5] Prime Minister to War Cabinet, 17 October 1944, Premier 3/355/13, Public Record Office.

[6] Dr Dalton's diary, 23 February 1945; Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

[7] Colville, op. cit. p. 93; Avon, op. cit. p. 545.

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of hindsight. One interpretation which the evidence will not, however, bear is of an implacable hostility on the part of Churchill or the British Government to Russian ambitions, and of a persistent and far-sighted desire, thwarted only by American blindness, to keep Russia at bay further to the East. In short, Churchill's view of Russian policy, though more realistic than the President's, was a fluctuating rather than a settled one.

Conscious of the differences in position and in strength between Russia, the United States and Great Britain, Churchill managed by force of personality, by eloquence and by deep knowledge to hold his own. "Stalin and the President," he said at the time of Yalta, "can do what they like, whereas in a few months' time I may find myself in the street." [8] Churchill deliberately deferred to the United States in many matters and was always hesitant to use up his stock of goodwill with the President by telegraphing on questions which he deemed to be of secondary importance. All the same, he held out successfully for a north-western zone of occupation in Germany, about the future of India, relations with Argentina, British control of Greece, the percentage agreement; he battled, with a good deal of stiffening from Eden, for a recognition of de Gaulle's position and for France's admission to the control commission for Germany; he contested what he rightly regarded as American illusions about the might of China. Because he concentrated so wholeheartedly upon the conduct of the war, he paid insufficient heed to domestic issues and especially to the social revolution which was being prepared in Britain. He committed himself unthinkingly, though temporarily, to the Morgenthau plan and failed to follow with close attention the proceedings of the European Advisory Commission.

Certainly Churchill intended doing his best to keep the American Army in Europe after 1945, though at the moment of his departure from power the prospects looked distinctly uncertain. He knew that Britain would depend for years on America's economic help. It is unlikely that he would have made any substantial difference to the settlement reached at Potsdam by a threat to risk a "public break" over the concession of the Western Neisse frontier to Poland, for Britain was militarily weak in relation to her two great allies; she was bankrupt, the United States was unconvinced, and Russia was in possession of Central and Eastern Europe. It was equally unlikely that the British and the Americans would have been prepared to use their possession of the atomic bomb as a serious bargaining weapon, although its perfection at that moment went far to nullify the advantage which Russia had fought for, the glacis or rampart of small states with which she had surrounded herself on her European frontiers. Nor is it certain that the seizure of Vienna or Prague by the Allied armies in the summer of 1945 would have prevented communism from spreading into large areas of

[8] Lord Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival*, p. 223.

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Europe. It is much more probable that even if Prague had been taken by General Eisenhower's armies, they would have retreated in due course and the situation in 1948 would have been little different.

CHURCHILL took far less interest in the Pacific theatre than in Europe and the Middle East. The whole Government realised the position of terrible weakness in the Far East, and it may well be that Churchill should have tried harder to restrain the United States from economic action against Japan in the summer of 1941. By then, Hitler had attacked Russia, and the Cabinet had to decide whether the tanks and aircraft should go to the Far East or to Stalin. They feared that a collapse of Russia would mean Hitler's complete mastery over Europe, whereas the fall of Singapore could be retrieved after Hitler had been defeated. Churchill was never prepared to sacrifice Egypt, partly because that was the one place from which the British could engage substantial axis forces on land. Whether the fall of Malaya and Singapore could have been prevented must remain a subject of debate. At all events, the price was for the British a severe one. Though they regained their territories in 1945, the standing of the British Empire east of Suez never recovered from defeat by the Japanese and everyone knew that the British could have hardly returned, save in the baggage train of the United States.

The peripheral strategy of indirect approach was habitual to Churchill, and, indeed, to many of the British. Graven upon his mind was the memory of the slaughter of the first world war. The second, a much longer war, was fought at a much lesser cost in British and Commonwealth lives. The metaphor with which he sought to persuade Stalin, of a crocodile with a soft underbelly, proved hopelessly optimistic. Whatever else the Allied armies found in Italy in 1943 and 1944, they certainly discovered no soft underbelly ready for the slitting. All the same, Churchill did not want an Allied invasion of the Balkans and it is not true that the British undermined *Overlord*, although they regretted the diversion of resources from Italy to an attack on Southern France in 1944. " If . . . ", Churchill had written to the Chiefs of Staff in the autumn of 1942:

> we move northward into Europe, a new situation must be surveyed. The flank attack may become the main attack and the main attack a holding operation in the early stages. Our Second Front will, in fact, comprise both the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of Europe, and we can push either right handed, left handed or both handed as our resources and circumstances permit.[9]

The United States Government held the British firmly in 1943 and 1944 to the agreed strategy, and no evidence has yet been forthcoming that the war would have been won more quickly or more economically

[9] J. R. M. Butler, *Grand Strategy*, Vol. III, pp. 637–38.

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by any alternative method, or that it would have been shortened if the declaration about unconditional surrender had not been made.

It is well known that Churchill prodded up the Chiefs of Staff ceaselessly, and that much time was wasted in the consideration of futile or impossible enterprises. That the system established in May 1940 survived in all essentials till the end of the war, and that the often strained relations between Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff did not lead to resignations, owes much to the tact and personality of General Ismay. His task was to interpret the Chiefs of Staff to Churchill, and him to them. Had he carried Churchill's messages to them verbatim, or vice versa, there would have been many explosions of atomic proportions. Ismay often felt that he ought somehow to save the Chiefs of Staff from more of the

> unnecessary, aggravating, and sometimes humiliating burdens that were thrust upon their already overloaded shoulders. But I found that if I tried to apply the brake too hard and too often, I merely made matters worse. The trouble was that our beloved Chief regarded any disagreement with his views as a *personal* affront; he never understood that if you [General Brooke]—and I in a more lowly field—had started saying we agreed with him when in fact we didn't, we would have been of no more use to him.[10]

It is fair to add to this that Ismay never wavered from the belief that while the Chiefs of Staff proved magnificent watchdogs, there was none of them "within lengths and lengths and lengths of Winston." Churchill himself hardly appreciated at the time or afterwards how deeply some of his thrusts had cut, and how wearing were the burdens which he laid upon others. All the same, there is no evidence that the Chiefs of Staff were endowed with a military wisdom much superior to Churchill's. As he observed with a chuckle, "they may say I lead them up the garden path, but at every turn of the path they have found delectable fruits and wholesome vegetables." The oft-repeated assertion that no major military operation was undertaken without the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff has to be qualified; for instance, it was Churchill and Eden who insisted on the despatch of two capital ships to the Far East in the autumn of 1941, overriding the objections of the Admiralty.

ALMOST everyone who knew Churchill intimately believed that he was a great man. His company and conversation had the quality of champagne and hardly a meeting passed without the utterance of some memorable or entertaining phrase. When it was reported that an Opposition leader for whom he did not much care was unwell, he grinned and said: "Nothing trivial, I trust." Lady Astor, exasperated after a long argument, snapped out: "Winston, if I were your wife I would put poison in your coffee," to which he rejoined instantly, "Nancy, if

[10] Ismay to Brooke, 25 June 1946; Ismay papers, IV/ALA/ID, King's College, London.

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I were your husband I should drink it." He suffered much from General de Gaulle and used to say with a sigh that of all the many crosses he had to bear, the cross of Lorraine was the heaviest. Refused permission to fly from England to North Africa, de Gaulle declared: "*Enfin je suis prisonnier. Bientôt vous m'enverrez à l'iloman.*" Not until this had been repeated three times did Churchill understand that "*l'iloman*" was General de Gaulle's rendering for "the Isle of Man," whereupon he replied in his best French: "*Non, mon Général, pour vous, très distingué, toujours la Tower of London.*" An item arose in the business of the Cabinet about the Virgin Islands, and a member asked the Prime Minister if he knew where they were. "Not exactly, but I trust they lie at a respectable distance from the Isle of Man." When, soon after the liquidation of the Chief of the Russian secret police, Beria, Malenkov was forced to resign, the Prime Minister of Australia said: "I expect he has gone to Siberia." "Oh no," said Sir Winston, "more likely he has gone to join Beria."

The Conservative Party was widely expected to win the election of 1945. The declarations from the first ten or twelve constituencies came through one morning in July while Churchill was in his bath. Captain Pim, who looked after his map room, read out the results. "This may well be a landslide," Churchill said, "and they have a perfect right to kick us out. That is democracy. That is what we have been fighting for. Hand me my towel." [11]

Churchill had brought to the conduct of the war resourcefulness, concentration, thoroughness, Napoleonic memory, self-confidence, political insight. Britain ended the war exhausted and with enormous debts. She had mobilised at least as fully as any other nation. She now had to feed and sustain fifty million people living in an area one third the size of Texas. The outcome, at least in the short run, looked disappointing. But the critical achievement was to have held out in 1940 and 1941. By 1945, the United States was prepared to uphold Britain economically, and to shoulder burdens far greater than those which had been borne by the British before the war. Incontestably, Churchill had made mistakes, some of them serious but none of them fatal. An artist through and through, eager for personal glory, self-confessedly ambitious not for vulgar triumph but for honourable fame, Churchill had displayed a range of qualities which no other potential leader of Britain during the second world war could begin to match. For such exceptional talents, a heavy price had to be paid not only by others but by their possessor. He once observed:

> to hold the leadership of a party or nation with dignity and authority requires that the leader's quality and message meet not only the need but the mood of both.[12]

[11] *Sir Winston Churchill: Tributes broadcast by the B.B.C.*, p. 60.

[12] Cited by Lady V. Bonham-Carter in "Winston Churchill—As I Know Him," in *Winston Spencer Churchill*, ed. Sir J. Marchant, p. 155.

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That Churchill did supremely well in the second world war; and since not even historians can sit upon the fence all the time, I had better confess that his achievement seems to me the most notable in the modern political history of Great Britain.

Comment

George F. Kennan

THERE is no question as to the overwhelming importance of the three personalities to whom the papers of Professors Dallek, Dallin and Dilks are addressed, as determining factors in the unfolding of the second world war; and it is indeed a good time, nearly a decade after the death of the last of the three, to re-examine their respective roles.

Let me first say something about each of the papers.

In his paper on Franklin Roosevelt, Mr Dallek has made the interesting point that FDR was a man who reflected, rather than created, that consensus of American opinion, against the background of which he felt himself obliged to act. This is a very valuable insight; and it is a point of great importance when it comes to judging his wartime leadership. Roosevelt had, unquestionably, a masterful understanding of the temper of American opinion; and few presidents, if any, have been so much concerned never to get too far behind it or ahead of it.

This did not mean, however—and I am sure Mr Dallek would agree—that FDR did not have, in the back of his mind, his own independent purposes, which in some instances deviated quite extensively from the prevailing consensus; nor did it mean that he did not exert himself to influence public opinion in the direction he wanted it to take. His fireside chats, delivered, as I recall it, over the radio on Sunday nights, probably represented the most effective direct effort to influence the public mind conducted by any president in modern times, unless an exception be made for Woodrow Wilson at the height of his power. But in all of this, as Mr Dallek correctly intimates, he was always very careful not to make it too evident that it was his purpose to persuade and to change the opinions of his listeners. As the clever and skilful politician that he was, he usually contrived, rather, to create the impression that he was simply filling his listeners in, like a friendly neighbour, on the problems with which he found himself confronted and the developments which he had encountered on his path, while sharing with them all the more essential assumptions.

I have the impression, moreover, that in major instances he influenced public opinion less through the power of his own words than through the quiet shaping, in a manner conducive to his own purposes, of the environmental factors, the external factors, in which the formulation of

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wartime policy had to proceed. Mr Dallek mentions these factors and their importance with respect to the development of public opinion, but he does not emphasize (and here I would perhaps go further than he does) the extent to which these factors were in some instances shaped and influenced by Roosevelt himself. The outstanding example of this was the approach to our participation in the war with Japan and, through it, the war in Europe. Opinions differ on this point; but I think it is clear that, by 1940, FDR had come to a point where he actually wished to see us enter both of these wars. But his approach, in each case, was oblique—designed, whether consciously or not, to force the two adversaries to move against us in such a way as to make it possible to hold that we had no choice—that we had to take up the gauntlet thrown before us. Hence the destroyer deal and the steadily increasing naval role played by American naval vessels in the North Atlantic in the period prior to Pearl Harbour; and hence, even more importantly, the policy pursued towards Japan over the years and months, and particularly the weeks, before Pearl Harbour. Opinions will differ, of course, about this; but surely it cannot be denied that had FDR been determined to avoid war with the Japanese if at all possible, he would have conducted American policy quite differently, particularly in the final period, than he actually did. He would not, for example, have made an issue over Japanese policies in China, where the Japanese were preparing, anyway, to undertake a partial withdrawal for reasons of their own, and where this sort of American pressure was not really essential. He would not have tried to starve the Japanese navy of oil. And he would have settled down to some hard and realistic dealings with the Japanese, instead of letting them be deluged and frustrated by the cloudy and unintelligible moralisms of Cordell Hull.

With the Germans, similarly, had Roosevelt seriously wished to avoid involvement in the war, policy could have been formulated in quite a different way during the first two years of the war. Ribbentrop, I expect, was not too far wrong when he said to our Chargé d'Affaires, in handing him the German declaration of war, four days after Pearl Harbour: "Your President has desired this war, now he has it."

I am not criticizing the President for his desire to enter the war in Europe; there were, I think, powerful reasons for our doing so. But I continue to regret that curious quirk in the American political mentality which apparently makes it impossible for us to enter by our own deliberate decision great wars which we later discover, once we are in them, to be of the most apocalyptic importance. And I must say that if it really was Roosevelt's feeling that we ought to enter the European war, then to manoeuvre us first into a war with Japan, or even to permit us to become involved in such a war, was the worst possible way to do it. For the settlement of affairs in the Pacific, as the British correctly recognized, could have waited until after we had dealt with Hitler. But by involving ourselves first with Japan, we tied up in the Pacific war resources which, if expended first in Europe, would have enabled us

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to finish that war considerably sooner and to meet the Russians considerably farther East on that continent. This would obviously have meant that the price we would have had to pay the Russians for their assistance in the war could have been much smaller than it actually was.

The truth is—there is no avoiding it—that Franklin Roosevelt, for all his charm and for all his skill as a political leader, was, when it came to foreign policy, a very superficial man, ignorant, dilettantish, with a severely limited intellectual horizon. One has only to glance at the list of ideas he had in the thirties and then during the war for solving his various problems of external policy, as Mr Dallek has listed them. The pre-war schemes for consultative pacts and disarmament agreements, summit conferences and quarantines were as unrealistic as were the concepts of unconditional surrender, the "four policemen" and the Morgenthau plan for Germany by which his war-time policy was informed. Either these schemes were cynically designed to appeal to a series of opinionated and unenlightened domestic lobbies, without serious regard to their external effect, or they bore witness to a very poor understanding of international affairs on the part of their author.

Roosevelt knew nothing about Russia, and very little about Europe. This in itself would not have been so bad. What was worse was that he did not seek or value the advice of those who did know something about these places and could have told him something about them. His closest adviser, Harry Hopkins, knew initially no more than he did; and while Hopkins gradually learned something—about Russia, at least—there may have been some truth in what Bill Bullitt used to say about him: that by the time he died he had begun to become an educated man, but it was the most expensive education the United States ever gave to any one person.

So I cannot speak with enthusiasm about FDR as a wartime leader. He may have done reasonably well in his contacts with the American generals and admirals and thus with his handling of the strictly military aspects of the war. It seems to me that he also did fairly well in handling his liaison with Churchill and assuring a reasonably smooth cooperation with the British, despite his dislike of his own British relatives, and despite the angry differences between the military leaders of the two countries. His strength as a wartime leader lay outstandingly in his great buoyancy of spirit, his refusal to be discouraged and his ability to remain at the centre of things, to make the White House the throbbing centre of American life and of America's war effort. But on the main aspects of wartime strategy—the involving of the country simultaneously with Japan and Germany, and the planning for the post-war future—it seems to me that he fundamentally misjudged the situations with which he was faced and found only very costly solutions—workable, no doubt, from the standpoint of the domestic politics of the moment, but costly and not far-seeing—to the problems these situations posed.

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WINSTON CHURCHILL was, of course, a bird of a wholly different feather. He is so well described in Mr Dilks's admirable paper that there is little I can add to it. Of the three, he was the one whose task, as it seems to me, was the simplest and most straightforward, if by no means the easiest. He was there, despite the occasional hesitations Mr Dilks has described, to prevent the Germans from completing their conquest of the continent and from arriving at a position from which they could easily conquer England. He had no need to look much further, or to the side. All that he valued and loved was at stake in this contest. He had the British people behind him. He had no ethnic minorities to plague him about the problems of the peace, as Roosevelt did—no background of bloody intrigue and domestic slaughter to make him fearful, as Stalin was, for his safety at the hands of his own comrades-in-arms.

The struggle was a hard one. It must have tried to the utmost the great stoutness of heart that was Churchill's most magnificent personal attribute. But the struggle was fought tenaciously and won, in a peculiarly British way, under his leadership. Churchill could lay his office down, at the end, not only with the sense of having done his duty, but with the reasonable confidence that without him the struggle would not have been won at all.

His country had never recovered—perhaps has not fully recovered even today—from the great sacrifices of the first world war. Churchill never realized, I suspect, how deeply the England he loved had already been undermined even before the Nazi onslaught began. But he gave that England a second chance to recover—a chance it might otherwise never have had. This was all he could do, and it was tremendous.

No more than Roosevelt was Churchill able to understand Stalin or Russia. For Churchill, as for his American counterpart, the mixture of quiet affability and reasonableness (when it suited his purposes) with the most extraordinary capacity for dissembling, the most exquisite cunning, and the most brutal, pitiless vindictiveness that made up the character of this incredible man were probably beyond imagination, certainly beyond recognition. Nor was the political system that lay behind Stalin easily intelligible to a Western statesman. Great as was Stalin's personal power, Churchill probably over-rated it. He did not understand Stalin's own dependence upon the terrible police system he had created. He had little idea of the brutal xenophobic viciousness of that system and the power it had, Stalin or no Stalin, to shape much of Soviet behaviour, especially in all matters affecting relations with foreigners. He appears to have had little idea of the horror that Soviet rule, particularly in its initial phases, spelled for the peoples of Eastern Europe. No better than Roosevelt did he understand that behind the common euphemism of "friendly governments," to which, as everyone then liked to say, the Russians were entitled in Eastern Europe in the post-war future, there lurked in reality government not just by representative local figures "friendly" to Russia, but government by Soviet agents, sometimes

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right out of the Moscow police headquarters—and government by the methods of what was then called the NKVD.

This ignorance was understandable. Never so much as in war-time is the wish father to the thought. It was probably too much to expect of either Churchill or Roosevelt that they should refrain from idealizing their Russian ally. It was too much to expect that they should recognize the full extent to which their association with and their dependence on him would compromise and vitiate their victory—that they should recognize that it would make hollow the meaning of the peace, inserting a new adversary in the place of the old one—but this time, an adversary who was, fortunately, further away. Still, the fact remains that Russia, and all that concerned the interpretation of that country and its meaning as an ally, was the point at which Churchill's great sense of history appeared to fail him. Not that he—or Roosevelt either, for that matter—could have done much more than they did to prevent the Russian conquest of half of Europe. That was a function and consequence of Western weakness in the pre-war period, and of America's own simultaneous involvement with Japan. But the things they said about Russia could have been different; and they could, by virtue of that difference, have stimulated fewer false hopes and accepted, for themselves and their countries, a smaller responsibility for the secondary tragedy they were unable to prevent.

WHAT, then, of Stalin—this great human enigma of our time? I think Mr Dallin has brought out with admirable clarity the ambivalence and the contradictions that characterized his war-time leadership, as they did so much of his political career in general.

It is important, I think, to bear in mind that at least until the return of the Soviet government to Moscow in the spring of 1943, after its flight to Kuibyshev, Stalin's main reaction to the war, and his main concern—first in trying to avoid it and then in his conducting of it—was fear for his own political position, and that meant, of course, for his very life, at home. Ever since 1936, when he observed the reaction of the Western powers to the entry of the Germans into the Rhineland, he had known that the final thrust of Nazi expansionism would be towards the East, and that the Western powers could not be counted on to save him. This filled him with terror. The Japanese were pressing him hard on the Manchurian and Mongolian frontiers; and he doubted the ability of the Soviet forces to cope simultaneously with both threats—or, for that matter, even with Germany alone. He had vividly in mind, I am sure, the lessons of the Brest-Litovsk crisis of 1918. He remembered only too well how the strains of the German advance into Russia at that time had split the Party and had threatened Lenin's position. If Lenin's position could be shaken in this way, his own was even more fragile and vulnerable. He knew how terribly he had compressed the spring of fear and hatred of himself within the Party by his reckless purges of the

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preceding years. He thought it practically out of the question that his personal position, and therefore his life, could survive an unsuccessful war against these two terrible external adversaries. And he was sure that his comrades, or military leaders, or both, would take advantage of this adversity to make an end to him.

For this reason, his entire policy from 1937 on was one of avoiding, in any way possible, a military conflict with the Germans. While permitting Litvinov to go on carrying until 1939 the pro-Western and anti-Nazi policy (because he always liked to have two strings to his bow), Stalin manoeuvred cautiously and delicately from 1937 to 1939 for a deal with the Germans that would buy them off and turn the point of their spear westward. He thought he had achieved this in the Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, which unleashed the war and set the Germans against the Western powers. But the easy German victories in the spring of 1940 were a terrible blow to him. A Germany which had conquered most of Western Europe with only minimal losses was now again in a position to turn its full force to the East.

In vain, Stalin now squirmed to avert the disaster. He succeeded in 1941 in buying off the Japanese, by encouraging them to look to the South Pacific for their next wave of expansion. But with Hitler he failed. When Molotov met Hitler in November 1940, Stalin overplayed his hand. Molotov, under his orders, asked for too much and succeeded only, had he known it at the time, in persuading Hitler that he could not afford to leave the Russian army intact and in position on his flank, as he carried out his intended advance to the Mediterranean.

From that time on, the die was cast. In desperation, Stalin refused to permit suitable defensive dispositions, fearing that if he allowed them, he would only provoke the attack he dreaded. And when the attack came, he saw his personal fate sealed and fell into the panic and apathy that Mr Dallin describes.

But there was, as it turned out, no one in Stalin's immediate entourage who was capable of seizing, or dared to seize, the sceptre of leadership that now dangled, momentarily, before them all. In this sense, it may be said that the purges of the late 1930s, removing almost everyone in his entourage of the older Bolshevik generation who had leadership qualities or any political prestige at all, had now paid off. When Stalin saw this, he perceived a ray of hope, regained spirit and self-confidence, and addressed himself, in the manner we have just heard described, to the conduct of the war. Here, once more, all his resourcefulness, his political skill, his ruthless will, his habit of power and his very considerable command of detail were brought into play. He contrived to mingle these qualities successfully with the outraged patriotic feelings of great portions of the Soviet population—with that deeply-ingrained Russian instinct of resistance to the foreign heretic that has never failed to burst out in the face of military incursions from without. And you know the outcome.

It is impossible, as Mr Dallin has also pointed out, to determine in

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these circumstances how much of the Russian victory occurred *because* of Stalin, and how much *in spite of* him. It is my personal view that this victory, like all other successes under Stalin's rule, was vastly more costly than it needed to be. For the collapse of the Russian armies under the initial German attack he was certainly outstandingly responsible. It was he who had had the generals shot, he who had wasted half a million men against the Finns, he who had forbidden any adequate defensive preparations as the German attack became clearly imminent. Even now in 1942, after the first war winter, after the stabilization of the front and his own psychic recovery, he pursued the war with a wholly unnecessary wastage of human life and cruelty against his own people. He put valuable generals into hopeless positions and then had them shot for failing to cope with impossible tasks. Whole armies were lost in encirclements that could certainly have been avoided. By his heartlessness towards those members of the Russian armed forces who fell into German hands and became prisoners of war, Stalin made himself responsible for the tragedy of the Vlasov movement, and broke the hearts and the bodies of hundreds of thousands of good men who returned from German imprisonment only to face a comparable punishment and misery at the hands of their own police system. Perhaps—who knows—the victory was in part dependent on other and more positive qualities: on his talent for political authority, on his ruthlessness of decision, on his capacity to identify with Russian national feeling, on his skill in dealing with the Western allies. Who can say? One can say only that if it did depend on these things, it was still a costly victory, involving great oceans of sacrifice and misery, both during the war and after it, that could have been avoided under a lighter, more humane and more compassionate touch.

About Stalin's diplomacy directed to the shaping of the post-war order I shall have little to say. It is often alleged that he deceived the Western leaders at the successive summit meetings. I do not see the evidence for this. If there was any deception, it was the Western leaders who deceived themselves. Stalin was perhaps better aware than were the others of the true meaning of the military events that had placed him in control of half of Europe. But this was not deception. He was animated by the same yearning for a wide military and political *glacis* on his Western frontier that had inspired his dealings with the Germans before the war broke out. No one could now deny him this, except at the cost of another war, which was unthinkable, and he was well aware of this. His task, therefore, was easy. He had little need to deceive.

Thus, of the three men who sat together at Teheran and Yalta, it was he, Stalin, who was in the most fortunate position. Churchill had, by this time, an extremely realistic understanding of the situation, but very little power; and he was near to his fall from office. Roosevelt had power but very little realism, and was rapidly failing in health. Stalin alone was powerful, realistic and in good health, as well as having

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a secure political position to carry him into the post-war future. He was the only one, perhaps, who saw quite clearly, with a vision unclouded by pity or remorse, the situation in which they all found themselves. He had accomplished much and survived even more. His position was, therefore, a favourable one.

For the others, this was obviously not the ideal way to end a war. But considering that the Western powers were unable to defeat Hitler without the aid of Stalin—of such a nature that it placed him automatically in command of half of Europe—this was perhaps all that they—or any of us—could expect.

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Reflections: 30 Years After

Hugh Seton-Watson

THE following remarks lack either the authority of one who, like George Kennan, was involved in the making of policy, or the erudition of those who have ploughed through the hundreds of square miles of documents, in archives or in public print, which reveal, and omit, so much of the high-level political thinking of 30 years ago. The present author was then a small cog in the machine. He had some experience of the Danubian and Balkan countries in the age of Hitler and in the earliest period of Soviet ascendancy, and has followed, not regularly, but in alternating bouts of intensive study and enforced neglect, the consequences of the failure—still with us today—to bring peace to Europe.

Looking back over 30 years, one can hardly resist a reluctant admiration for Stalin. It is true that the initial disasters suffered by the Soviet Army were a direct consequence of the escalation of the Great Purge in 1937 and 1938 for which Stalin's paranoid suspicions were responsible; and that Stalin had a further personal guilt through his perverse refusal to accept evidence that Hitler was planning invasion for the early summer of 1941. It is also true that in four years of war, Stalin truly showed himself to be a man of steel, and became in the eyes of millions of Russians (even of the many who hated him) and foreigners, Allied or neutral, a symbol of invincible resistance. There is a curious resemblance between Stalin in 1941–45 and Alexander I in 1812. The two men's characters and ideas were highly dissimilar, but each in his time played the same decisive part. Both accepted the unglamorous, unheroic task of sitting far behind the front and taking the final decisions. Kutuzov and Zhukov appeal to the common man's imagination; but it was Alexander and Stalin who resolved that there should be no surrender, and then no compromise, but that the enemy was incorrigible and must be pursued until he was destroyed. Thus, all who survived to live in freedom in Europe and their children born since then owe a debt of gratitude to Stalin. This remains no less true when set beside another truth, that other millions of Europeans who hoped that with the destruction of Hitler they would recover their freedom, or would win a freedom which they never had, owe the destruction of that hope to Stalin. Both truths result from Stalin's inflexible will to achieve his clearly seen aims: to crush the invader, and to advance as far outwards as possible the frontiers within which his own unlimited rule prevailed.

The feeling that we owed our liberty to Russian fighting men and to their supreme commander, Stalin, was very widespread in Britain and among British soldiers on fronts far from Britain's shores. As a minor official, first civilian and then military, in the British war machine overseas, I felt this myself, and thus have little right to accuse others

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of lack of realism. My enthusiasm for the Soviet Union had been increased by my observation, on the spot, of the weakness of most democratic politicians and organizations in the face of encroaching fascism, both foreign and indigenous, in Central Europe and the Balkans between 1937 and 1941; it had been temporarily checked by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but had revived after Hitler invaded Russia. This enthusiasm, based on wishful thinking, had been shared by many of the Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Rumanians and Bulgarians with whom I had spent a lot of my time: only my Polish friends lacked it, and their attitude not only annoyed, but also disturbed me, since I well knew that they were not " reactionary agents of landowners " or " Sanacja bureaucrats." I began to realize that they were right and I had been wrong, as reports of Soviet actions in 1945 came onto my office desk, and still more when I revisited the Danubian countries in 1946 and 1947. By this time, those of my Danubian friends who had shared or had inspired my earlier illusions had learned the hard way how wrong they had been.

Poland was, of course, the main source of conflict between the Western powers and the Soviet Union after they had become allies; and, looking back over 30 years, we can say that the sacrifice of their Polish ally was the decisive stage in the process which placed all Europe at the mercy of the Soviet Russian Empire. The sacrifice was more dishonourable for Britain than for the United States, whose leaders could not be so aware of the morally binding force of commitments to earlier allies whose countries had long since been overrun. Churchill clearly understood that no government could ignore evidence that at least 4,000 Polish officers, taken prisoner in war, had been murdered in cold blood; yet he was also bound to feel that the Katyn discoveries and the obstinacy of the Polish exiles about their eastern frontier were a nuisance impeding the prosecution of the war. Churchill at least told the exiled leaders that they must yield their eastern territories, thereby incurring their bitter resentment; while Roosevelt allowed Mikolajczyk to think that he would support his refusal, thereby winning Polish-American votes in the 1944 election.

Public opinion in Britain and America was wildly pro-Soviet, and its feed-back compelled the politicians to accept Soviet wishes and, to some extent, even induced a pro-Soviet euphoria in the politicians themselves.

Citizens of modern English-speaking democracies seem to find it necessary to identify their enemies with the powers of darkness, and to see in their allies gallant heroes *sans peur et sans reproche*. This may perhaps be explicable by distant historical and cultural causes, in particular by the Old Testament-style self-righteousness of Scottish and New England Calvinists, and by the rather milder but pervasive Puritanism of the English. The tendency was held in check in nineteenth-century England by the scepticism and knowledge of Europe that were to be found, from time to time, among the ruling class, but it burst its bonds in the first world war, when it was found necessary to mobilize the whole society. Though its best-known exponent was Woodrow Wilson, it would

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be unjust to consider it a purely American political disease: the British succumbed readily.

However hard one tries to be objective after 30 years, it is still difficult to deny that there was much to be said for identifying Adolf Hitler with the powers of darkness; but the picture of a benevolent Uncle Joe "in a taxi-driver's cap" has less to commend it. The extent of the crusading fervour of Wilson's disciple, Roosevelt, and the limits of the trust which he placed in Uncle Joe, may still be debated. Churchill had no illusions on the second point, but it is clear that optimistic idealism coexisted in his mind with ruthless realism based on *raison d'état*. It would have been difficult for either to have warned their people about Soviet behaviour and Soviet plans, yet one cannot escape the question: "Should they have begun to do so?" It is essentially the same question as that regarding Chamberlain and Munich. Should he have prepared the British public to face the threat of the Third Reich when Hitler swallowed Austria in March 1938, so that they would have been ready to resist in September 1938; instead of waiting until March 1939 to prepare them for September 1939? Or did Chamberlain really believe at Munich that Hitler was a man of peace, and Roosevelt at Teheran that he could manage Uncle Joe?

THE main result for Europe of the second world war has been the complete destruction of what was the object of all the chief European wars since the end of the fifteenth century—including those which were ostensibly wars of religion—the European balance of power. The attempts of previous contenders, or suspected contenders, for the hegemony of Europe (the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Nicholas I, William II, Hitler) were defeated; but in 1945 there was only one great military power left in Europe, the heir of a revolution which had begun as a fundamental rejection of militarism, and balance was only redressed on a world scale by calling in the New World.

In this respect, the situation of 1945 was the direct opposite of that of 1815, but in another respect, it was strangely similar. Victory was considered to have proved the superiority of the old regime. This was especially the case in Russia, where the soldiers who had saved Europe from Napoleon were simply told to go back to serfdom. It is true that there were some Russians, especially among the small European-minded intelligentsia of noble origin, in officers' uniforms, who believed that the people had earned its liberty, and that Russia should have what in a later age and another country would be called a New Deal. But the old regime made short shrift of them. Political despotism and cultural obscurantism were imposed upon the people of three-quarters of the continent. The man with whom this restoration is usually associated is Metternich, a brilliant sceptic who was perhaps never truly "enlightened" or "reactionary," and whose skilled diplomacy our contemporary Henry Kissinger has aspired to imitate. But the true symbols of the age of restoration

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were not Metternich but two Russians: first Arakcheyev, whose personal style and whose belief that all obstacles can be overcome by giving orders and brutally punishing those who flag closely resembled that of Stalin; and Nicholas I, a handsome figure of a man with fine manners, who personally ordered that the Ukrainian poet and painter Shevchenko be deprived of pencil and paper during his years of banishment, and who sent his armies to crush revolutionary Hungary in 1849.

The Russian soldiers of 1815 were sent back to serfdom, the Russian soldiers of 1945 to *kolkhoz* and factory discipline, Stakhanovism and socialist competition, *agitprop* exhortations and the rule of the security police, its special sections and its *seksots*. In Russia in 1945, as in 1815, there were men and women who believed that the time had come for a New Deal, but the regime dealt swiftly with them. The regime was also extended to another hundred million Europeans as far as the Oder and the South-Eastern Alps. Whereas, after 1815, there was at least a certain variety of despotic monarchs and princelings, in Central Europe, from 1945, one infallible teacher of genius of all progressive humanity began to apply one infallible mechanism of exploitation, falsification and terror. Before it had been perfected for the whole region, one country—Yugoslavia—at first unwillingly, but then with growing enthusiasm and ingenuity, escaped the infallible tutelage and became the object of successive experiments by indigenous leaders.

The 1815 regime survived for about half a century. Within five years there began a series of revolts by civilian or military groups with various notions of liberty, and all but one were crushed by Austrian, Russian or French armies. The Greek case was an exception only because it became an object of diplomacy and war between states. The more widspread revolts of 1848 were also crushed. What broke up the restoration regime was not the series of defeated " bourgeois revolutions," but a series of wars between large states—in the Crimea, Lombardy, Moravia and Lorraine.

The 1945 regime has also had its revolts—in Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia—and all have been crushed. They cannot easily be classified under either " class " or " ideological " labels (" bourgeois " or " proletarian," " liberal " or " nationalist "). Most were led, like those of 1848, by intellectuals and carried out by workers in industrial cities. Some were made by workers alone (in Plzen, Poznan, Gdansk and Szczecin). They were revolts against lies and exploitation, and for human dignity. Only when they were met by Russian threats did the latent national resentment become prominent.

All were crushed, as were the revolts of the 1820s and of 1848. The force which eventually broke the ice of the post-1815 political freeze—war between European states—is one to which no responsible European government of our time will resort. The disproportion between the military strength of the Soviet Russian Empire and that of any single European state, and the probability that, if war were generalized, nuclear

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weapons would be used, appear to rule it out; and if nuclear war should come, so little would be left in the ruins that arguments about human or national liberty would have little meaning.

Does this mean that the regime of 1945 will last not "for ever" (because every historian knows that "for ever" and "never" are historically meaningless terms), or even for a thousand years (as Hitler's Third Reich was supposed to last), but as long perhaps as the Roman Empire, or the Ottoman Empire? Does it mean that the form of human organization widely, though imprecisely, known as "liberal democracy" (with its peculiar balance between freedom of opinion, popular representation and social mobility) will turn out to have been a rather brief interlude in the history of North-Western Europe and North America and an insignificant episode in the history of the rest of the world?

These questions are unanswerable, but it may be worth noting two sets of trends, visible in the two parts of Europe since 1945.

In the Eastern half, after the horrors of the late Stalin era in Russia and the Stalinization of Eastern Europe, there has been a slow process of gradual material improvement. The Soviet rulers seem to have been rather skilful in their management of this process, not allowing it to go too fast, and avoiding recessions. The Soviet subject has been able to feel that, though he it not as well off as he would like to be, things have got better, are getting better, and are likely to go on getting better. He has also been able to feel that his country is getting more and more powerful, that other countries' bad "capitalist" governments are getting more and more afraid of it, and this has no doubt given him some satisfaction. In the Western dependencies of the Soviet Russian Empire, the same trends have been at work, though they began later, have suffered some reversals, and have made less impression on peoples (especially Czechs and Germans) whose elder generations could remember much better things. The growth of material prosperity, both in the metropolitan lands of the Empire and its colonial periphery, has gone together with a rapid growth of education at all levels, of which the communist leaders are inordinately proud. This has taught successive generations of young people to think. Many Russians have thought chiefly of their Empire's might and have been content. Others have thought the way the great Russian writers thought about the regime of their time. Non-Russians have thought about their people's position in the Empire, and have become still more aware of the falsification of their own history and culture that has been forced on them. Thus the very successes of the Soviet Imperial regime inevitably and interruptedly create enemies for it. Yet the Imperial rulers have lost none of their will to power or of their self-righteous conviction that they alone possess a scientific understanding of human society and its inevitable future.

In the Western half, material improvements have been much greater, but have been interrupted by periodical reversals, and accompanied by the unending boasts and promises of salesmen, both in business and in

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politics. No limit has been placed on popular expectations, and so on popular resentments when expectations are not fulfilled. Thus that part of the population which is not much given to political or social thought has been frustrated by rapidly rising prosperity, while the corresponding part of the population in the East has been contented by a much smaller improvement in its condition. Among the minority in the West which is addicted to thinking, utopianisms and guilt complexes have run riot, and it finds itself confronted no longer by any sort of ruling class, but by an odd assortment of privileged persons who have lost their nerve.

To the fashionable thinkers in the West, the domination of the Soviet Russian Empire in Central Europe, and the threat which this represents for the rest of Europe, are a bore; and it is best to forget about bores or to deny that they exist. The Western mind and the Western media crave for novelty, and long to see novelty beyond the Oder as well. Yet it is not the nature of Soviet Imperial rule which has changed in recent years so much as the attitude of Western wishful thinkers to it. Different phrases become fashionable and go out of fashion—" cold war," " peaceful coexistence," " *détente* "—but the reality remains. Below the surface, social and cultural changes are indeed at work, of which those which can be seen are not necessarily the most important. But the " superstructure " —Soviet Russian Imperial domination—has not changed. It does not merely demand, like its many historical predecessors, that its vassals should place the Empire's security before their local interests. It insists on the national humiliation of the vassal peoples, and thereby creates national resentments which renew themselves again and again. Until the Soviet imperialists are willing to give up this special requirement of national humiliation, they will keep Europe in an explosive condition. Nothing that Western governments can do or say, no amount of indifference or benevolence or cooperation, can solve the Soviet imperialists' problem for them.

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A Conversation with Richard Pipes

USA–USSR: The Preconditions of Détente

George Urban

Urban—I propose to begin this discussion by looking at the semantics and vocabulary of Soviet political articulation. My immediate purpose is to find out whether the manner in which words are used, and not used, in the Soviet Union can tell us anything about Soviet attitudes to *détente*.

I would hesitate to raise so obvious a point, were it not for an erroneous, but commonly held, Western assumption that the image which totalitarian regimes offer of themselves and their policies to their captive audiences is governed by a set of rules barely related to that governing their "real" policies: totalitarian public usage is thought to be "evocative," "irrational," "ideological," whereas the policies actually pursued are "realistic," "down-to-earth" and bounded by "national interest." The first is all talk—the hard decisions are said to be taken at the second level.

However, on closer examination, the differences between base and top dressing look less convincing. While it is true enough that one of the functions of totalitarian rhetoric is to elicit support for policies the true nature of which cannot be frankly stated, it is also true—and equally important—that totalitarian usage creates its own momentum, setting goals which totalitarian regimes cannot afford to neglect, and ruling out others which they cannot afford to support, without losing their title to legitimacy. In other words, you make your own propaganda, but then your propaganda also makes you.[1]

Is there a predominant mode in Soviet rhetoric that might offer us a key to Soviet thinking?

[1] The following passage from Khrushchev's memoirs (Vol. I, pp. 342–43), describing the preliminaries of Moscow's ideological reconciliation with Yugoslavia in 1955, illustrates this point: ". . . we had been so estranged from the Yugoslavs and we had thought up so many accusations against them that we'd started to believe what we'd been telling ourselves. It's like in that old story about the mullah . . . who is walking through the village square telling people that back where he's just come from they're giving away free lamb and rice. Word quickly spreads through the town, and everyone starts running in the direction where he pointed. When the mullah sees everyone running, he stops somebody and asks, 'What's happening?' 'They're giving away free lamb and rice over there!' So the mullah hikes up his skirts and runs along with the crowd to get free food, even though he made the whole story up himself. It was just the same with Yugoslavia. We'd made up a story about all the terrible things the Yugoslavs were doing, and we'd heard the story so often that we started to believe it ourselves."

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Pipes—The language of Soviet politics is permeated with the vocabulary of militarism. Every sphere of public activity becomes a " front " which has to be " stormed " by " brigades " in a " campaign." All-out " offensives " are launched to overcome initial difficulties, and peace itself becomes the object of " struggle." This tendency to borrow words from the vocabulary of military science has its roots in Lenin. Marx is many things to many people. You can, if you wish, lift out of Marx the liberal humanitarian element of the young Marx, as some modern Marxists do—Marx the Feuerbachian, Marx the author of the *Philosophical Manuscripts* etc.—and you can also do many other things. Lenin took out of Marx the idea of the class war as an inevitable and pitiless concept. We are told by Peter Struve, who knew Lenin intimately in his early career, that Lenin was attracted by Marx's theory because he found in it " the doctrine of class war, relentless and thoroughgoing, aiming at the final destruction and extermination of the enemy." Class war is, of course, the common property of all socialists, but to Lenin it was a very tangible thing—a daily, hourly struggle between the " camp of socialism " and the " camp of capitalism." What for Marx and Engels was a means became for him an end. Lenin was, indeed, the first political leader to look upon politics entirely in terms of warfare and to pursue this conception to its merciless end.

Now, the second factor which accounts for the militarism in Lenin's thinking and vocabulary was General Ludendorff, whose masterful conduct of " total " war has probably exercised as great an influence on communist practices as anything Marx and Engels had written. Lenin observed carefully how the Germans mobilized the home front for total war—a temporary measure in the case of Germany—and grafted the idea of total mobilization onto Marxism, the end result of which was Soviet economic planning. The Soviet concept of the " art of operations " (and we may come back to this in a moment) is also derived from an analysis of Ludendorff's conduct of the war—the idea that victory requires a series of interdependent actions, based on solid logistic support and synchronized to produce on an enemy mounting pressure which eventually causes him to collapse.

Last, but by no means least, there was Clausewitz. Lenin read him rather late in life, in 1915, but the appeal was instantaneous. Lenin, as might be expected, especially admired Clausewitz's insistence that war and politics were not separate, antithetical activities, but simply alternative methods pressed into the service of a single policy. Whether one or the other was chosen at any juncture in inter-state relations was determined by what the ends required and by no other consideration. Lenin felt that blurring and then erasing the boundaries between political tactics and military tactics suited his book well at home, and he urged Communist Party workers to study and apply the principles of Clausewitz. In this he was, incidentally, at one with the Nazis, who apostrophized Clausewitz with equal vigour.

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Urban—I notice there is a school of thought in American political science which studies the Soviet Union in terms of the "mobilization state."

Pipes—Not a bad framework for such an enterprise, for militancy and military symbolism are, as I say, deeply embedded in every aspect of Soviet life. Soviet society is mobilized for war, not necessarily in the conventional sense (though it is mobilized for that too) but for class war which may take on a number of forms, and militancy is nourished by continuous propaganda which sees to it that at no point is the human psyche allowed to relax. The techniques vary: you create a myth of encirclement which makes it easier to enforce discipline and to offer a semblance of justification for maintaining a siege mentality. You withhold consumer goods from Soviet society, because such goods have a way of satisfying the needs of the ordinary citizen and thus making him less pliable in the hands of the state. I am convinced that the failure to provide consumer goods is not just an economic but a political decision.

I don't normally stress the impact of ideology on Soviet society, but there is no doubt that the concepts of a universal militancy have become part of the mental equipment of the ordinary Soviet citizen. And can you blame him? He is being told year in and year out that the world is in a condition of permanent class war and that, since the October Revolution, the class war has become even more acute. This war, in the Soviet view, need not be a shooting war; sometimes it does break out in actual hostilities, at other times it takes the form of ideological combat—that is its irreducible minimum. The two ideological systems must never be reconciled, and that is why, even during the current phase of *détente*, Moscow insists on keeping alive the ideological conflict.

Urban—The problem for the observer less steeped in the intricacies of Soviet ideology is that the Soviet Union has, in fact, successfully put into practice *détente* types of policies from Brest-Litovsk to the present day, without giving up ideological combat. So can we unhesitatingly say that ideological combat, and all it implies, is a surer index of Soviet intentions as far as inter-state relations are concerned, than the actual record of peaceful co-existence?

Pipes—*Détente* has been deployed—and Brest-Litovsk and, later, NEP are good examples—whenever the Soviet Union was militarily or economically weak and needed peace and Western assistance. They were temporary expedients which the new Soviet state saw itself constrained to adopt in order to secure some breathing-space by coming to terms with a powerful enemy. Lenin was under pressure from the Zimmerwald-Kienthal programme to turn the war into international civil war, but he realized that Russia's internal situation did not yet permit this. His advocacy of a peace treaty with the Central Powers on any terms

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produced a savage conflict in the Central Committee and almost led to Lenin's resignation. The records of the discussions in the Central Committee have been published. The communist leaders were very frank in those days, so we have no excuse for not knowing what motives they had at the back of their minds with their earlier moves to achieve a breathing-spell.

Urban—I suppose if you conceive of *détente* and the " normal " Soviet attitude to the outside world—that is to say, the class struggle projected onto the international arena—as complementary policies in line with Clausewitz, Soviet policy to this day must be said to have shown a remarkable consistency.

Pipes—It has, and the reason lies not in the innate force of Lenin's ideas. It lies in the fact that the Soviet Union of today finds itself in a situation in one essential respect still identical with the one Lenin had left on his death bed, that is, a government devoid of any popular mandate or any other justification of its monopoly of political power except the alleged exigencies of the class-war. The regime is locked in, and even if it wanted to extricate itself from its predicament by internal democratization, it would be prevented from doing so by the opposition of its powerful and conservative bureaucratic establishment.

Urban—Any idea, then, of the Soviet system liberalizing itself under the pressure of the increasing sophistication, higher living standards and *embourgeoisement* of its establishment is chimerical. Indeed, the Kremlin has at its disposal tools for the conduct of a " total " foreign policy.

Pipes—I think so. Soviet foreign policy is very " total " indeed. It follows the principles of the " art of operations " in that it draws no distinction between diplomatic, economic, psychological and military means of operation. The bureaucracy carries out orders and asks few questions. Militancy is so deeply entrenched in the mentality of the Soviet elite that I wonder whether the best way of easing East-West tensions is by attempting the piecemeal resolution of specific disagreements. These disagreements aren't, after all, the causes of tension, but its consequence. The last war, too, wasn't fought over Danzig.

Urban—Do we have an answer to the " art of operations? "

Pipes—Although this is a time-honoured technique of Soviet foreign policy, I don't think we have as yet developed a sufficiently comprehensive monitoring system to deal with it. The technique is, after all, quite simple: you do not go in for a series of isolated jabs, but coordinate your tactical moves so that each supports the other and you subordinate them all to an ultimate strategic objective. The idea was borrowed, as I say, from the German military, but it was a concept favoured by some

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Tsarist generals too. The Bolsheviks are simply using it in a larger context, following Clausewitz. If we had a sufficiently sophisticated early warning system, we might be able to tell why the Russians are jabbing in one place rather than another, and, by fitting the pieces together, explain how the Russians go after their quarry. As it is, we are seeing each jab in isolation and respond accordingly, that is—very inadequately.

Urban—Lenin's adoption of Clausewitz strikes me as natural: if class war—which is international by definition—is the basic premise of your thinking, you have to adopt a " total " foreign policy, i.e. one that cuts across " domestic affairs " and " foreign relations " and treats them as one.

Pipes—Communism views the sovereign state as a transitional phenomenon connected with the capitalist mode of production and, therefore, destined to disappear with it, and it is for that reason that neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin had anything theoretically significant to say about foreign policy.

The Soviet Government does not recognize in theory, and only grudgingly in practice, the international system of sovereign states. It has bowed to the necessity of maintaining a Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its diplomatic corps because other countries it must deal with happen to do so, but the Ministry is not charged with the formulation of foreign policy. Every important foreign policy decision is made by the Politburo and often carried out by its own agencies.

But Soviet foreign policy also works on other levels, of which interstate relations conducted through the diplomatic network is only one, and not necessarily the most important. Moscow maintains an extenisve subversive apparatus. The practice of entrusting foreign policy matters to the KGB and military intelligence is widespread. We know from Soviet diplomatic defectors that at some Soviet embassies less than 20 per cent of staff work for the Foreign Ministry and are accountable to the Ambassador. The rest are employed by other agencies, mostly engaged in intelligence activities and reporting directly to Moscow. Hence it should occasion no surprise that the United States found it necessary to counter this unconventional conduct of foreign policy by broadening the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency and pitting against the Soviet variety a " total " foreign policy management of its own.

Urban—The brunt of *détente* diplomacy is borne by the Soviet and American sides. Are there any specific sensitivities in the American psyche that the Russians can play on more readily than they might on those of other nations?

Pipes—I believe so. When the Soviet leaders talk to the United States President, the Secretary of State, senators, congressmen and presidents of large corporations from whom they want money and technology,

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then they argue that basically the two systems are much more alike than meets the eye. They suggest that the Americans should treat Soviet ideology as a rhetorical device and nothing more. They stress the convergence of industrial societies—a line they totally reject at other levels, but one which comes in very handy with high-level United States executives. This line can be extremely effective, because it appeals to the tendency of Americans to regard the whole world as aspiring to the state of being American, and prevented from being so only by poverty, ignorance, or some inexplicable wrongheadedness.

Now, on the mass level abroad, the Russians project a very glossy picture. Soviet society, they say, while it still has problems, hasn't any of the problems that plague the ordinary American: no unemployment, no crime, no corruption, no inflation and so forth. This, too, has great appeal for the man in Atlanta who has no idea what really goes on in the streets of Novosibirsk or even Moscow.

Urban—I would have thought the American psyche in its present state of disorientation would offer Soviet policy-makers a much wider scale of opportunities to exploit than those you have listed. When your adversary's will is undermined by a lost war (Vietnam) and a profound internal crisis (Watergate), he may well prove to be a walk-over, or so it might seem to the more sanguine minds in the Kremlin.

Pipes—I would not stress American disorientation and demoralization too much—though these exist—first, because the Russians have some outsize skeletons in their cupboards (hence their silence on Watergate and the reasons for Mr. Nixon's resignation), and secondly because the Soviet leaders know that, ignorant though the United States public may often be, it would hardly enjoy the sight of bailing the Soviet Union out of its economic predicament *and* being destroyed by the Soviet Union at the same time.

In looking at the Soviet estimate of the United States' psychological make-up, I would rather point to certain fundamental differences between how Americans and Russians habitually view the conduct of foreign relations and state-to-state negotiations in particular.

American culture rests on a tradition of give and take. The principal United States preoccupation has always been commercial and, therefore, predisposed toward compromise. Each commercial transaction must show some profit for both parties; the competition between them is over the division of profit—who gets this and who gets that—but not over the principle that both have to benefit. It is well understood that neither party walks away with the till.

On the other hand, in Russia you have a society which makes its living on the production and consumption of goods (agricultural and industrial) and which is, therefore, predisposed to the denial of compromise. Why do I say that? Until a century ago the main form of Russian wealth was owning land worked by serfs. When you own land

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and serfs, your idea in life is to grab as much as you can and as fast as you can and never mind how your economic activity affects your neighbour. I needn't remind you that the Russian tradition is so entirely non-commercial that the first Russian merchant bank was founded in the 1860s and that, until the nineteenth century, the predominant form of exchange activity was straightforward barter.

These traditions have had an important influence on the negotiating postures of the two countries. Whenever we approach the Russians with a proposal (and that is why we are at such a disadvantage in negotiating with them) our position inevitably includes provisions designed to make it acceptable to the Russians. We sweeten our suggestions with concessions before the Russians have had a chance to ask for any, because we assume that the other party will do likewise, since the first premise of any negotiation is that the other party, too, must benefit.

Not so the Russians. Their position always represents what the Soviet Government actually wants, weighted down with other unrealistic demands to be given up in exchange for American concessions. They give absolutely nothing to the other fellow for free. So any negotiation with the United States is bound to work out in Russia's favour because the original United States positions include concessions which need not be fought for. Splitting the difference between the two parties isn't, therefore, a 50–50 arrangement, but gives the Russians a disproportionate gain.

This straining for gross advantage is occasionally self-defeating. Two years ago the Russians had a wonderful thing going: they had the beginnings of *détente* plus massive financial and economic aid almost within their grasp, but they were so keen on making a fast killing that they went for the American wheat deal. They got their killing but the killing left a bitter taste in America and contributed heavily to delaying for the Russians infinitely greater advantages—such as clinching investment contracts worth tens of billions of (US) dollars. They risked their long-range interests for a paltry 300-million-dollar profit simply because they did not know where to call a halt. The 1974 attempt to buy more United States wheat has shown them hell-bent on aggravating their earlier blunder.

Urban—You are suggesting that Soviet maximalist positions should be countered by maximalist positions of our own so that if any whittling down has to be done, we don't whittle down our conditions until the Russians have done some whittling down too.

Pipes—My position is that we should confront the Russians with our demands, just as they confront us with theirs, and not let ourselves be inhibited by unwarranted feelings of guilt, or complain that the Russians don't love us. The Russians know how to cash in on the American Protestant tendency to self-accusation. But as we are aware of the fact

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that *they* are aware of this weakness, we can surely protect ourselves accordingly.

Urban—How, in fact, does the Soviet side press home a maximalist proposal and how does is come about that we accept it?

Pipes—Let me give you an example. The administration of Berlin after the war was regulated by four-power agreements; hence any unilateral change of its status in one part of the city by one of the four powers was illegitimate, or should, at the very least, have been accompanied by similar changes in the status of other parts of the city occupied by the other powers. In 1957, the Soviet Union recognized East Germany as a sovereign state and gradually transferred East Berlin to the control of the GDR. The Western powers neither accepted this act as legitimate nor did they follow suit by transferring sovereignty over West Berlin to the Federal Government. The Russians, however, regarded the incorporation of East Berlin in the GDR as a *fait accompli*. They have not allowed the future of East Berlin to be put on the agenda of any conference or summit meeting since 1958. At the same time, however, by putting intermittent pressure on West Berlin, and especially by threatening its communications with the Federal Republic, the Russians have transformed what, in fact, was a problem of Berlin as a whole into a West Berlin problem which is said to be a threat to peace and to thus require a negotiated settlement. In the 1972 four-power agreement, the Federal Government secured certain concessions from the Soviet Union. However, the cold fact remains that neither Bonn nor the Western powers got any concessions on East Berlin, because the status of East Berlin was simply not on the agenda. The Russians ruled it out from the beginning as non-negotiable. This is the way the Russians usually proceed and, astonishingly, they get away with it much of the time.

Urban—Is it your view, then, that at the current Security Conference, for example, we should have insisted on putting questions such as the condition of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria on the agenda?

Pipes—Yes, that is the sort of thing we ought to do for the sake of equivalence. Of course it would be very difficult to get Western diplomats to agree to insist on maximalist demands of this kind. The immediate reaction would be: " You must be mad. If you make any such proposals, the Russians will walk out."

Urban—Which is itself a telling sign how successfully the Soviet " art of operations " has affected—one might almost say brainwashed—our side.

Pipes—It is, but it is also a sign of confused thinking. What our men forget or overlook for some reason is that the whole idea of having

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a so-called Security Conference comes from the Russians. *We* didn't suggest it—they are the ones who have been peddling the idea up and down the world for many years. It is *their* security they want to talk about, not ours.

By now, of course, the Soviet side has got so accustomed to the fact that we never make " unrealistic " demands that our diplomats may be quite right in saying that the Russians would be scandalized if we did. Here I must say a word about semantics. The word " realism " is in great vogue in all Soviet foreign political articulations. " Realistic " in the Russian vocabulary is what conforms to Soviet interests. For example, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line is " realistic," but any recognition of the present status quo in the Middle East would be " unrealistic." " Realism " is when we recognize that the Russians are in Eastern Europe to stay. If we question it, we are not being " realistic." Now we in the West have fallen into this semantic trap: we don't, in fact, make " unrealistic " demands, but take for granted that the Soviet side should make such " unrealistic " demands on us—if I may, for the moment, use their language from our point of view. This semantic technique, and our lack of resistance to it, allows the Russians to make continued piecemeal encroachments on our interests.

Urban—But why do we fall for this terminological subversion? We are neither innocents in this game nor are we excessively unintelligent.

Pipes—Basically the problem is that we are very affluent. We feel that we *have* so much that we can afford to give away a great deal without being any the worse for it, which is, in effect, an appeasement policy. One can also turn it around and say: we have so much, and therefore so much to lose, that it isn't worth our while getting into major squabbles over small issues. It is an attitude of mind the Soviets know how to exploit, having learnt from Hitler. Stalin has expressed on a number of occasions respect for Nazi methods, but always with one reservation: Hitler was over-confident. Hitler was in too great a hurry, Hitler went for this great Western weakness with enormous energy and ended up in war after three or four years.

The Russians are much more cautious and they dispose of a great deal of time. They encroach upon us in very small instalments. They would have pressed for Danzig (if they had been in Hitler's shoes) over a period of ten to fifteen years, until we got tired of them and *gave* them Danzig; they would certainly not have gone to war over it. What we don't seem to realize in the West is that there is a principle involved in our non-resistance to this Soviet technique of making inroads through the back door. If we don't stand up on one small issue because we think it is too insignificant, and then don't stand up on another and a third, we could end up losing everything we have, small and large.

Urban—The Russians, on their part, are extremely conscious of the need to resist this kind of erosion and are highly legalistic in their

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interpretation of international treaties, frontier agreements and everything that might touch upon the status quo.

Pipes—This is why they do not give up the Kurile Islands, for example, and this is why the Russians do not yield to the Chinese demand that they agree that the present Sino-Soviet border is the result of unequal treaties, which of course it is. A piece of paper, you might say, and so it would be, but the Russians fully realize that any doubt cast on the legitimacy of *some* of their boundaries would involve undermining their entire hold on Eastern Europe. Now if *we* were in that kind of a position, we would have agreed to the Chinese demand years ago.

The trouble with our current attitudes is that we, and especially the European governments, take extremely short-term views of our problems. Why hold on to a couple of terrorists who might have killed a dozen people, when that might result in your oil supplies being cut off? Why not accept some face-saving formula at the Security Conference when that might buy you a surprise-free life for a year or two? There is very little leadership in the West and virtually none in Europe. European governments live from day to day and this is an enormous weakness, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Urban—But isn't this a congenital defect of the democratic form of government? Democracies never take a view further than the next elections, and nowadays they are (as you say) happy if they know where they are going next week. And this weakness does not only handicap them in their dealings with totalitarian governments who work with global planning devices, but it also makes it virtually impossible for them to do justice to the world's ecological, environmental and demographic problems, all of which are extremely long-range.

Pipes—I grant that there is a problem here, but it need not be as bad as we have allowed it to become. After all, for twenty years we *had* a policy—a consistent policy—towards the Soviet Union. We had leaders in the West—Truman, Adenauer, de Gasperi, Spaak. . . . These men, too, had to fight elections and nurse their constituencies and play to the gallery, but they knew where they were going. They were not just being dragged along by events. Our present leaders are. So, while I agree that democracy is, to some extent, intrinsically at a disadvantage, the disadvantage need not be of the kind and magnitude which we have, gratuitously as I see it, invited upon ourselves.

Urban—You said a moment ago that one of the psychological soft spots of the American people is their need to be "loved." Clearly, if America had a policy—and by that I take it you mean a policy Moscow might find distasteful—Soviet stocks of "love" (such as they are) would soon be exhausted. But even if we keep on muddling along without a policy, as we have done in recent years, playing *détente*

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from improvised positions and writing them off when they become a burden, our capacity to attract Soviet "love" will still be extremely limited. The "no-love" position in Soviet-American relations isn't something we can overcome by consular agreements or liquefied gas, for it is precisely what the Soviet definition of ideological conflict is about.

Pipes—Americans dread being hated. They never ask themselves who hates them and why. They don't seem to realize that to be hated can be an honour if you are being hated by the right sort of person. It is, I suppose, the self-accusatory tendency in the Protestant ethic that makes you feel guilty purely because someone hates you, the inference being that this hatred must to some extent be your fault because you have done your hater an injustice. Now, the Russians play on this quirk of the American psyche. They exploit it by setting in motion a barrage of hostile actions accompanied by expressions of hatred. The natural American reaction is bewilderment followed by guilt. And so an atmosphere is created which leads to concessions to propitiate the allegedly injured party. The Nazis used similar techniques vis-à-vis England and the Russians have learned from them.

Urban—But in the current phase of *détente*, this "hate-you" technique is used with considerable restraint and sophistication. It is not on display, as it was not so many years ago, all the time and in all places.

Pipes—The "Hate-America" campaign is, at the moment, largely confined to domestic audiences in the USSR; and of course it is not in the Kremlin's interest to make the American public aware of the extent to which the Russian people are being incited to hatred of America, or that they are being incited at all. But the fact is that, *détente* or no *détente*, inside the Soviet Union, the United States is continuously depicted as the bastion of fascism, the citadel of world imperialism, the bloodthirsty supporter of Israeli Zionism and so forth. So what, in the Soviet Union, is known as "ideological warfare" is a euphemism for "Hate America." Abroad, however, the Russians do play the game much more softly at the moment.

For example, in the last year of the Vietnam war we did some heavy bombing in the North. Where two or three years earlier this would have brought upon us massive demonstrations in Grosvenor Square and the Champs Elysées, there was none this time. So the Russians are conscious both of the uses and limitations of the "Hate-America" technique.

At the moment they are guided by the limitations. *Détente* to them is a tactical move made necessary by the backwardness of Soviet technology and the desirability of attracting Western aid and investment on a very large scale. They realize (as I said before) that they cannot have a series of bitter confrontations with the United States *and* get our money as well, so they must, for the time being, somehow come to terms with us,

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making certain, however, that by keeping up the flames of the ideological war their constituency at home is not so confused that when the time comes to revert to the " hard line " it will baulk.

Urban—The Soviet Union has always been in dire need of investment and technology. What is partly new is the openness with which, at least behind closed doors, this need is now admitted in international negotiations and American help sought. Domestically, of course, no such admission is made; even the 1973 wheat purchases have been kept secret from the Soviet public.

I am struck by a passage in the Epilogue to the second volume of Khrushchev's memoirs, where Khrushchev says that vast military expenditure is all very well for the Americans who can sustain it and profit from it, but it spells the ruin of the Communist world:

> The reactionary forces in the West know it's expedient for them to force us to exhaust our economic resources in a huge military budget thus diverting funds which could otherwise be spent on the cultural and material needs of our peoples. We must not let ourselves be caught in this trap. . . . The arms race has been part of a calculated plan to hinder the development of our economy, impede the growth of our standard of living, sow the seeds of disarray and dissatisfaction—and, if possible, bring about the collapse of socialism and a restoration of capitalism in our country.

These thoughts of Khrushchev raise a question in my mind: when we are being asked by the Soviet leaders to find the money to support their economy, aren't we being invited to do what—if my reading of Khrushchev is right—he is implying we should not do in our own interest: channel funds to the Soviet economy as a whole, stabilizing the system and thus, directly or indirectly, boosting Russia's military potential?

Khrushchev makes it very clear that, when he was Chairman of the Council of Ministers, heavy arms expenditure forced him to suspend the construction of subways in Kiev, Baku and Tbilisi and to cut back on athletic stadiums, swimming pools and cultural facilities. Are we now to make it possible for the Soviet leaders to finance the expansion of the Soviet navy, for example, by providing Russia with resources for the construction of football stadiums and underground railways?

Pipes—There is no question that Western investments and technological transfer would greatly add to the Soviet military potential and make the system less unattractive than it is. The present Russian leaders are engagingly frank about this. Their problem is to justify *détente* to their domestic audiences, and the thrust of their argument is that American goods, investment and know-how will give the Soviet system a tremendous shot in the arm. This is true, and that is why I believe transfers of capital and technology should be carried out very carefully. I also believe that for every transfer and every commercial deal we ought to exact an immediate and commensurable price.

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For example, we should say to the Soviet leaders: "You are asking us to help you put up a plant. All right, we'll give you the licence provided that you stop jamming Radio Liberty. The moment you start jamming again, we will suspend, for one year, all further deliveries." This kind of procedure would make good sense to me: it would leave it to the Russians to decide whether they want investment more than jamming, and it would put a very tangible premium on the reform of the Soviet economy. The assumption behind our present *détente* philosophy is that if we furnish the Russians with the massive assistance they want from us, the Soviet system will, through a number of unproven transmission belts, eventually change its character. But this is mortgaging the real present for a highly vague future. My conception of *détente* is, therefore, direct barter on the basis of periodic accounting: "We give you this, you give us that—at the end of each period we draw a line and see whether both of us have met our obligations." This is the sort of thing *détente* should be about.

Urban—Now it is my turn to say with your Western diplomats: "But surely the Russians would have none of this": look at their reactions to the Jackson Amendment.

Pipes—Sometimes they would, sometimes they wouldn't. The pressure to accept this kind of arrangement would be very strong. At the moment we are being asked to give, give and give again. No payment is made; the returns will come later, the Russians assure us, in oil, gas and other resources. I'm not implying that the Russians are getting everything they want from us, but they are getting a great deal more than they should, and they are, in the process, contracting debts which they may or may not be able to repay. This is wrong. I would, as I have just said, simply put it to the Russians: "We'll supply you with such and such items on your shopping list, but you must at once pay us A, B and C." Let them, then, make the choice. In the case of the Jackson Amendment, they first decided in favour of concessions until the credit sums available to them were limited, at which point they decided to say no. They may still change their mind, however, given some additional concessions.

Urban—Let me take you back to the semantic differences that appear to make any understanding between the Soviet *Weltanschauung* and our own—in so far as we have one—so difficult to come by. The problem boils down to the question whether, in our view, *détente* is exclusively about inter-state relations or whether it is also predicated on certain changes in the domestic conditions of the Soviet Union. The semantic hurdles are, as we have already seen, quite daunting. It is, in international politics, hard enough for men of the same culture to understand each other, even though words have a shared meaning in their vocabularies. But when neither of these conditions obtains, as is the case in Soviet—US relations, isn't *détente* just an extremely costly way for us to underwrite

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the post-war gains and future stability of the Soviet Union? After all, we cannot even agree with the Russians on the meaning of the word *détente*.

Let me quote a few examples from one authentic witness, Andrei Amalrik, (*Will the USSR survive until 1984?*)

> The idea of self-government, of equality under the law for all and of personal freedom—and the responsibility that goes with these—are almost completely incomprehensible to the Russian people. . . . The very word "freedom" is understood by most people as a synonym of the word "disorder" . . . ;
> As for respecting the rights of an individual as such, such an idea simply evokes bewilderment,
> . . . "justice" is motivated by the wish "nobody should be better off than me,"

and so forth.

Pipes—As you know, I have myself written about these semantic barriers, and they are, of course, a great impediment. However, the purpose of *détente* is not so much to make Russia change its system of government as to reduce the threat which it poses to Europe. Now, to some extent it is true that a freer and better informed Russia is less of a menace, and it is for that reason that we are calling for internal changes in Russia and Eastern Europe under "Basket Three" and through other channels. But a complete internal transformation is not really what we are after—we are after stability and peace, and if the Russians, even while maintaining their present system of government, can demonstrate that they are doing all in their power internally and externally to live in accord with us and their neighbours, then we would certainly not press them for any change in their system. It is not our way. Personally, I wish that the system would change, but this is not a goal that a country can adopt as its foreign policy. It would be preposterous (as well as hopeless) for us to demand that the Soviet Union become a democratic country before we can talk peace with it.

Urban—Let me quote you Amalrik again: "Collaboration takes for granted mutual reliance one on the other, but how can one rely upon a country [Russia] which over the centuries has been distending itself and disintegrating like sour dough? . . . Genuine *rapprochement* can be based on a community of interests, of culture, of tradition and on mutual understanding. No such thing exists."

What strikes me as significant in this passage is that, in Amalrik's view, the external posture of the Soviet Union is a function of such elusive and definitely "domestic" factors as culture, tradition and understanding. Can, therefore, a minimalist conception of *détente* be anything more promising than a non-aggression pact?

Pipes—*Détente* implies no love relationship. The cultural and semantic barriers are, of course, there, but this need not affect state-to-state

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relations. After all, we have decent relations with countries which have totally different sets of values and traditions from our own—India and Japan, for example. Peaceful coexistence does not require that we all look alike and think alike. That would be an impossible demand; humanity lives at very different levels of development.

Urban—You have not quite convinced me. I still feel—and I'll quote some more evidence in a moment—that a country's internal condition is a fair barometer of how we can expect it to behave in its external affairs, and that this is true for Russia *par excellence*. Consider Amalrik again, weighing up the character of Soviet Russia, and compare what he says with an observation of the Marquis de Custine, writing well over a century earlier.

> Amalrik: "What does this people with no religion and no morality believe in and what is it motivated by? It believes in its own national strength which other peoples must fear and it is motivated by the realization of the strength of its own regime of which it is itself afraid."
> The Marquis de Custine: "This essentially conquering nation, greedy as a result of its hardships, atones in advance for the hope of exercising tyranny abroad by degrading submission at home; the glory and the wealth which the Russian nation expects distract it from the shame which it suffers at home; in order to clean itself of the ungodly sacrifice of all its public and personal liberties, the kneeling slave nation dreams of the domination of the world."

These two readings of the Russian national character are strikingly and depressingly alike: there is no glory to be had at home, hence aggrandizement is sought from adventure abroad—from pan-Slavic nationalism in the nineteenth century, from proletarian internationalism in our own. How does all this augur for *détente*?

Pipes—I don't think there is a direct relationship between what the mass of people think and feel, and the international policies pursued in their name. The two operate on different levels—not totally different levels, I grant, but different levels all the same. In other words, we must not think of international relations as if they were human relations. If, for example, you went to Russia and tried to set up a business there, you would, I suspect, run into people—the ordinary people of Russia—who might make life very difficult for you. But if you are dealing at the international level, methods have been worked out a long time ago which make it possible for different civilizations to coexist with each other in peace. That is what diplomacy is about. The rules of modern diplomacy were laid down at the end of the Thirty Years War, in 1648, in the Treaty of Westphalia. This Treaty (together with its predecessor, the 1555 Peace of Augsburg) enshrined the idea that there can be a Catholic and a Protestant Europe, that the two can coexist and have normal relations. This was a revolution in human thought, for, until then,

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it was always taken for granted that the condition of the survival of one was the extermination of the other. So, after 1648, you had a Protestant culture and a Catholic culture which—given the importance of popular religions at the time—were as different as ideologies are today and possibly much more important in the daily lives of the people. The diplomatic practices then established by these two, seemingly irreconcilable " camps " of Christianity have made it possible to reconcile their interests—without abolishing their doctrines—in certain peaceful ways. We are the heirs to that tradition.

Therefore, while I agree with much of what de Custine and Amalrik have to say about the nature of Russian political culture, I don't think it follows that the Russian people must necessarily want to conquer the world, and even less do I believe that they will succeed in conquering the world. The tendency *is* there—the desire to show force abroad because there is weakness at home is clearly in evidence—but if you confront this with determined diplomacy in which sophistication is combined with force, you need not be overwhelmed.

We must remember that the Russians are immensely responsive to power: they know how to use power, but they also know how to yield to it. To this day, the entire mentality of the Soviet government is rooted in peasant experience. If you study Russian history, you will find that the peasant was always surrounded by force; he expected to bully or to be bullied. This is a natural consequence of the virtual absence in Russia of a legal tradition—where there is no law to adjudicate disputes, force inevitably replaces law. Here we have a great asset which we have as yet not learned how to use. We can make a very strong impression on the Russians at both the personal and national levels, provided that we let it be known that we carry a sizeable stick. The Russians can recognize a superior adversary when they see one, and they are very good at backing down without feeling any shame—as we saw in Cuba and in our October 1973 alert. My point is that this healthy respect for power makes it entirely possible for us to stop them even in the face of everything you said and quoted about the Russian character.

Urban—But who, I ask you, is going to do the stopping?

Pipes—Ah, but that is an entirely different question. What I am saying is that we *can* stop them if we want to stop them. Proper leadership in the West could do it. The exercise need not be futile—one could easily chart a whole series of positions we could recapture from the Soviet Union if we knew how to use the power we have and made the decision to use it.

Urban—Khrushchev's memoirs bear out what you say. He makes the point time and again that during his incumbency the Soviet Union was, militarily and economically, terribly weak, but the weaknesses had to be covered up, for otherwise the United States might do nasty things to

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Russia. Hence the bluffing, the thunder and fury of Khrushchev's peregrinating statesmanship. And, judging from the Soviet eagerness for *détente*, this may, certainly in the economic field, still be the case.

Pipes—Luckily for us, Khrushchev over-estimated both our will-power and our political sagacity.

Urban—There is certainly no reason why we should not take the Russians at their word and agree with them that in matters of ideology there can be no peaceful co-existence. But as soon as *we* act on that understanding, up goes the cry of cold war, imperialism and the rest. So the motto " in matters of ideology there can be no peaceful co-existence " is, in fact, interpreted by the Soviet side as meaning " we are entitled to work for your destruction, because we are on the side of history, but hands off the socialist camp." However, there is, as I see it, also a deeper reason which prevents us from making a matching effort. Whether we agree with it or not, whether we think it is bogus or not—the Soviet Union *has* an ideology; we haven't: how do you put an ideological scaffolding around something as amorphous and fluid as " democracy "? I suspect, therefore, that even if we did have the will to take up the Soviet challenge, we'd be fighting with unequal equipment.

Pipes—I would not sell us that short. We do have an ideology, a very powerful ideology, much more powerful that those juvenile ideas, that sham religion which the Soviet Union promotes under the self-contradictory title of " Marxism-Leninism." I haven't the slightest doubt that if free elections were held around the world and people were to choose between, say, a set of values which you and I put down on paper, and one that our opposite numbers in the Soviet Communist Party did, we would win hands down. The idea of law, the idea of freedom, the idea of human dignity are extremely powerful ideas. They have agitated humanity for centuries and their appeal is fresh and inexhaustible.

Our problem is: do we have the vision and the vigour to pursue them? It is here that our principal weakness lies. We haven't the will to use what we have. We are being mesmerized by the sheer determination and (apparently) overwhelming self-confidence of the Soviet side.

Urban—Matched now by Soviet superiority in armed power, too.

Pipes—That is of very recent origin and is even now not convincingly established. But we have allowed ourselves to be hypnotized into lacking will even when we had complete armed superiority over the Soviets. And for this we must not blame them—it is entirely *our* fault.

Urban—We are now coming back to a problem we have already discussed in a slightly different context: why are we unable to get a grip

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on ourselves in this battle of wits? You said earlier that we were too affluent, had too much to lose and so forth. Is that, I wonder, the whole answer?

Pipes—It isn't, and the rest of the answer falls into two parts—one has to do with Europe and the other with the United States. The lack of determination is much greater in Europe than in America and the reasons are straightforward. Two world wars have so debilitated the will both of the European peoples and their governments that they have become incapable of taking bold action of any kind. There is a feeling in Europe—not always articulated, but very prevalent—that almost any policy is better than war, for war only destroys without settling anything. Hence you choose the line of least resistance, you conceal your impotence, above all from yourself, by rationalizing your appeasement.

"The Russians," you will hear Europeans say, "are terrible people who run a detestable system, but they will mellow as they get into closer contact with Western civilization, as all barbarians of the past have (allegedly!) done," and so forth.

The second factor, just as important, is the social revolution which Europe has undergone since the war. Until quite recently, Europe was governed—by the yardstick of the United States at any rate—by an upper class élite which ran foreign offices and military establishments, and set the tone of government internally and externally. The private ethos of Europe was entirely upper bourgeois, and even those who had not climbed the ladder to bourgeois status aspired to it.

All this has radically changed. The lower middle classes and the working class have moved into positions of power and influence—they are Americanizing the whole social and ethical climate of Europe. Their materialism, their acquisitiveness, their ability to win for themselves in a few years possessions and living standards which would have been beyond the wildest dreams of their grandfathers, would put any American to shame. Moreover, these people are just not politically inclined—unlike their American counterparts, they have never been involved in the political process and they appear to have no desire to get involved. They are European isolationists in the same sense of the word as their cousins in America were American isolationists fifty years ago. They can see no point in standing up to the Soviet Union or even wasting time thinking of such problems when time could be usefully occupied in the football stadium or watching television.

To sum up: weariness and disillusionment with war and politics and, second, the pursuit of material wealth as a by-product of the social revolution have, between them, sapped the political will of Europe.

Urban—I would have thought that *embourgeoisement* and the acquisition of wealth would make people more, rather than less conscious of the need to safeguard their new status and property, and that this awareness would call for an active foreign policy. After all, the officer who

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has come up from the ranks is always a greater stickler for respect and discipline than the man from West Point or Sandhurst. So, unless we have changed overnight into a continent of mindless sybarites, bourgeois status should have given us an extra stake in the political process, rather than the reverse.

Pipes—You are right in saying that, from the psychological point of view, the *nouveau riche* should have more to worry about than people of established status. But here a third factor comes into play: for the past 25 years, the United States has assumed the task of the military protection of Europe. If the various Berlin confrontations, the suppression of Hungary and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, for example, had been European happenings, rather than moves on the Soviet-American chessboard, I am sure there would be a very different psychology in Europe. But as things are, the Europeans feel that their military power is so inferior to that of the Soviet Union that they could not begin to stand up to Russia, and that America's protective presence makes it unnecessary to do any such thing in the first place. So the new European rich go on concentrating on their personal ends, glutting themselves on the goods and the good life they have just discovered and leaving the rest to the Americans. This, to my mind, is the kind of thing that accounts for the paralysis of the political will of Europe.

Now this is not true of America. Of course, there is in America a sense of tiredness after 25 years or so of carrying the burden of world leadership. There is, in particular, fatigue after the Vietnam war, and there is confusion and bewilderment about the Watergate affair, Nixon's resignation and the state of the presidency. Nevertheless, there is a very strong political sense which pervades the whole population—a sense of what freedom is about, what blessings we Americans enjoy because of that freedom. I am certain that if the United States were ever to be challenged on some issue that truly mattered to its future, the President would have no difficulty in rallying the American people. The will of America is not sapped.

I am not saying this in any spirit of vindictiveness: America, unlike Europe, did not suffer the ravages of two world wars on its territory; its losses were not comparable with those of the European countries and, also, the social revolution which has unhinged the European social order has been continuously with us for a century or so. For this combination of reasons, the average American is very conscious that America is a blessed land, that he owes America a great deal and he is prepared to fight for it. The European, as I see it, isn't ready to fight for Europe. For the average European, politics have always been made by an elite or, in recent decades, by the Americans; hence he does not feel involved —a home, the box (television) and a holiday are as far as his horizons will stretch.

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Urban—This is, of course, precisely the picture we used to have of the average *American* during the period of isolationism—

Pipes—and it was partly accurate. Now Europe has caught the disease and caught it with a vengeance. But while the United States is geographically so placed that it could (though it can no longer) indulge its shortsightedness, Europe cannot.

I'm not saying that the United States has no responsibility for European apathy; the flaccidity of Europe is indeed a measure of the success of American foreign policy, for we have given Europe too much of a good thing for too long. America ought to have started withdrawing from Europe in the late 1950s when the EEC was being put together. Our attitude should have been: "You are building up your economic unity, we hope this will impel you towards political unity and the two will force you to have your own military capability. And, just to make sure that all this does happen, we will start taking our troops out right now and complete our withdrawal over the next five or so years." This kind of thing would have given Europe a salutary shock.

Urban—You would not obviously agree with M. Jobert (the former French Foreign Minister) that America was in Europe exclusively to protect its own, not Western Europe's, interests?

Pipes—I hardly think I could agree with anything M. Jobert might say. The United States has stayed in Europe because American foreign policy was beset by a sense of inertia—a fear that if we showed the slightest weakening of the United States' resolve to stay in Europe, the Russians would at once take advantage of it. As always in history when you have a good thing going, the policy of least resistance is to keep it going. The American decision to stay was an understandable but costly long-term blunder.

Urban—I can sense two flaws in your argument, and they may very well be flaws in my understanding of the points you have made. First, why is it that affluence and *embourgeoisement* have a way of making *our nouveau riche* lethargic, egocentric and ineffectual, but seem to have no such impact on comparable classes in the Soviet Union? You said earlier on that higher living standards and a greater sophistication would not change the militancy of the Soviet establishment. This is an unusual judgment, for most Western observers believe that any liberalization of the Soviet system will occur for more or less the same reasons which—according to your analysis—account for our own apathy and our unwillingness to take part in the political process: the mellowing and enervating influence of the consumer society and the rising expectations it generates. If this were to be the case, apathy would be facing apathy, and *détente* might assume a more pleasing aspect than it does. But this is not happening.

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Is there any reason why the Soviet new class should be more resistant to the allurements of affluence than we are proving to be? Has that splendidly slothful figure, Oblomov, ceased to stand for the ruling vices of the Russian elite?

A Marxist might, of course, argue that the answer is very simple. He would claim that, having played out its role in the historical process, the European bourgeoisie, new and old, has lost its will to govern and is now propelling itself into the dustbin of history; not so the "new class" in the Soviet Union (my Marxist would, of course, never accept that term), where the proletariat is being carried forward, under the guidance of its "most progressive elements," by the wave of history.

Pipes—The two phenomena are totally unlike. *Embourgeoisement* in Western Europe is affecting virtually the whole population; the goods and gadgets and holidays are coveted by all and available to all. *Embourgeoisement* in Russia, in so far as it really exists, is the privilege of a relatively small elite which has never severed its umbilical cord with the state. Historical traditions play a role here, but without examining those in detail, let me simply state that the Russian elite shows a high degree of psychological continuity which manifests itself in nationalism and obedience, whatever other concepts may have been superimposed on that attitude in the name of ideology. I would go so far as saying that the Russian élite isn't a class or a pressure group in our sense at all. It resembles a self-perpetuating religious order, rather than what one normally thinks of as a governing establishment. Your idea, therefore, that *détente* might produce a convergence of apathies which would make Europe and the Soviet Union comparably impotent, is not a contingency I would personally put my money on. But nor, I take it, would you.

Urban—The second inconsistency (as I see it) concerns your point that in the late 1950s, parallel with the building up of the EEC, the United States should have pulled out some of its forces from Europe and signalled that, within a few years, it would take out the rest. At the same time, you said that Russian governments have an immense respect for power, and you also mentioned that, in the official view prevailing in Washington in the late 1950s, an American withdrawal from Europe would have entailed unacceptable risks. It is the latter point I want to argue.

The Soviet leadership can be astonishingly unsophisticated when trying to read and make sense of Western political attitudes. We saw this in Korea, for example, where one of Dean Acheson's casual remarks was interpreted by Stalin and his entourage as meaning that the United States had ceased to regard Korea as being within its sphere of interest, and this gave Stalin the green light for the North Korean attack. Here is a very important precedent, and my view is that, had the United States gone home from Europe in the late 1950s or early 1960s, Moscow might

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well have taken that for a sign of either American weakness or an abdication of American responsibility or both. For what other reasons —Khrushchev might have asked—would a great power give up something it has got? If the Soviet leadership under Khrushchev was foolish enough to believe that it could get away with challenging the United States on its home ground in Cuba, might it not have been tempted into an even more "hare-brained" adventure nearer home, once the United States presence had been removed from Europe? Khrushchev's tendency to project Soviet modes of thinking on to the "enemy" was always evident and is clearly attested by his memoirs.

Pipes—I don't agree. In the late 1950s, the United States had a very large nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union—enough to make any Soviet move in Europe prohibitively expensive. Russia's withdrawal from Cuba under determined American pressure was a sign of the size of the problem Russia was facing. Therefore, if the United States had started moving out of Europe in those years of undisputed nuclear superiority (gradually, of course), it would have indirectly contributed to the aggregate power of the West by cajoling or pushing Western Europe into political unity, and hence also into making a substantial military contribution of its own. So withdrawal would have ultimately strengthened our posture militarily *and* politically: it would have jerked Europe into pulling its weight more in accord with its economic power and geographic position. We could have prevented it from becoming a drop-out, which it now is.

Urban—I grant you this is a convincing reading of what ought to have been done if our politicians of the time had known what we now know—for example, about Khrushchev's inferiority complexes, the extent of his and his generals' bluffing to confound their adversaries and so on. But our politicians didn't, nor were they particularly far-sighted, nor did Europe want to abandon the Belloc principle: Better keep a hold of Nurse, for fear of getting something worse.

Pipes—Well, if this discussion has demonstrated anything, it is that Europe has now landed itself both with "nurse" and "worse."

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The Energy Gap in Eastern Europe

John M. Kramer

IN the past year, Americans have become painfully aware that the nation's energy supplies are not inexhaustible. A new term, "the energy crisis," has entered our vocabulary; its impact has been symbolized by brown-outs and black-outs, and frantic motorists searching for an open petrol station with the determination of medieval knights pursuing the Holy Grail. The industrialized nations of Western Europe and Japan have also suffered severely from the current energy crisis. Highly developed consumer-oriented societies apparently have an insatiable appetite for energy. This has led to spiralling prices for existing energy supplies, a development stimulating inflationary pressures in many countries.

With world-wide attention focused on the Arab oil boycott and resulting dislocations in the economies of advanced capitalist nations, energy problems in communist Eastern Europe have gone relatively unnoticed.[1] Yet the countries of Eastern Europe have become increasingly concerned about their energy supplies, and several of them have enacted comprehensive programmes for conserving existing supplies as well as developing new ones. Both Rumania and Bulgaria have established restrictions on petrol consumption, reduced speed limits and ordered that thermostats be turned down in government offices and enterprises. In Yugoslavia, panicky consumers have filled up their bathtubs with fuel and oil, and the government has announced substantial price increases for petroleum products, while in Poland even the military has taken steps to conserve fuel.

Naturally, the nature of the problem and government response to it varies amongst the different countries of the region, given the geological diversity of Eastern Europe and the significant differences in the sources and kinds of energy used. While the initiation of the current campaign to conserve energy in Eastern Europe followed closely the outbreak of the hostilities in the Middle East in October 1973, the increased price of Arab oil is only one of a complexity of factors contributing to official

[1] For earlier discussions of the energy situation in Eastern Europe, see the following: Jaroslav Polach, "Nuclear Power in East Europe," *East Europe*, 17 (May 1968), pp. 3–12, and "The Energy Gap in the Communist World," ibid., 18 (April 1969), pp. 19–26; Jaroslav Polach, "The Development of Energy in Eastern Europe," in Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in the Countries of Eastern Europe*, (Washington DC, Congress of the United States); Stanislaw Wasowski, "The Fuel Situation in Eastern Europe," *Soviet Studies*, XXI (July 1969), pp. 35–51. A recent discussion of the prospects for the development of atomic energy in the region is Josef Wilczynski, "Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes in the Warsaw Pact Countries," *Soviet Studies*, XXVI (October 1974), pp. 386–90.

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concern with the region's energy situation. In the following analysis we will examine various facets of the energy situation in Eastern Europe.

INCREASED energy consumption is directly related to economic growth and industrialization. Eastern Europe is no exception to this rule; the intense commitment to industrialization on the part of communist elites has resulted in rapid, albeit uneven, economic growth throughout the region, and to a concomitant expansion of energy consumption as well. However, the growth rate of energy consumption has consistently outstripped that of energy production in the region. Thus, between 1950 and 1966, indigenous energy production increased by 110 per cent, while energy consumption expanded by 150 per cent.[2] This has created in Eastern Europe an " energy gap," i.e. a disparity between indigenous energy production and total energy consumption. Such a gap appeared in Eastern Europe in the early 1960s when the absolute amount—not just the rate of growth—of the energy consumed in the area exceeded domestic production.

This gap is likely to grow as energy consumption rapidly increases, not only because of planned industrial growth, but also because the East European regimes are steadily expanding the manufacture of energy-devouring consumer products. Thus that ubiquitous symbol of mass consumption society, the private motor-car, is finally making its appearance in Eastern Europe. In East Germany, for example, the number of private cars doubled between 1965 and 1972, and totalled 1·4 million in the latter year. While the present stock of motor-cars throughout the region is still relatively small by Western standards, all the East European regimes have announced plans to increase production in the future. The proliferation of cars, televisions, electric toasters and other gadgets will place ever greater strains on already taut energy supplies in Eastern Europe.

While the growth in energy consumption in Eastern Europe parallels the pattern found in other industrialized regions, the kinds of energy consumed do not. Industrial growth in both Western Europe and Japan led to an increase in the rate of oil consumption that far surpassed the increase in the rate of overall energy consumption.[3] In contrast, Eastern Europe still relies heavily on solid fuels for its energy; in the late 1960s, oil and gas accounted for only 21 per cent of the energy consumption of the six East European members of Comecon, and the figure is only 13 per cent, if Rumania is excluded.

Yet the consumption of liquid fuels, especially oil, has increased steadily throughout much of Eastern Europe, and consumption will rise even more dramatically in the future. For example, in Bulgaria liquid fuels constituted only 14 per cent of the energy consumed in 1960, and

[2] Quoted in Polach, " The Energy Gap in the Communist World," p. 20.

[3] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Energy Policy Problems and Objectives* (Paris, 1966); see especially tables 2B, 5B, 8B.

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planners projected that they would account for 35–38 per cent of consumption by 1980. However, in 1970 liquid fuels already accounted for over 40 per cent of total consumption, and Bulgarian officials now forecast that by 1980 they will provide almost 65–70 per cent of the country's energy.[4] Tables 1 and 2 further illustrate this trend towards increased consumption of liquid fuels.

TABLE 1

Energy Consumption in Hungary 1960, 1970, 1972

Energy Source	1960 %	1970 %	1972 %
Coal	74.0	52.3	44.3
Oil	19·6	30·5	36·0
Natural Gas	3·4	15·3	17·8
Wood	3·0	1·9	1·9
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0

Source: *Statistical Yearbook 1972*, p. 182.

TABLE 2

Energy Consumption in Czechoslovakia 1970, 1972, 1980

Energy Source	1970 [a] %	1972 [a] %	1980 [b] %
Coal	74·9	67·0	57·0
Oil	19·0	25·8	29·7
Natural Gas	3·5	4·7	7·5
Other	2·6	2·5	5·8
Total	100·0	100·0	100·0

Source: [a] *Planovane hospodarstvi*, No. 6, June 1971.
[b] *Rude pravo*, 19 June 1972.

Estimates of future oil consumption in Eastern Europe vary, but it could reach almost 200 million tons by 1980.[5] The increasing reliance on liquid fuels contributes significantly to East Europe's energy gap, since the region, exclusive of Rumania, has few indigenous liquid fuel reserves. Therefore, East Europe must rely primarily on imports to meet its growing requirements for these fuels. Table 3 illustrates the sources of crude oil for selected East European countries in 1971.

[4] *Novo vreme*, No. 4, 1964; *Ikonomicheski zhivot*, No. 8, 21 February 1973.
[5] For a number of different estimates, see Wasowski, op. cit., pp. 40–41; see also Abraham Becker, "Oil and the Persian Gulf in Soviet Policy in the Seventies," in Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, eds., *The USSR in the Middle East* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 181.

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TABLE 3

Sources of Crude Oil for Selected East European Countries, 1971 (In Millions of Tons)

	Domestic Production	Imports	Total	Domestic Production as per cent. of Total
Bulgaria	0·30	7·55	7·85	3·9
Czechoslovakia	0·19	11·50	11·69	1·6
Hungary	1·93	4·89	6·82	28·7
Rumania	13·70	2·85	16·55	80·2

Source: Compiled from data in the following *Radio Free Europe* reports: Bulgarian Situation Report/41, 23 November 1973, p. 4. Czechoslovak Situation Report/42, 21 November 1973, p. 6. Hungarian Situation Report/40, 13 November 1973, p. 4. Rumanian Situation Report/45, 20 November 1973, p. 7.

Both Poland and Yugoslavia also import large amounts of crude oil: in 1972 Poland imported over 90 per cent of its crude oil requirements, while Yugoslavia imports annually over 70 per cent.[6]

Traditionally, the USSR has supplied the bulk of the difference between Eastern Europe's production and consumption of fuel and energy resources. Hence an examination of the relationship in the energy field between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is essential to an understanding of the fuel situation in the region.

THE USSR exports huge amounts of fuel and energy to Eastern Europe. Energy exports to the European members of Comecon have grown steadily from 24 per cent of total Soviet energy exports in 1960 to over 30 per cent in 1970.[7] Furthermore, in the current five-year plan (1971–75) the Soviet Union has agreed to increase substantially its energy exports to the Comecon countries.[8] Table 4 demonstrates the almost total dependence of European members of Comecon, except for Rumania, on Soviet oil for their import needs.

Although an Albanian radio report recently charged that as a result of the October Middle East war the "Soviet revisionists have reduced the oil supplies to their East European provinces,"[9] the continued high

[6] *Rocznik Statystyczny* 1973, p. 414; *Vjesnik*, 5 Jan. 1974.

[7] Robert Campbell, "Some Issues in Soviet Energy Policy for the Seventies," in Joint Economic Committee *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies* (Washington DC, Congress of the United States, 17 June, 1973), p. 51.

[8] The USSR has agreed to increase substantially its fuel and energy exports to Comecon in the ninth five-year plan (1971–75) as contrasted to the eighth five-year plan (1966–70): petroleum from 138 million tons to 243 million tons, natural gas from 8 billion cubic metres to 33 billion cubic metres, electric power from 14 billion kwh to 42 billion kwh. For details, see Premier Kosygin's remarks at the twenty-fourth Party congress (1971) reported in *Pravda*, 7 April 1971.

[9] Radio Tirana, 11 Dec. 1973, translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Eastern Europe Daily Report, 13 Dec. 1973.

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TABLE 4

Crude Oil Imports of European Members of Comecon from the USSR, 1971

Country	Per cent. of Imports from USSR
Bulgaria	76
Czechoslovakia	92
East Germany	89
Hungary	89
Poland	100
Rumania	0

Source: Compiled from data in *Radio Free Europe*, Rumanian Situation Report/9, 27 February 1973, p. 18.

level of Soviet energy exports to the region seems assured until the end of the current plan (1975). However, Soviet as well as Western analysts have expressed doubts that the USSR can continue after 1975 to satisfy completely the rapidly expanding energy demands of the European communist states. A Hungarian expert estimates that by 1980 the Comecon countries will be forced to buy between 150 and 170 million tons of crude oil from countries other than the Soviet Union.[10]

Furthermore, several experts have predicted that by 1980 the Soviet Union itself may well face an energy gap that will compel it to import large amounts of crude oil and natural gas.[11] The development of the huge Siberian natural resource complex is the major variable determining the magnitude, if any, of a future Soviet energy gap. Siberian petroleum and natural gas are scheduled to play a critical role in the future provision of Soviet energy supplies: the West Siberian fields are to account for two-thirds of the increment in petroleum output during 1971–75, and they are to provide between 75–80 per cent of the increment for the entire decade of the seventies. Production of West Siberian natural gas, which amounted to 318 billion cubic feet in 1970, is projected to rise to 4·6 trillion cubic feet annually by 1975.[12]

[10] *Nepszabadsag*, 23 Jan. 1974. Another estimate is provided by Abraham Becker who predicts that the Comecon countries will be forced to buy almost 100 million tons of crude oil equivalent by 1980 from countries other than the Soviet Union. Confino and Shamir, op. cit. p. 185.

[11] In fact, the USSR already imports some crude oil and natural gas. In 1973, it imported 13 million tons of petroleum, which was over 10 per cent of its petroleum exports for the year. Of course, such imports do not necessarily indicate that the Soviet Union cannot meet its energy requirements from its own reserves, but rather that in some instances, such as the use of Iranian oil in the USSR's southern republics, it may be cheaper to import energy than to exploit more expensive domestic reserves. However, for predictions that the USSR may be compelled by 1980 to import large amounts of energy to meet domestic shortages see the *Washington Post*, 15 Nov. 1973, and *Wissenpolitik*, No. 1, 1972, pp. 110–111.

[12] N. K. Baibakov, ed. *Gosudarstvennyi pyatiletnii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR na 1971–1975 gody* (Moscow; Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972), p. 258; *Oil and Gas Journal*, 24 Aug. 1970, p. 128; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 8, Feb. 1973.

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However, the exploitation of Siberia's natural riches poses formidable obstacles. Although a detailed analysis of these obstacles is beyond the scope of this paper, we may briefly list several of the most important barriers.[13] First, Soviet estimates of the extent of these reserves have been less than precise. The Soviets seem to have broadened the definition of "proven" reserves to encompass reserves that are only "probable" by Western standards. John Hardt has commented that "some Soviet geologists appear to buttress their claims concerning Siberian reserves with new, unproven geological theories evocative of Trofim Lysenko's ill-founded 'solution of the grain problem.'"[14] Second, complex technological problems must be overcome, not only to exploit these reserves, but also to transport them to consumers. Finally, the remote location of these reserves in an inhospitable environment will substantially increase the cost of their development. Several Soviet economists estimate that the development of Siberian petroleum and natural gas reserves may cost almost four times as much as the continued development of the Ural-Volga deposits.[15] Transportation of the energy to markets in European Russia and abroad will be one of the most substantial of these costs.

Therefore, the future expansion of Soviet energy supplies may not grow as rapidly as the demand, thus provoking sharp competition between domestic and foreign consumers for these resources. In this competition the economic profitability of energy exports to Eastern Europe, and the opportunity costs of exports to hard currency areas, will be a critical variable influencing Soviet calculations of the optimum level of such exports. The Soviets have a strong incentive to increase energy exports to hard currency areas, because it is only in the advanced capitalist countries that they can acquire the sophisticated technology that their economy requires. Besides, the attractiveness of selling energy supplies to these countries is likely to increase in the future, as world market prices for such commodities rise sharply. In fact, one Western authority estimates that if the Soviets were to divert the bulk of their petroleum exports from Eastern Europe and the developing countries to Western Europe and other industralized countries, then they could increase their hard currency earnings by between 6 billion to 9 billion dollars annually (at current world petroleum prices).[16] Yet the Soviets have experienced difficulty in fulfilling several of the agreements already concluded with these nations for energy supplies. For example, in 1972 the USSR delivered less than two-thirds of the agreed quotas of crude oil to West

[13] For more extensive analyses see the following: Campbell, op. cit., pp. 45–55. John Hardt, "West Siberia: The Quest for Energy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), XXII (May–June 1973), pp. 25–36. Robert N. North, "Soviet Northern Development: The Case of Northwest Siberia," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), XXIV (Oct. 1972), pp. 171–99.

[14] Hardt, op. cit. p. 27.

[15] *Kommunist* (Moscow), September 1966, pp. 66–67.

[16] Marshall Goldman, "Raw Materials, the Environment and Foreign Trade in the Soviet Union," paper presented at the Conference on Soviet Resource Management and the Environment, Seattle, Washington, 6–7 June 1974, p. 7.

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Germany, one of the lowest levels since the Soviets began repaying the Germans with crude oil for wide-diameter pipe used in oil pipeline construction. German officials speculated that rising consumption in both the USSR and Eastern Europe, plus Soviet difficulty in expanding domestic oil production contributed to the Russians' inability to meet the quotas.[17]

By contrast with the strong economic incentive to export energy to the West and Japan, the Soviets have often complained about the unprofitability of such exports to Eastern Europe. The Soviets contend that the prices charged to their East European customers for energy do not reflect the full cost of extraction and transportation of these resources. Moreover, they argue that the East Europeans repay them for high quality energy supplies with shoddy goods that fall below world standards.[18] Ironically, several East European commentators have argued precisely the opposite: that the USSR has exploited the region by selling it energy supplies, especially crude oil, at higher than world market prices.[19]

Whatever merit the East European argument may have had in the past, it is clearly not valid today. The current price of Soviet crude oil exports to Eastern Europe still falls well below the world market level, despite the fact that the Soviet Union more than doubled the price of its oil exports to Eastern Europe in January 1975. Prior to this, the price had been based on agreements concluded among the Comecon members in 1969–70 which would have been valid until the end of 1975, but earlier this year, the Soviet Union decided to scrap the old system whereby the price of oil was fixed for five-year periods. The price will now be reviewed annually. World prices have risen so sharply that what the East Europeans were paying for Soviet crude oil in 1974 (before the recent increase) was perhaps only one-fifth of the current market price [20]; what they are paying now is still about one-third less than the current world price.

The disparity between what the Soviets charge Eastern Europe for oil and world market prices has reportedly sparked within Comecon "intensive discussions" that "threaten to produce deep divisions in the bloc." While the East Europeans concede that some price adjustments are necessary, they are apparently baulking at the magnitude of the increases demanded by the Soviets. For example, Jan Chylinski, a vice-chairman of the Polish Planning Commission, agreed in a recent interview that "a corrective mechanism" must be developed by Comecon to bring its raw material prices into closer conformity with world prices, but he also stressed that among socialist countries "the profits of an oil producer should not be too high." Another Polish official reinforced Chylinski's

[17] *New York Times*, 4 Nov. 1973.

[18] For example, see Michael Gamarnikow, "Is Comecon Obsolete?" *East Europe*, 17 (April 1968), pp. 12–18.

[19] See, for example, Radio Prague, 7 Nov. 1967, cited in Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak Situation Report/43, 28 Nov. 1973, p. 3.

[20] *Washington Post*, 4 Mar. 1974.

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position when he argued that the future price of Soviet energy "will have to be fixed so that we don't lose and no one gains." [21]

Comecon regulations specifying that all prices of raw materials in the current five-year plan are based upon adjusted world market prices in the previous five-year period are a major obstacle to Soviet efforts to increase substantially the price of crude oil to its Comecon partners in the future. Since the start of the dramatic increase in world petroleum prices did not begin until the very end of the third year of the present plan (i.e., 1973), the average price of oil in the first three years of this plan is far below the existing world market price at the end of the plan period. Furthermore, it seems almost inevitable that this price will be substantially below the world market price in the entire period of the next five-year plan (1976–80). Therefore, the Soviets are attempting to change the regulation.

While the East Europeans are understandably reluctant to accede to this request, they may be compelled to do so, because of an implied threat that the USSR, if baulked, will not agree to any fixed long-term price for petroleum. If this threat was enacted, it would seriously damage the ability of the East European regimes to formulate future five-year plans. Fixed, stable prices, especially for such a critical commodity as oil, are essential for such plans, because of the planner's need to minimize uncertainty about the future.

While recently spiralling world petroleum prices have pressed upon the Soviets the urgency of re-adjusting Comecon energy prices, the USSR has, in fact, for several years been attempting to increase the economic attractiveness of energy exports to Eastern Europe. It has pursued this primarily by pressing for closer cooperation among Comecon members, especially through East European investment in the exploitation of Soviet fuel and energy reserves. Thus the "Comprehensive Programme for the Extension and Improvement of Collaboration and Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the Comecon Countries" (1971) advocated investment by Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland in the exploitation of Soviet energy reserves to be repaid by deliveries of fuel and energy to these countries.

So far, however, Comecon's East European members seem less than enthusiastic about this idea. The East European response is based upon both economic and political considerations. Some observers question the economic feasibility for the East Europeans of large investments in the Soviet petroleum and natural gas industry.[22] Further, the East Europeans may be reluctant to tie up huge amounts of capital in the Soviet Union which could later be used to exert pressure on them.

This last assertion points to one of the most important considerations of the USSR in supplying fuel and energy to Eastern Europe. The substantial dependence of these countries on Soviet energy supplies is a

[21] Ibid.

[22] Wasowski, op. cit., p. 48.

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crucial instrument through which the USSR can exercise political control over them. One wonders whether the USSR would relinquish such an important instrument of control by permitting the East Europeans to buy large amounts of their fuel and energy in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Yet there are good reasons for the Soviets to permit the East Europeans to purchase at least some of their energy supplies elsewhere. First, in the period after 1975 it is unlikely that the USSR will have sufficient energy resources simultaneously to satisfy growing domestic energy consumption, maintain substantial energy exports to capitalist countries, and fill completely Eastern Europe's rapidly widening energy gap. Second, such a policy will release additional Soviet energy reserves for export to hard currency areas. The opportunity costs to the Soviets of such exports have always been high in relation to similar exports to Eastern Europe, and they will increase even more if Comecon fails to eliminate the growing difference between world petroleum prices and those paid in intra-Comecon trade. Finally, energy exports will still constitute an important instrument of control, because most of the East European nations will continue to import a substantial amount of their energy from the USSR. In fact, it is now a moot question whether the USSR will permit its Comecon partners to establish contacts with non-socialist oil producers, because the latter have already done so for some time.

ALTHOUGH Eastern Europe still receives most of its fuel and energy from the USSR, it is not immune to the consequences of recent developments in the world energy market, especially the sharp increase in petroleum prices. First, of course, the increase in world market prices means that the East Europeans will be paying substantially higher prices for Soviet oil exports. Second, to the extent that higher petroleum prices raise the costs of production in Western countries, the East Europeans will have to pay more for certain imports from the West. Finally, the East European countries are directly affected by the price increases, because they all import some oil from non-socialist, principally Arab, nations. Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Libya supply the bulk of this oil to Eastern Europe, although Rumania also imports oil from Saudi Arabia, and, as from 1978, will import crude oil from Venezuela. Fortunately, recent developments have not affected the supply of Arab oil to Eastern Europe, since all of the region's regimes, except Rumania, completely support the Arab cause against Israel. While some Rumanian officials expressed the fear that their country's diplomatic stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict might jeopardize its oil imports from the Middle East, this fear has not yet materialized. In fact, in February 1974, Rumania signed a new trade agreement with Libya whereby the latter will deliver to it almost 12 million tons of crude oil by 1977.

Naturally, the price increases have affected individual East European nations differently, depending on the extent of their oil imports from

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non-socialist sources. For countries such as Rumania and Yugoslavia, which already import large amounts of Arab oil, the impact is considerable. For example, in 1974 Yugoslavia needed to import about 8·5 million tons of crude oil, at a cost of more than 1,000 million dollars; in October 1972, the same amount of crude oil would have cost approximately 200 million dollars. One Yugoslav source estimates that the increased cost of oil will account for over 80 per cent. of the nation's 1974 balance of payments deficit of approximately 720 million dollars. Yet countries such as Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, which do not depend as heavily as do Rumania and Yugoslavia on Arab oil imports, have also been adversely affected by price increases. For example, at the Libya oil auction in December 1973, Poland bought one million tons of crude oil and Hungary and Bulgaria each 500,000 tons at 160 dollars per ton—a price that was approximately 2·5 times greater than the price paid in October 1973.[23]

The impact of the recent price increases will be acutely felt in the near future when substantial quantities of Arab oil begin to flow to Eastern Europe. The Adriatic pipeline, a joint project by Yugoslavia, Czechslovakia and Hungary, represents the most ambitious attempt so far to bring Middle Eastern oil to the region. Controversy has plagued the project since it was first discussed in 1964. Not only did groups in Yugoslavia question the pipeline's potentially adverse impact on the environment, but the three countries could not agree upon a pipeline route until mid-1973. Most of the objections to the pipeline have now been overcome, and it is scheduled for completion in 1975. The pipeline's tanker terminal at Rijeka on the Adriatic coast will be capable of handling about 34 million tons of crude oil annually by the 1980s. Under the agreement, Yugoslavia will receive about 24 million tons annually from the pipeline, and Czechoslovakia and Hungary approximately 5 million tons each. Poland and Rumania have also expressed interest in joining the pipeline project, although they are not parties to the present agreement. Polish officials have indicated that they might wish to contract in the future for as much as 11 million tons of oil annually from the pipeline.[24]

Eastern Europe's growing energy gap, and the USSR's unwillingness and/or inability to fill it completely, has forced the region increasingly to turn to non-socialist sources for energy supplies. Some groups in Eastern Europe may be pleased with such a development as a potential means of lessening Soviet control in the area. Yet the authorities must be concerned with the enormous economic burden that this development entails. To soften this burden, most of the regimes have taken a number of steps to conserve existing energy supplies. We now turn to an examination of these various programmes.

[23] *Vjesnik*, 25 July 1974; *Vilaggazdasag*, 26 January 1974.

[24] For details of the Adriatic pipeline project, see the *Washington Post*, 10 Jan. 1974.

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ALL the East European countries, except for East Germany, have undertaken special measures to conserve fuel and energy reserves.[25] For example, the Yugoslavs have substantially increased the price of petrol, diesel fuel and home heating oil. In an effort to conserve electric power, the Federal Executive Council has ordered that the public lighting of streets, factories and other business establishments be reduced by 50 per cent, that television stations cut back their broadcasting time by two hours daily, and that the use of neon signs be discontinued.

Poland has taken several measures to reduce the consumption of liquid fuels, especially petrol. Like the Yugoslavs, the Poles have announced price increases on many petroleum products. They have also placed limitations on the fuel consumption of official cars, certain types of trucks and buses, and aircraft on domestic flights. Even the Polish military has joined the effort to conserve fuel by pledging to reduce the number of vehicles used in training and by making better use of existing means of transport.

In Czechoslovakia, officials had repeatedly claimed that the world oil crisis would have only a marginal impact on their country, since Czechoslovakia received almost all of its oil from the USSR.[26] Yet in March 1974 the Czechs, too, were compelled to announce substantial price increases for petrol and the imposition of speed limits for all vehicles. Further, Czech officials have indicated that the shift from solid to liquid fuels envisaged in the next five-year plan will not be as great as originally projected. The authorities have also been concerned with conserving electric power. They estimate that during hours of peak power consumption the gap between demand and supply can reach almost 400 megawatts. Therefore, the Czechs have established norms of consumption for all industrial users of power. In addition, enterprises have begun to place machines that consume large amounts of power on shifts in the late afternoon and evening hours when demand for power throughout the country is low.

The Hungarians have also initiated a number of steps to conserve energy, although these steps initially were not as comprehensive as the programmes of several other East European countries. Thus, on 20 April 1974, the Minister of Heavy Industry announced the following measures: (1) ministries and other organizations must now elaborate energy con-

[25] For details of the various energy conservation campaigns, see the following: Bulgaria: *Rabotnichesko delo*, 1 Dec. 1973; Czechoslovakia: *Rude pravo*, 26 Nov. 1973, 30 Mar, 1974; Hungary: *Nepszabadsag*, 18 Apr. 1974, Radio Free Europe, Hungarian Situation Report/16, 23 Apr. 1974, pp. 2–3 and *Magyar Hirlap*, 14 July 1974; Poland: Radio Warsaw, 24 Nov. 1973, discussed in Radio Free Europe, Polish Situation Report/41, 30 Nov. 1973, pp. 13–16; Rumania, *Scinteia*, 18 Nov. 1973; Yugoslavia: *Tanjug*, 7 Dec. 1973, translated in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Eastern Europe Daily Report, 10 Dec. 1973.

[26] See, for example, the remarks by Foreign Minister Chnoupek (Radio Hvezda, 21 Nov. 1973) and Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Vinklarek (Radio Prague, 14 Nov. 1973). Reported in Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak Situation Report/14, 3 Apr. 1974, p. 2.

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servation plans; (2) permits for the use of energy sources will henceforth be restricted; (3) investments in projects that are not energy intensive will be given priority; (4) the manufacture of oil heaters will be curtailed. Then in mid-June, the government announced substantial price increases, beginning in 1975, for many fuels, including a 45 per cent increase for diesel oil and a 40 per cent. increase for both petrol and home-heating oil. To cushion the impact of these price rises on the Hungarian consumer, the government simultaneously announced increases in wages for most industrial workers, but not for agricultural personnel.

Rumania and Bulgaria have enacted the most extensive energy conservation programmes in Eastern Europe. Several of the steps that they have taken are quite imaginative: Bulgaria, for example, has initiated a nationwide competition to conserve fuel and energy with the winners receiving prizes ranging from a Moskvich car to a wrist-watch. Also, they were the only two nations in the region to introduce petrol rationing for private cars. Bulgaria's plan involves an elaborate coupon system, whereby drivers are entitled to so much petrol at set prices, and to additional petrol at higher prices. Although Rumania abandoned petrol rationing in March 1974, the authorities continued to pursue the goal of fuel conservation by providing, in the same decree that eliminated the rationing, for sharp increases in the price of petrol and motor oil. Both countries have also placed restrictions on the use of official cars; Bulgarian authorities, for example, have ordered that the fuel allocated to such vehicles be reduced by 50 per cent. Finally, each country has established new, lower speed limits for all vehicles, both public and private.

Rumania and Bulgaria have also taken a number of steps to reduce energy consumption in industrial establishments and in private homes. Bulgaria has ordered a 15 per cent reduction in the consumption of liquid fuel used for heating offices and enterprises, and ordered that central heating units that supply heat to the population must reduce fuel consumption by six to eight per cent.

Rumania has taken even more severe measures. In addition to ordering many of the measures taken by their Bulgarian counterparts, Rumanian officials are even contemplating changing the country's economic priorities to encourage the development of industries that consume little fuel. In a recent speech to the Central Committee, the Rumanian party leader, Nicolae Ceauşescu, raised the possibility of reorienting industrial growth to stress the development of industries and industrial processes that consume relatively little fuel.[27] If such a reorientation involves shifting emphasis away from investment in the petrochemical industry, as the context of Ceauşecu's remarks implied, then this would indeed represent a major departure from Rumania's previous development strategy.

The energy conservation campaigns undertaken by the various East European regimes represent an acknowledgment of the seriousness of

[27] *Scinteia*, 1 Dec. 1973.

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the region's energy situation. Moreover, their elaboration suggests that at least some of the region's governments recognize the need for comprehensive long-term programmes to conserve fuel and energy supplies. Thus, these programmes may be only a prelude to more systematic and far-reaching proposals in the future.

EASTERN Europe's energy problems are primarily a function of the region's rapid industrialization since the end of the second world war. Since Eastern Europe is relatively deficient in indigenous energy reserves, it was almost inevitable that the region would experience an "energy gap," wherein energy consumption would outrun production.

Eastern Europe's energy gap will have far-reaching consequences within the region itself and in its relations with the USSR. As noted, it has already provoked sharp debates within Comecon over the price of Soviet energy exports, and it will cause economic dislocations of varying degrees within each of the East European countries. Such economic dislocations may have profound political consequences as well, for they can contribute to an increase in systematic instability. Probably few officials in Eastern Europe have forgotten that price increases on consumer goods precipitated the discontent among the workers that eventually toppled the Gomulka regime; they may well fear that similar increases on fuel and energy products will provoke the same result. Further, the drive to protect the environment may suffer to the extent that it clashes with steps to cushion the impact of the energy crunch. Thus, in Yugoslavia, spiralling oil prices have largely halted a trend towards the installation of home oil heating units that were replacing the old wood and soft coal furnaces which had traditionally heated most homes and which contributed to the stifling atmospheric pollution of such cities as Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb.[28] Yet the situation is not entirely bleak: the world's energy problems will also bring benefits to several East European countries. For example, coal is Poland's best earner of hard currency, and exports to the Common Market are expected to double over the next five years.[29] Countries with a highly developed petrochemical industry, such as Rumania and Czechoslovakia, will benefit from higher prices for their products. However, whether such gains offset losses resulting from the energy problems of these countries remains to be seen.

How will Eastern Europe attempt to meet its future energy needs? The USSR will, of course, remain a major supplier of energy to the region. Yet the Soviet leadership must soon begin to ask itself hard political and economic questions as it seeks to determine the proper level of future energy exports to Eastern Europe. First, the leadership must determine the value of such exports to the USSR as a means of political control over the region. Second, the opportunity costs of energy exports to capitalist countries, as contrasted to Eastern Europe, will be an

[28] *New York Times*, 10 Mar. 1974.
[29] Radio Free Europe, "Polish Coal Exports Grow," 15 Nov. 1973.

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important variable influencing how much the Soviet leaders will want to export to the latter. Yet, no matter how the Soviet leaders answer such questions, it is highly unlikely that imports from the USSR, especially after 1975, will close Eastern Europe's energy gap. Possible constraints on domestic production, as well as rising consumer demand in the USSR itself and in capitalist countries, will almost surely place limits on the amount of energy that the Soviet Union will export to Eastern Europe.

Hence, Eastern Europe will undoubtedly turn increasingly to the Middle East for its energy supplies. Projects such as the Adriatic pipeline indicate that Eastern Europe's desire for Middle Eastern oil is not temporary, but represents instead a long-term policy commitment. Increased exposure to the volatile world oil market may cause serious problems for Eastern Europe's central planners. Long-term planning requires that officials make accurate predictions about future trends and developments, something that may prove difficult if prices for vital commodities, such as energy, fluctuate unpredictably.

Finally, Eastern Europe will attempt to close its energy gap by conserving its existing reserves, as well as by developing new sources of energy. In the short term, if the region hopes to avoid potentially serious political, economic and social dislocations brought about by a widening energy gap, it will have to scramble for increasingly tight and expensive energy supplies from the USSR and the Middle East, and exercise special care to manage its existing supplies as carefully as possible. In the long run, the development of nuclear power may prove the best means for closing the energy gap. No country in Eastern Europe has yet developed an extensive nuclear power capacity, although each of them has ambitious plans for doing so. The reluctance of the USSR to provide technical assistance to such programmes is the major obstacle to their development. Although the USSR agreed in 1955–56 to provide such assistance to all the East European countries except Albania and Yugoslavia, it has, until recently, largely failed to do so. The result is that nuclear power will not be a significant source of energy in any East European country before 1980.[30]

[30] Wilczynski, op. cit. gives a detailed assessment of the prospects for nuclear power development in East Europe.

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A Quarter of a Century of the Two Germanies *

Melvin Croan

1974 marked the 25th anniversary of the establishment of both present-day German states, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East. Both these states were regarded by their sponsors outside Germany and by their respective German "founding fathers" as merely temporary constructs, pending the formation of a single German government. Twenty-five years later, the two German states prove one French adage but disprove another. Their survival for a period of time longer than that of either the Nazi regime or the Weimar Republic and, indeed, now nearly as long as that of both of those earlier German political systems combined, certainly testifies to the validity of the adage, "*Il n'y a que le provisoire qui dure*" ("Nothing endures quite like that which is provisional"). But the basic features of each of the two present-day German states, different as they are from one another, disproves a second adage."*Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*" ("The more things change, the more they remain the same"). In fact, both Germanies today are profoundly different from any previous Germany. As Ralf Dahrendorf, the distinguished German sociologist, sometime German Commissioner to the EEC, and presently head of the London School of Economics, has cogently argued in his masterful study, *Society and Democracy in Germany*, the socio-economic foundations of *traditional* German political authoritarianism have been uprooted in both the FRG and the GDR. In that sense, each of the two present-day German states and societies constitutes a case of Germany's belated modernization, albeit along entirely different lines—an individualistic, constitutional democratic order in West Germany, and a collectivistic party dictatorship in East Germany. And, of course, these divergent paths to modernization have been achieved at the painful price of Germany's national division.

So, looking back over the last quarter of a century, and, indeed, somewhat longer, to 1945, "the zero point" in Germany's current history, I would like to focus on three major aspects: first, briefly to review the achievements of each of the two Germanies; next, to analyse the issues and the problems that exist in their relationship to one another; and finally, to try to grapple with the elusive, but supremely important question of the German nation, i.e., with the question of German national identity, now and for the future.

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BEGINNING, then, with achievements, those of the Federal Republic are perhaps too well known to require extensive elaboration. In the first instance, one thinks of West Germany's *economic miracle*, the emergence of West Germany from the chaos and ruin of the immediate post-war years into a healthy and robust economy, with a standard of living exceeding that of Britain and France; an economy which, though not without its problems, has, nonetheless, been the envy of much of the rest of the world, including the socialist camp and the Soviet Union. But at least as important as the economic miracle experienced by West Germany has been its *political miracle*; a political miracle, I would suggest, in two separate senses: 1. The miracle of Germany's rapid international rehabilitation. This was a direct result of the choice, made quite consciously and firmly by all the major West German political elites and supported overwhelmingly by West German public opinion for integration with the West. This choice for integration with the West marked a resolution, at least for the time being, of the age-old dilemma that had long bedevilled the country: whether Germany belonged to the West, or to the East, to both or to neither. 2. In addition, there was a political miracle in another no less important sense: the miracle of making the democratic processes of the Bonn Constitution really work, so that the Federal Republic has enjoyed strong and effective, but also representative and responsible government, not just under one man, Adenauer, or under one party, the CDU. The Federal Republic has survived and has been institutionally strengthened by a change of leaders and regimes, from Adenauer, through Erhard, Kiesinger and Brandt, to Schmidt; from CDU, through Grand Coalition, to Socialist-Liberal government. The Federal Republic has coped with domestic political crises, not perfectly, to be sure, but more smoothly and successfully than many observers dared even to hope.

But if all this has been true of the FRG, it has also been true, *mutatis mutandis*, for the other German state, the GDR.

After almost a decade of merciless Soviet economic exploitation, and without any sources of external support, such as the Marshall Plan, that were available to West Germany, the GDR in the 60s also experienced its own "economic miracle". Today, the GDR, with only the scantiest raw materials and energy base of its own, can claim to rank as the ninth most productive industrial state in the world. It enjoys the highest standard of living in the communist world; it is the envy of the Soviet Union, to say nothing of Poland and hapless Czechoslovakia.

But there is also a sense in which one can speak of a political miracle in the GDR. This long-time outcast among states has now, of course, broken through to general diplomatic recognition and membership in the UN. Domestically, the GDR, long regarded as politically unstable, has been consolidated. It can now claim an impressive degree of internal political cohesion and stability. Among other things, the East German regime weathered the transition in leadership from Ulbricht to Honecker

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without a sign of elite in-fighting, much less of popular unrest. While the East German political system is assuredly one that does not recommend itself to constitutional democrats or even to humanistic Marxists, it does govern more smoothly and effectively than many observers would have thought possible. And, given its origins and early post-war history, that too must be accounted a miracle.

So, we have not one but two German success stories; and we may next consider how they relate to one another. Not very easily, I am afraid.

TO be sure, the period of almost 20 years of what has been called "The Cold Civil War" in Germany has now given way to a novel phase of "co-existence" between the FRG and the GDR. But it is important to recall that this was accomplished without any positive contribution from East Germany; indeed it was achieved in the teeth of stiff opposition from the East German elite. The achievement was the handiwork in the first instance of the two Bs: Brandt and Brezhnev; Brandt's *Ostpolitik* of reconciliation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, including the GDR, was reciprocated by Brezhnev's *Westpolitik*, not so much of reconciliation with the FRG for its own sake, as of East-West *détente*, to gain Western acceptance of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, thereby relieving political pressure on the Soviet Union's European front at a time when Russia faced a worsening problem with China, and, incidentally, also in the hope of gaining access to West German credit and technological and scientific know-how.

In any case, the East Germans were dragged along, against the desires and better judgment of the GDR ruling political elite, which feared that a relaxation of tensions in Germany might prove destabilizing at home in the GDR. Despite formidable obstacles, a series of inter-German accords was concluded in 1971–72 culminating in the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR which was concluded in 1972 and ratified in 1973. As a result of these agreements, and despite incidents such as the Guillaume affair, in which, in effect, the East Germans toppled a West German government, not only have technical contacts between East and West Germany been proliferated, but human contacts in the form of personal visits have greatly expanded.

For all this, one can give one small cheer, but probably not much more. For East Germany's "opening" to West Germany remains sharply circumscribed and tightly controlled: travel is one-way, West to East, except for East German pensioners; there have been fresh hindrances on travel, such as the doubling of the amount of West German currency that must be exchanged; "co-existance" has been accompanied by an East German campaign of *Abgrenzung* (ideological and political demarcation vis-à-vis West Germany). Finally, technical contacts have not necessarily facilitated a reversal of political estrangement between the two German states, for that would require a fundamental political reorientation on the part of the GDR of which there is no sign and, indeed, which

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remains impossible as long as it is not in the Soviet interest. Despite all measures of " co-existence " between East Germany and West Germany, the fundamental antagonism nurtured by the GDR towards the FRG continues unabated, if only because this antagonism forms an essential part of the very *raison d'état* of the East German regime, and its elite continues to be fearful that a genuine, far-ranging relaxation of tensions in Germany might threaten its hold over the East German population. If there were genuine *rapprochement*, the East German population might ask: " Why can't we travel to West Germany? Why doesn't our government take political steps towards eventual national reunification? " In other words, in the limited " reassociation " with West Germany which has been forced on the East German leadership by the Soviets, it sees the spectre of national reunification, and even, short of that, the threat of domestic political restiveness.

As a result, tensions continue to simmer beneath the surface and occasionally they erupt (a) on specific issues, such as those concerning Berlin, on various technical arrangements between the two states and, in particular, the " swing " involving West German credits in East German-West German trade (these may be resolved as they arise, but not at all necessarily through West German negotiations with East Germany, but rather with the Soviet Union—and for a price. At present, there are signs of an impending FRG-GDR package agreement, arranged by Bonn and Moscow); and (b) even more fundamentally, on basic issues, in particular on the *concept of the nation.*

On this overriding issue, East German and West German positions are mutually exclusive and utterly irreconcilable. For the FRG, official doctrine postulates the existence of " two separate states within a single German nation," and looks for progress from regulated co-existence, through good-neighbourly relations to a gradual healing of Germany's national division. For the GDR, there is *Abgrenzung* and the official theory of the existence now of two separate *nations.* The latter has been incorporated in the constitutional revision on the 25th anniversary of the GDR, " the socialist state of the German nation " has now become " the socialist state of workers and peasants," all reference to German national unity has been dropped; instead, there is the constitutional assertion that GDR is indissolubly linked to the socialist camp and to the USSR.

WHAT, then, can one say about the future of the German nation? Any observations that one ventures must be tempered by the prior reflection that we know all too little about the infinitely complex and highly subtle processes by which nations are formed and may dissolve. So I offer these concluding remarks with very little certainty as to what they may add up to. Nonetheless, if one had to draw a balance sheet, even an interim one, there would be far more entries on the negative side of the ledger as regards the ability of a single German

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nation to survive Germany's division into two separate states, with radically different political systems and socio-economic orders.

On the negative side, then, we should take at face value the GDR elite's doctrinal pronouncements. They may be just tactical, but I think they are something more: not only are they shared by the Soviet Union but they also speak to the East German elite's perceived political needs and its psychological predisposition.

Here I mean not just commitment to a separate East German nation, but something, to my mind, far more important: an assertion of eternal fidelity to the Soviet Union. Actual bilateral integration is now far advanced. The GDR, even more than the FRG, is rapidly becoming a *transnational society,* with political, economic, technical and intellectual elites, numbering in tens if not hundreds of thousands, enmeshed in larger Soviet-dominated international organizations and bilateral Soviet-East German enterprises, e.g. the secret police, the army, bureaucracies around seventy USSR-GDR agreements under the Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, and Comecon. If this is true from the elite, what of society as a whole? The sense of common Germany nationality would seem to be still very widespread, and there is also some dislike of and disdain for the Russians, Poles, etc. (A popular motto might be: "With the Soviet Union forever—but not one day longer"). But to the extent to which this is the case, it only serves to heighten the elite's dependence on the Soviet Union.

As for West Germany, here, too, elite supranational integration is important. What was once an "escape from the dead end of German history" though integration with the West has now developed a much more positive aspect of a genuine German, in this instance, West German "vocation for Europe." As concerns popular attitudes, after the initial excitement of rediscovering East Germany and German brothers and sisters (or have they become only cousins?) in the GDR, many West Germans find they don't like what they found. In all likelihood, there will be fewer visits in the future. Also, family ties are bound to be diluted with the passage of time. Finally, there is the attitude of the younger generations. Youth in West Germany shows precious little national identity and, indeed, is tending to become appallingly ahistorical. Some university youth don't identify with much at all, be it Germany, the Federal Republic, Europe, or anything else. Now, all of this is to suggest that the continued existence of a single German nation, if not as a political entity, then as a social aspiration, and if not as a social aspiration, then at least as a cultural phenomenon (*Kulturnation*) may be in doubt. No particular form of Germany's survival as a national community can, I think, necessarily be taken for granted.

And yet, it will also not do simply to dismiss Germany, as a very perceptive student of the German scene did in a recent article in the *New York Times* Sunday Magazine Section, as "One Nation—

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Divisible." [1] A nation, according to this account, which was finally lost on the playing fields of Hamburg last summer when the East Germans scored a stunning victory over the favoured West German eleven in soccer. (The crowd reaction, said another spectator, proved that " sport was merely a continuation of politics by another means ").

So facile a conclusion will not do, if only because nationalism and national feeling are both too volatile and also too resilient to permit the pronouncement of obsequies after a mere quarter of a century, a short span of historical time by any reckoning and one during which the free expression of opinion has been consistently and effectively denied to the East German population. It may well be that the East German population —*not* the GDR elite, and *not* the West German population—is the last bastion of genuine German national feeling. But as long as that one source persists, the German nation cannot, in my view, be pronounced dead. As we know from innumerable other cases elsewhere in the world, where national feeling *seems* dead, it may only be dormant. It may lie dormant for decades and even for centuries, only to erupt afresh under unforeseen, often improbable circumstances.

[1] Melvin J. Lasky, " One Nation, Divisible," *New York Times Magazine*, 22 September 1974, p. 20 ff.

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A Revealing Encounter :

The Theatre of the Absurd in Czechoslovakia *

Marketa Goetz Stankiewicz

IN 1964–65, the Slovak theatre journal *Slovenské divadlo* published in three instalments a long review article on Martin Esslin's *The Theatre of the Absurd*. What is significant about the article, apart from the fact that it welcomes the "tragic humanism" of the Theatre of the Absurd which represents "the antipode of superficial and false optimism," [1] is that it readily accepts the new literary label and uses it as a tool for analysis. Indeed, when the plays of Ionesco, Genet, Beckett and others reached Czechoslovakia, they arrived there under the package-description of the "Theatre of the Absurd." Whatever our own attitude to the term, we should remember that Czechoslovaks were acquainted with it even before they had the opportunity to read and see the plays concerned. Perhaps this is why something truly "absurd" happened, when the Theatre of the Absurd finally arrived in Czechoslovakia—with a delay of about 15 years—during the middle sixties. The prime example of theatrical originality of the fifties was received in Prague as a historical curiosity. The revolutionary playwright who had intended to shock a chicken-livered audience was given the red-carpet treatment. The Prague critic Sergej Machonin who reviewed Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* and Ionesco's *The Bald Soprano* and *The Lesson*—which had their first performance in Prague at the Theatre on the Balustrade—actually wrote: "Finally we will take a look at it [the Theatre of the Absurd] and see for ourselves *what it really was*." [2]

The 1959 Congress of the International Theatre Institute had reported on the opening address given by the leading playwright of the Absurd under the heading "Eugene Ionesco opens fire." [3] By 1965, the ammunition appeared to have been discharged and a Czech critic could calmly shelve it with theatrical history and refer to it in the past tense. East Europeans saw the plays of the Absurd not as *avant-garde* events that smash traditions but as literary museum pieces. Having made their youthful, revolutionary splash in the past, the plays by now had

* All translations into English are by the author, except the quotes from Ionesco's plays and Camus' essays which have been taken from the popular English translations.

[1] Július Pašteka, "Súčasné divadlo absurdity," *Slovenské divadlo*, roč. 13 (1965), p. 192.

[2] Sergej Machonin, in *Literární Noviny*, c. 3, p. 3, 16 Jan. 1965. (Hereafter Machonin, 16 Jan. 1965.)

[3] "Eugène Ionesco ouvre le feu," textual report of Ionesco's opening address to the Eighth Congress of the International Theatre Institute, Helsinki, June 1959, in "Théâtre dans le Monde" VIII (Autumn 1959), p. 171.

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reached middle-age respectability, had their places in theatrical source-books, and were listed in subject catalogues of university libraries. It is hard to keep up a revolutionary gesture when you are an accepted member of a revered elite. This was the problem of the " Theatre of the Absurd " when it met Czechoslovakia.

The term itself had filtered into Eastern Europe through the cracks in the locks of Stalinism during the fifties, and, as communication between Czechoslovakia and the West began to increase during the early sixties, information about a new kind of drama was eagerly absorbed by the theatre-loving population. In this way, Czechoslovaks lived with a " myth " of the Theatre of the Absurd until their first encounter with the prototype of Absurd Theatre when Jan Grossman, then leading the dramatic ensemble of the Theatre on the Balustrade, put on his own adaptation of Alfred Jarry's *Ubu Roi*. The production was a huge success and, despite the displeasure expressed by the authorities, it had almost 500 performances in Prague and was put on at several drama festivals outside Czechoslovakia. *Ubu Roi,* however, is a more " open " work than the plays, of, say Ionesco and Beckett, and the stage-success of Grossman's version was no real indication of the general critical reaction to what has come to be called the Theatre of the Absurd. However, the puzzlement of the Czechs when confronted with the plays of Dürrenmatt, Beckett and Ionesco was of short duration and soon they came to two important realizations: first, that they understood this kind of theatre in a different way from the West; secondly, that they had an Absurd Theatre of their own without having known it. This point could serve as an orientation sign for our discussion, indicating the deep-seated difference between East European and Western plays of the Absurd. The former—by Havel, Topol, Klima and others—consist of an earnest search for the hidden moment at which reasoning becomes absurd, the latter—be it in Beckett's, Ionesco's, Genet's, Albee's or Pinter's plays—illustrates the conviction that this moment can never be found.

WHEN Ionesco's *The Bald Soprano* was produced in Prague in 1965, it was put on not as a bombshell of *avant-garde* theatre, but, rather, as a classic, out of " solidarity with the forerunners," and with the intention of finding out whether the work would yield new " unforeseen meanings." [4] Whether the latter has happened has to be left unanswered, since the Czechoslovak theatres did not have the opportunity to stage the several productions of the play which it takes to explore hidden possibilities of interpretation. Still, what we do find out is rather interesting. We know that *The Bald Soprano* contains several scenes in which the characters—middle-class couples with stereotyped reactions to everything—hold conversations that consist entirely of clichés. Western critics have found them to be the funniest scenes of the play. Well aware

[4] Machonin, 16 Jan. 1965.

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of Ionesco's "image" as a parodist of mechanized society, the Czech director was trying to go one better than the playwright, to make sure the audience got the message. He made the characters move about the stage with mechanized movements and speak their clichés in monotonous voices. The Czech audience failed to be amused. What they would have found funny is "the tension between inner mechanization and lively presentation," i.e., stupid clichés said with a matter-of-fact naturalness. But "if a puppet speaks like a puppet it is neither absurd nor funny." [5] Here we have another example of the East European mentality resisting an earnest, implicitly didactic approach to the absurd problem of standardization—an approach that has been prevalent in far too many critical discussions of Ionesco in the West.

Perhaps it is significant that the play in which Ionesco used a really humorous absurd image in order to make a sociological point was the play that was most appreciated by both the Czechoslovak audience and its critics. *Rhinoceros,* produced in Prague in 1966, had various repercussions. Compared with some reactions of Western critics, they reveal basic differences in attitude—but not where one might expect them. The play has been amply discussed in the West. Like all great plays, it radiates different shades of meaning, depending on the background of the audience. We know the plot: a small provincial town is awakened from its placid slumber by the appearance of a rhinoceros; soon the inhabitants find they have much in common with the thickskinned, brutal creature and begin to change—social elite, clergy, civil service and all—into rhinoceroses. At the end, the play's hero, Berenger, is left as the only human being in a world of animalistic grunts. We see the varied possibilities of interpretation. In Germany, for example, the audience immediately related the play to its own experience with Hitler. To the German audience the play was a clear analogy to National Socialism and was staged as "a naked tragedy, without concessions, hardly touched by a deadly irony." [6] In North America, however, something entirely different happened: Berenger, the meek, drifting anti-hero of the play, was turned into a "sort of lucid intellectual, hard, a kind of unvanquished revolutionary who knew exactly what he was doing." [7] Obviously, the American production treated conformism as something contemptible and ridiculous. Czech critics regard Berenger as anything but a hard-nosed uncompromising individualist. Rather, they find the character lacking in even a trace of heroism or toughness of mind. The fact that Berenger does not change into a rhinoceros, like all the others, is explained by the simple fact that he is all too human: "His humanity is not programmatic but natural." [8]

In Ionesco's collected comments *Notes et contre-notes* which have

[5] Zdeněk Hořínek, "Zástavení na Zabradlí," *Divadlo* (Oct. 1965), p. 15.
[6] Ionesco, *Notes et contre-notes* (Paris, 1966), p. 290.
[7] Ibid. p. 288.
[8] Zdeněk Hořínek, "Bérenger a nosorožci," *Divadlo* (Apr. 1969), p. 33.

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never been published in Czechoslovakia, the playwright argues that "it is the human condition that governs the social condition and not vice versa."[9] East Europeans are bound to react to such a comment, depending on their political convictions, either with ideological indignation or a wistful smile. Those belonging to the latter group may find the preceding comment much more meaningful: "The authentic human community is extra-social . . . [and] reveals itself in our common anguish, our desires, secret nostalgias felt by us all."[10] It is the strong sense of this kind of community that prevents the Czechoslovak Theatre of the Absurd from losing sight of the point at which absurdity starts, and thus making all values relative.

By the time the Czechoslovaks got a chance to review a performance of Genet, they had found their own way of looking at the masterpieces of the Theatre of the Absurd: they concentrated on its formal aspects. In his review of a Prague production of *The Maids* in 1967, the critic Zdeněk Hořínek approached the play as a kind of rhythmical composition. The action, he felt, was not sufficiently rhythmically structured, and the director was overly concerned with emotions rather than with "meanings, relationships and thought,"[11] Although the critic uses the words "meaning" and "thought," he obviously stresses the *formal* aspect, and the "existential" problems analysed by Sartre in his famous discussion of the play (which must have crossed the Czechoslovak borders in some form or other) are hardly touched upon. A year later, the same critic buckled down to do precisely that. But if we expect an echo of Western essays on *The Maids* that speak of "the ritual of wish-fulfilment,"[12] the "demonstration of non-being in being,"[13] or the "change of consciousness after the murder"[14] we are mistaken. What we read is this:

> Genet's cramped world and Genet's cruel theatre have one important fault—the humour is missing. Genet takes the world and himself in it . . . too seriously. That is why he is unjust, dogmatic and arrogant. That is why he is incapable of sympathy and humility. That is why he is a pamphletist rather than a judge. That is why he cannot escape the captivity of his psychic trauma.[15]

Those who have had their quiet thoughts about Genet's grim determination to see only evil, hear only evil, speak only evil, may feel that the critic has a point. However, the fact that Czechoslovaks preferred their Genet on the stage rather than in their philosophical library does not mean that they were not eager to read him. The Czech translations of

[9] Ionesco, *Notes et contre-notes*, p. 143.
[10] Ibid. pp. 142–43.
[11] Zdeněk Hořínek, "Obrazy a obrady," *Divadlo* (Dec. 1967), p. 61.
[12] Esslin, *The Theatre of the Absurd* (Revised ed., New York, 1969), p. 175.
[13] George E. Wellwarth, *The Theatre of Protest and Paradox* (New York, 1967), p. 116.
[14] Werner Kließ, *Genet* (Velber bei Hannover, 1967), p. 32.
[15] Zdeněk Hořínek, "Úděl zavržence," *Host do domu*, roč. 15, c. 6, 1968, p. 61.

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The Balcony and *The Blacks*, published in an edition of 1,300 copies in 1967, disappeared literally on the day of publication.

IT is one of the ironies of the fluctuating tension between literature and life that the liberalization of a regime has, among others, a rather startling influence on the creative work of the authors writing under it: they will want to write not about the joys of a newly found freedom of expression but about the darker aspects of life—futility and death.[16] This discovery casts a peculiar light on an aspect of the problem of censorship that has hardly received any notice: if authors are told to write about life only, they will want to write about death; if they are told to express joy, they will want to sing dirges in a minor key; if they are told to write about the accomplishment of tasks, they will want to say that there is nothing to be done. For years, Czechoslovak writers had been constrained to write in an "ideologically sound" and optimistic vein, pointing to a bright future in the perfect classless society. Now suddenly they came face to face with Samuel Beckett, the most sombre of the writers of the Absurd.

It could be said that the Czechoslovak attitude to Beckett acted as a sort of barometer of the political climate. The freer the country became from the political pressures of systematized thinking, the more they liked Beckett. The less they had to worry about the everyday problems of doing anything ideologically "wrong" and getting into trouble, the more they responded to Beckett's arid speculations on futility and death. "Absurd"? Perhaps, but true. Take some samples of reactions to Beckett's writings. In 1963, the Slovak theatre journal *Slovenské divadlo* cautiously introduced the first translation of *Krapp's Last Tape* as an interesting, but slightly rotten fruit: Beckett was a great poet expressing the "apocalyptic feelings" of an individual emerging from a society, "the values of which have been crumbling for a long time.[17] Only a few months later, the Czech theatre journal *Divadlo* printed an article which said that the same play, despite its brevity and plotlessness, represented the "whole curve of events of an extended human life."[18] A year and a half later, in the Spring of 1965, the critic Hořínek called Beckett "one of the greatest analysts of the crisis of modern man;"[19] and—we must remember that during that period things were developing with unprecedented, almost feverish rapidity—only another five months later we actually read about the impossibility of assessing Beckett with a Marxist evaluation. A Marxist critic, defining the difference between Marxist thinking and Beckett's conclusions, nevertheless admits "the impos-

[16] Kenneth Tynan is aware of this phenomenon ("The Theatre Abroad: Prague," *New Yorker* [Apr. 1967], p. 103).

[17] Signed J. K., Introduction to the Slovak translation of *Krapp's Last Tape*, *Slovenské Divadlo*, roč. 11, 1963, c. 3, pp. 402–3.

[18] Josef Kaustitz, "Beckettovy hry o štěstí a neštěstí žít," *Divadlo* (Dec. 1963), p. 28.

[19] Zdeněk Hořínek, "Ionesco a ti druzí," *Divadlo* (Apr. 1965), p. 76.

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sibility of erasing the phenomenon Beckett from our cultural subconscious." [20]

When *Waiting for Godot* was performed for the last time at Bratislava's *Divadlo na korze* in 1969, the production proved how deeply Czechoslovak mentality had grasped the essential Beckett. The first half of the performance was sheer slapstick amusement. It seemed as if the audience were being told: "Look, we have become used to living absurdly during those last 17 years since *Waiting for Godot* was written. Let's just use it as a libretto for unlimited fun, let's make it a hilarious comedy about today's man." However, as the play proceeded, it became more and more melancholy and the spectre of hopelessness wedged its way into the fun with increasing urgency. The "hope" that Godot would arrive and do away with all the misery, began imperceptably to change its nature, until a disturbing realization dawned on the audience: Godot was only an excuse for the two tramps to stay together. "They had become Godot for each other. Only they did not know about it." [21]

One of Dürrenmatt's grotesque tragi-comedies—whether we chose to include them with the Theatre of the Absurd, like George Wellwarth, or not, like Martin Esslin—was performed at Prague's National Theatre, which, even in the days of the thaw, was not exactly a place for theatrical experimentation. Nevertheless, the Swiss writer's work proved to be very exciting for Czechoslovaks. His social ideas (his most famous play can be, and has been, interpreted as a full scale attack on "capitalism"), his tension-loaded closeness to Bertolt Brecht, his brilliant essays on the problems of the contemporary playwright are the subjects of numerous essays in Czechoslovak literary journals. Dürrenmatt has been one of the few contemporary Western writers who have provoked a lively polemical exchange in print between two critics [22]; and moreover, he is most frequently compared with Czechoslovak writers (like Karel Čapek or Ludvík Aškenázy).[23] It is noteworthy that the influential critic Hořínek makes a crystal-clear distinction (too clear for those who know Dürrenmatt well) between him and the writers of the Absurd, by pointing out that Dürrenmatt's work was not as hopeless at the latter's and that the defeat of his heroes was not to be looked for in the uselessness of action itself, but rather in their "wrong tactics." [24]

On the whole, it can be said that Czechoslovakia's reaction to Dürrenmatt's work does not differ greatly from that of the West. All we may find is some particular sparkling amusement about the playwright's "clever

[20] Petr Pujman, Introduction to a selection of Beckett's plays in Czech translation. Quoted in Hořínek, "Absurdní výběr z Becketta," p. 75.

[21] Vladimír Štefko, "Sám sobě Godotem," *Divadlo* (Dec. 1969 [double number]), p. 79.

[22] The exchange of comments between Jitka Bodláková and Josef Kopecký appeared in *Divadlo* in the Spring issues of 1963.

[23] Dušan Pokorný, "Fysikové a roboti," *Literární Noviny*, roč. 12, č. 47, 23 Nov. 1963), p. 8; Zdeněk Herman, "Piškot na váš úcet," *Divadlo* (Dec. 1965), pp. 39–41.

[24] Zdeněk Hořínek, "Cesta k lidovému divadlu," *Divadlo* (May 1964), p. 34.

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relativization of historical certainties," [25] when Romulus, a Roman emperor and hero of the past, is revealed as a chicken-raiser with good intentions that make a mess of everything. Here we feel a gusto in the Czechoslovak response to the playwright that cannot be matched by that of the Westerner, unused to an imposed hero worship *en masse*.

The case of Harold Pinter is revealing, because Czechoslovak productions and criticism seem to make light of those mysterious regions—stressed by both Western productions and commentators—that loom beneath the realistic texture of Pinter's everyday, colloquial language. The Czechoslovaks prefer to have their Pinter a realist—and it seems to work. In his comment on *The Caretaker*, produced in Prague in 1965, Sergej Machonin, though aware of the characters' " trying to realize their most elementary ideas of human existence, " [26] stresses the *reality* of the alienation between them. Moreover, *The Homecoming*, staged in Bratislava in 1969, was conceived as a completely realistic play. Those who have read Martin Esslin's book on Pinter, will be aware of his imaginative interpretation of the play's action as a " projection of archetypal fears and wishes." [27] One character, especially, has triggered various original interpretations among Western critics, namely, Ruth, the son's wife, who arrives with her husband from America in the all-male household of his family, and stays there in the combined role of a kind of mother-mistress-whore figure, personifying the fulfilment of primordial wishes. In the Slovak première of *The Homecoming*, Teddy, Ruth's husband, who returns to America at the end, is seen as the main character, representing a sort of prodigal son who finds himself " a stranger " [28] in his own home, because his values have changed. How different this approach to the play is becomes apparent when we remind ourselves that Western sources tend to regard Teddy as the stuffy professor-conformist who goes back to his useless research and arid lecturing when he feels that his mask of respectability is beginning to peel off, as he sees his wife getting cheerfully ready to share bed and breakfast with anyone who will pay. Perhaps this difference in interpretation reveals less about Czechoslovaks than it does about the nature of Pinter's work itself which, like a magic mirror, allows everyone to find his own image in its depths.

WHEN Czechoslovak theatres began producing Sartre's plays in 1963, they knew that they were faced with a complex problem. Not only was it lacking a repertoire of forerunners for his kind of quasi-philosophical theatre, but also the very subjects of Sartre's plays—the activist-idealist and the use of violence, the imposition of a sense of

[25] Zdeněk Hořínek, " Dürrenmattovy historie," *Divadlo* (Sept. 1969), p. 28.
[26] Sergej Machonin, " Dramatik a doba," *Literární Noviny*, roč. 14, č. 43 (23 Oct. 1965), p. 3. (Hereafter Machonin, 23 Oct. 1965).
[27] Martin Esslin, *The Peopled Wound: The Work of Harold Pinter* (New York 1970), p. 161.
[28] Vladmír Štefko, " Divadlo ironie a relativity," *Divadlo* (Feb. 1969), p. 78.

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guilt as a power instrument—were extremely "hot" themes for a nation which was just beginning to scan an opening horizon, after being hemmed in by orthodox ideology for half a generation. Yet while the West had learned to take their Sartre with a grain of salt, the Czechoslovaks had not had the opportunity to develop such a philosophical distance. They took their Sartre undiluted and—on the first, rather staggering impact, when *The Prisoners of Altona* and *The Devil and the Good Lord* were performed in 1963 and 1964—considered him the dramatist who brought into the theatre great "philsophical problems . . . in their state of birth, in an unsolved, dialectic struggle," that he therefore was "the creator of truly philosophic drama." [29] This accounts for the fact that the Czechoslovaks, highly astute to the literary value of the new plays that were reaching them at the time from the West, were, initially, not particularly sensitive to the dramatic weakness of Sartre's theatre. It was so exciting in *what* it had to say, that it did not seem to evoke much criticism of *how* it was saying it. This is also the reason why the Czechoslovaks' first reaction to Sartre's plays was less ambiguous than their reaction to the dramatists of the Absurd. The intellectual climate in the Czechoslovakia of the mid-sixties was one of renewed belief in human dignity together with the excitement of enjoying a growing freedom of artistic expression. All this created an atmosphere drastically different from the brutality of Genet's bordellos, the paralyzing uselessness of Ionesco's rows of empty chairs, even the agonized wait under Beckett's one and only tree (although there, at least, there was something to laugh at!). The philosophical speculations of Sartre seemed to be much more relevant to people's main concerns.

However, within a period of three or four years, a surprising change occurred. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex issue, we might say that Czechoslovak attitudes to Sartre and Beckett were related to each other like the two ends of a see-saw. As Beckett went up, Sartre went down. In 1962, an edition of five of Sartre's plays was hailed by critics as a major literary event, the excitement over which was dampened only by the regret that the selection failed to include the drama *The Flies*. Its theme of the rejection of public exhibitions of guilt and stress on individual freedom were, of course, highly topical and exciting themes. Three years later, we find a very different attitude to Sartre: "If Sartre is a writer-philosopher or a philosophizing writer—which apparently does not make the philosopher thrive and certainly harms the writer—then Beckett is always exclusively a great dramatic poet." [30] If we overlook the fact that the critic, wanting to make a certain distinction, obviously overshoots his aim, we realize that there is more to this change in attitude than is apparent from a flippant turn of phrase. Is it that a *poète engagé* had less and less to say to a society that was trying to get away from imposed engagement and find its own form of involvement in general

[29] Pat, "Jak hrát Sartra?" *Divadlo* (Dec. 1964), p. 74.
[30] Hořínek, "Absurdní výběr z Becketta," *Divadlo* (Sept. 1965), p. 74.

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questions? Perhaps it was also felt that under certain circumstances Sartre's political theories had a hollow ring. This becomes apparent in *Dirty Hands,* produced in Prague in Autumn 1968, a short time after the Warsaw Pact troops had occupied Czechoslovakia. It was a problematic time for a play which treats the conflict between the decisive political activist and the emotional humanist intellectual to be brought before an audience. The Czech audience responded with unexpected irony. Quite contrary to the author's intentions, they treated *Dirty Hands* as if it were an " absurd " play, and laughed during the all but funny ending,[31] a reaction which, a reviewer explains, was due to their realization that Sartre had not only posed an incomplete political question, but had failed to provide a dramatic solution.

During the same period, another one of Sartre's plays was running in Prague. *The Flies* had its premiere at the Komorní Theatre while *Dirty Hands* was still running at the E. F. Burian Theatre. The author himself attended the premiere and weekly papers ran a large photograph of Sartre on the stage, a bouquet of roses in hand, thanking the audience for their ovation.[32] The see-saw had moved again: the political events of August 1968 had made Sartre's theatre more exciting again for Czechoslovaks. As the awareness of the changed political situation forced itself on everyone, as the occupation raised anxious questions regarding individual freedom in everyone's mind, *The Flies* became a highly topical play. The author wanted to show man's abandonment in a godless world, but the work had also been read as a resistance play. It is clear that Sartre is approached here not so much as a writer, but rather as a man who has used the word " freedom " loudly at a time when everyone feared to lose it.

THERE remains Albert Camus, the writer who has tried to give the concept of the absurd a philosophical basis. The forceful and elegant way in which he formulated what he took to be the essence of the Absurd had its impact on the Czechoslovak literary scene, although it seems that he puzzled the best minds. On the whole, the Czechoslovaks' attitude to Camus is of a two-pronged nature, which reflects on the writer himself. Above all, they seem to be concerned about his sense of values. Again, as in the case of the playwrights of the Absurd, the Czechoslovaks' deeply-rooted resistance to a complete denial of values seems to obstruct their way to Camus. Sometimes they even try to prove that Camus did defend values. This is the case of Machonin who reviewed *Caligula* when it was produced in 1965: although the playwright, Machonin argues, does not offer any positive solutions in the play itself, he does tell us that " it is punishable to try to realize a project . . . for the price of wilful destruction and ruin of values. The

[31] Jana Patočková, " Hra na téma století," *Divadlo* (Jan. 1969), pp. 51 and 55.
[32] Alena Urbanová, " Svoboda člověka mezi lidmi," *Divadelní noviny,* roč. 7, č. 7 (8 Dec. 1968), p. 3.

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greatest and most beautiful dream is senseless if it is achieved by means of the tyranny and murder, force and the denial of the human being." [33] At other times, as in the case of *The Misunderstanding* which ran at the Liberec theatre in Northern Bohemia in Spring 1969, another reviewer discovers a contradiction [34] between the basic philosophical idea—the human being's absolute isolation, expressed by the character of Martha who has been described by Western sources as representing "the anger of an absurd hero" [35]—and the figure of the Mother who laconically decides to die, on discovering that the stranger whom she has killed is her own son. The loss of her only certainty, a mother's love for her child, destroys her. The critic's discovery of the playwright's inconsistency is as noteworthy as the decision of the director of the Liberec production largely to ignore Martha as the spokeman for the philosophy of the Absurd and to centre the whole play around the theme of motherhood. Both show that Camus as a philosophical thinker proved too fuzzy: it seemed better to stay with Camus, the literary man.

Furthermore, we have the philosopher-critic Oleg Sus who, trying to clarify the concept of the Absurd for the Czech reader, finds that "absolute, existential absurdity honourably holds watch over the boundary line of *in extremis*." This is rather a resourceful way of putting it. But later in his essay, Sus reveals his doubts about "Camus' conception of permanent revolt giving value to man's existence." He considers them

> upright and honouring their author, [but] neither binding nor logical . . . If everything in life is absurd, can nonsense be regonized at all? Is it *comparable* to anything, measurable? In the night of absurdity all cats are absurd . . . How can absurdity occur without a contrasting background, without its opposite, a non-absurd world (never mind whether imagined or real . . .)? [36]

Thus, by means of a logical argument, Sus punches holes in Camus' theories, and philosophically, he punches them well. Yet somehow they miss their aim, because Camus does not bear to be approached as a systematic philosopher. He was not what he wanted to be—the founder of a system of twentieth-century thought—but a poet who, with all the inconsistencies and intellectual blunders that go with a great spiritual effort, tried to wrench from the incomprehensible world some way of coping with it—like Beckett or Kafka rather than Heidegger or Jaspers.

THERE is one aspect of the impact of the Theatre of the Absurd in Eastern Europe that must not go unmentioned. An unforeseen result of a combination of circumstances, it may be particularly

[33] Machonin, 23 Oct. 1965.
[34] Jindřich Černý, "Camusova moderní tragédie," *Divadelní noviny*, roč 12, č. 18 (7 May 1969).
[35] Thomas Hanna, *The Thought and Art of Albert Camus* (Chicago, 1958), p. 71.
[36] Sus, "Theorie absurdna," *Divadlo* (May 1963), pp. 2–3.

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interesting for that very reason. It proves that these plays, which no longer talk *about* the absurdity of man's existence but illustrate it with concrete examples, have the power of fables that yield multiple meanings which the author might not have foreseen. The old writers of fables were well aware of this curious expansion of meaning. So was Freud, though from a more " scientific " point of view.

What happened to the absurd play in the 1960s in Eastern Europe was something like a large-scale, magnified illustration of Freud's example of unconscious humour—a form of communication not intended by the author. In his treatise *Der Witz,* Freud describes the workings of the unconscious joke, a message that affects the audience in a way the author had never surmised. Freud illustrates it, as always, with an example from the life of one of his patients: two children, a boy and a girl, entertain their relatives by performing a little play they thought up: the boy acts a husband returning from the wars after a long absence, and regales his wife (the girl) with stories about his heroic deeds. She counters this by informing him that during the time he fought the battles she had been preparing a surprise for his homecoming. Pointing to twelve dolls neatly lined up in the background, she explains that she has made all these beautiful children for him to enjoy after his return. Freud tells us that when the whole family burst out laughing, the children, confused and hurt, refused to continue with their play and withdrew, obviously disturbed by the strange reaction to their performance.[37]

Something similar happened to the playwrights of the Absurd who, trying to write plays that would " openly oppose realism, and tacitly reality itself," [38] suddenly found them containing political messages when performed in a different social atmosphere. Take Ionesco's *The Lesson* in which an authoritarian professor drains his pupil of natural responses and vitality to the point where he kills her. It is obvious that a nation that had to accept a certain form of " the truth " for some time would react to this play with the excitement that comes from the awareness of how it related to their own lives. The absurd situation had become real in a different context. Molière's *Le Misanthrope,* a work that presents us with the model of a loner (a seventeenth century version of Camus' absurd hero in *The Outsider*) who opts out of society in the name of the honesty of his convictions, experienced a similar career. The audience in Prague, where the play was performed in the late sixties, reacted so strongly that the authorities decided to close the play down.[39]

Despite, or more likely, *because* of its atmosphere of noncommittal mystery, the Theatre of the Absurd became charged with politically electrifying meaning. Of course, this aspect of the performances was

[37] Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Werke,* Vol. 6 (4th ed., London 1969), pp. 209–10.
[38] Ionesco, *Notes et contre-notes,* p. 138.
[39] Georges Schlocker, " Unberechenbarer Beifall," *Theater heute* (June 1970), p. 62.

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not discussed in print, but remained the open secret of the dialogue between the stage and the audience, fleetingly recreated with every performance.

FOUR days after the opening performance of Václav Havel's Absurd play *The Memorandum* at the Theatre on the Balustrade in Prague, a Czech reviewer made the following comment on the play: "The mechanism of cowardice, power and indifference—all this, although doubtless it is absurd, is only to a very small degree a product of the absurd imagination of the playwright." [40] A short time later, a German critic in the influential *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* expanded on that very point by arguing that in *The Memorandum* forms of "absurd and realistic theatre . . . can hardly be distinguished . . . [and] turn out to be opposite sides of the same coin." [41] Here we have first-hand proof that an absurd situation on an East European stage has a realistic impact on the audience. It seems that Western critics have used this realization (with more or less discretion) as a master key to the interpretation of the East European Theatre of the Absurd. We find the idea expressed in many variations. A few months after the above comments, Martin Esslin in an article significantly entitled "Political Theatre—absurd," took the idea an important step further. He pointed out the power of the absurdist form "to treat concrete and political issues with such a high degree of generalization that audiences with entirely different backgrounds can understand them similarly and relate them to themselves." [42] By the time Esslin published the second expanded edition of his *Theatre of the Absurd* in 1969, he introduced the section on Eastern Europe as follows:

> In the early nineteen-fifties, at the time of the controversy between Kenneth Tynan and Ionesco, it appeared as though the Theatre of the Absurd—introspective, oblivious of social problems and their remedies—was the very antithesis of the political theatre as preached by Brecht and his followers, or by the official arbiters of the arts in the Soviet Union and her bloc. It is one of the ironies of the cultural history of our times that, after the thaw had set in in Eastern Europe, it was precisely the theatre of Ionesco which provided the model for an extremely vigorous and barbed kind of political theatre in some of the countries concerned.[43]

This idea was surely exciting, possibly for two reasons: first it provided an unexpectedly topical aspect for the much-discussed, enigmatic qualities of the Western Theatre of the Absurd; secondly, it

[40] Jindřich Černý in *Lidová Demokracie*, quoted in Andreas Razumovsky, "Der Mechanismus von Feigheit und Macht," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (8 Aug. 1965).
[41] Ibid.
[42] Martin Esslin, "Politisches Theater—absurd," *Theater heute* (Jan. 1966), p. 8.
[43] Esslin, *The Theatre of the Absurd*, p. 271.

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seemed to provide an access road to the mystery of East European contemporary culture, isolated from the West virtually since the beginning of World War II. It was exhilarating to realize that, for example that play of existential anguish, *Waiting for Godot*, in another social context suddenly appeared as a topical political comment on the never-never-land of a future perfect society, when all hardships and wants of the present would be gone. It was equally stimulating to speculate on the magic power of a message that is not clearly expressed but clearly understood—thus creating between the artist and his public a hidden, but very strong form of communication that is largely unknown (because, luckily, it is hardly needed) in the West.

PLAYWRIGHTS, directors and designers who had to cope with the amorphous power to censorship for many years and for whom the truth was the sweetest of forbidden fruits were, of course, aware of the electrifying power of the *sub rosa* statement. And they naturally used it. Under the guise of nonsense—or absurdity—using the ancient prerogative of the fool to say what others must conceal they felt free to address themselves to their audiences who responded readily and delightedly to anything that could be taken as a reference to the current situation—no matter whether it was in actual words, gestures or a special feature of the stage set. This was the common ground on which the playwright, director, designer and actor met the audience—an extremely fruitful context in which to make theatre.

When Kenneth Tynan commented on his visit to Prague in 1967, he found that it was virtually impossible for a Czech artist to make a statement that had no political resonance. "No matter how remote a playwright's symbols and metaphors may be, the audience translates them into terms of practical politics and current events." [44] Sometimes this eagerness to grasp hidden meanings had little to do with the artistic impact of a play. Take the example of Shaw's *Saint Joan* which was staged in Prague in 1966. When in the *Epilogue* of the play the heroine returns (a quarter of a century after having been burned to death) as a serene ghost in order to see how things are going in the world, the Earl of Warwick greets her with a Shavian: "Madam: my congratulations on your rehabilitation. I feel I owe you an apology." [45] At this, the Czechoslovak audience began to clap and cheer so that the end of the play was drowned out by the noise. They had heard a highly topical line, the political meaning of which was clear to the point that some members of the audience might actually have experienced the situation personally or in their immediate families. The word "rehabilitation," used playfully by Shaw in his ironic attack on the flexible policy of the Church, was suddenly

[44] Tynan, "The Theatre Abroad: Prague," p. 102.

[45] George Bernard Shaw, *Saint Joan, The Collected Works*, Vol. 17 (New York, 1930), p. 162.

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charged with electrifying topical meaning. After all, Rudolf Slanský, who had been a top man in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, had fallen into disgrace during Stalinism and had been executed after a show trial in 1951, was declared innocent of all major crimes in 1962 and officially "rehabilitated." Another example of a similar kind, is, unlikely enough, Edward Albee's play *A Delicate Balance*—reviewed in New York as "dissecting the agony of fear and emptiness" [46]—which was one of three plays [47] withdrawn from performance in Prague. The reason was, in Albee's case, the topical impact of a single sentence which, in the words of the Czech authorities, caused among the audience "reactions that were contrary to the idea and the spirit of plays . . . ." [48] This undesirable response occurred when a meddling couple who had overstayed their welcome in a family answer the question whether they have come to stay for ever, with a deadpan: "If need be." [49] The biting double irony of this odd example of censorship is that theoretically the authorities were right: Surely this reaction was "contrary to the idea" of the play, and Albee never dreamt of the political colouring these words would take on before an audience that had witnessed the events of August 1968 a year and a half earlier.

And so we have crossed the threshold of another absurd situation concerning the Theatre of the Absurd in Czechoslovakia. The eager responsiveness of the audience, ordinarily a delight to anyone who has anything to do with the theatre, may not have the best effect on Western opinions of Czechoslovak absurd plays. During the sixties, as more and more people travelled across the border, critics and commentators returned from Prague, ready to publish enthusiastic essays about the lively atmosphere of Czechoslovak theatres and the astuteness of the audience in catching topical nuances and political allusions. Add this information to the Western contemporary eagerness to make everything "relevant," and you have created an image of Czechoslovak theatre that may be exciting, but not quite for the right reasons.

THE problem of the political image might be best illustrated by the case of Václav Havel who is best known in the West and who, in general discussions of contemporary theatre, usually represents Czechoslovak absurd drama. It is fair to say that most critics and scholars, eager to point out Havel's incontestable political relevance, have tended to short-change the wider implications of his plays and pay insufficient attention to his artistic qualities. Even those who seem aware of the universal appeal of his work have—quite understandably

[46] Max Lerner in *The New York Post*, quoted in the cover text of the Pocket Book edition of Edward Albee, *A Delicate Balance* (New York, 1970).

[47] The other two plays were Molière's *Tartuffe* (See also note 39) and the Czech writer Oldřich Daněk's *Vrátím se do Prahy* (*I shall return to Prague*).

[48] Broadcast by Radio Prague, 2 Feb. 1970.

[49] *A Delicate Balance*, p. 122.

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—been sidetracked by the surprisingly original way in which he expresses his criticism of a systematized society, so that they have spent their energies on the political (though Havel would call it anti-political!) aspect of his writings. Even when they touch on the general meaning of Havel's work, speaking of the "universality of his metaphors,"[50] his exploration of "the devaluation of language,"[51] calling one of his plays "a type of absurd ritual in which the act of being and non-being is commemorated,"[52] or pointing out that his plays, though "inspired by life in Czechoslovakia . . . just as clearly relate to any technocratic society,"[53] none has really tried to formulate the relevance of Havel's work for our society.[54]

A related case is that of Ivan Klíma whose play *The Castle*—probably the weakest of his dramatic works—has been receiving more than its share of attention, because it seemed to politicize Kafka and was variously interpreted as criticizing the hierarchy of a people's democracy.[55] Klíma's later plays received much less attention abroad. Whether this "political" image is partly the reason why the works of the most poetic and most profound Czech playwright, Josef Topol, have not yet made the impact abroad they deserve—Topol and politics mix as poorly as Beckett and politics—is a fruitless speculation. There remains the case of Pavel Kohout who stirred up considerable interest in Germany, partly owing to his polemic with the German writer Günter Grass, which appeared in the German weekly *Die Zeit* during 1967.

And so—since other Czechoslovak dramatists have been until now largely unknown in the English-speaking Western world—Czechoslovak contemporary theatre has somehow, very much against the intent of its playwrights, projected a political image to the world outside its borders. This is another ironic aspect, because, since the late fifties, Czechoslovak theatre has been precisely the opposite, namely, anti-political theatre. After a decade of ideologization of drama, when plays had to be written to reflect the dictates of Socialist Realism—a form of "applied art" in order to foster ideology—the stage, young writers felt, was again to exist for its own sake, theatre was to be made for theatre's sake, as a protest against the ideologization of art. This protest, because of its very anti-

[50] Esslin, "Politisches Theater—absurd," p. 11.

[51] Vera Blackwell, "The New Czech Drama," *The Listener* (5 Jan. 1967), p. 10. (Ms. Blackwell has translated Havel's three full-length plays into English).

[52] E. J. Czerwinski, "Jesters and Executioners: The Future of East European Theatre and Drama," *Comparative Drama,* Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 1971), p. 123.

[53] Jarka M. Burian, "Post-War Drama in Czechoslovakia," *Educational Theatre Journal,* Vol. 25 (Oct. 1973), p. 311.

[54] Paul I. Trensky's article "Václav Havel and the Language of the Absurd" (*The Slavic and East European Journal,* Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 1969, pp. 42–65) is an excellent introduction to an analysis of Havel's use of language, but it steers clear of more far-reaching conclusions.

[55] See, for example, the entry on Klíma in the German reference guide to modern national drama, Siegfried Kienzle, *Modernes Welttheater* (Stuttgart 1966). English translation, *Modern World Theatre* (New York, 1970).

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political attitude, was actually a political gesture. But only to Czechoslovakians. Once a play had left the system against which it strove, it ought to be given a chance to be considered out of context. Perhaps our awareness of this context is still—and is likely to be for some time—too strong to permit us to free ourselves from it. Indeed, that would not do full justice to Havel either. As he says in an essay published in *The Times Literary Supplement* in 1967, he knew very well the old truth that " the extraordinarily intense relationship which the theatre has and has always had with political reality is not a fortuitous one, but has its natural roots in the structure of the theatre as an art form. Its essential need for *topicality* (in the broadest sense of the term) must necessarily lead to its essential *politicality* (again in the broadest and deepest meaning of the word)." The asides in brackets are so important that Havel stresses them once more when he expresses his own conviction as a dramatic author that:

> the best theatre is and always has been political. Political, I repeat, in the *broadest and truly serious sense of the term* . . . as something which has the innate characteristic that it is not indifferent to the fate of the human *polis*, that it has a live, committed and penetrative relationship with the social reality of its country and its time and that it attains its " timelessness " and " universal " understanding through its concrete knowledge of its place and its time . . . . The theatre can depict politics precisely because it has no political aim. For this reason, it seems to me that all ideas of a so-called " political theatre " are mistaken.[56]

Perhaps we ought to give some thought to what Havel means by *the broadest and truly serious sense of the term* " political." It might help us realize that the non-political politicality (or political non-politicality —whichever way we take it) of the Czechoslovak Theatre of the Absurd has much in store also for us.

[56] Václav Havel, " Politics and the Theatre," *The Times Literary Supplement* (28 Sept. 1967), pp. 879 and 880.

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Eastern European Integration: Constraints and Prospects

Phillip J. Bryson and Erich Klinkmüller[1]

ALTHOUGH economic integration is sometimes seen as a mechanism for the ultimate achievement of political unification, it is viewed in Eastern Europe primarily as an end in itself. Whatever integrative progress the socialists are able to achieve is, of course, dependent upon how successfully centripetal or disintegrative forces can be overcome. These forces seem, in spite of the presence of centrifugal forces and Soviet diligence, to be growing with the passage of time.

In Eastern Europe, the Stalinist-autarkic conception of national economic development had largely proved inappropriate for the traditionally trade-dependent, small European socialist states[2] within a single decade of its adoption. Once it has taken root, however, Stalinist planning cannot easily be eradicated; after it has become intellectually moribund one must continue to reckon with its legacies.[3]

After a quasi-awakening to the unquestionable benefits of Ricardian trade wisdom, which had been achieved by the end of the 1950s,[4] the socialist states had first to pursue increased economic cooperation through a decade of economic reforms.

By 1970, the reform movement had become bogged down, and the East Europeans were prepared to search for another means to achieve better economic performance[5] and a more substantial specialization and division of socialist labour. This time the means was a new drive for economic integration utilizing, in fact, little more than an intensification of old planning techniques. National planners, however, were to

[1] The authors wish to thank Gert Leptin and Jozef M. van Brabant for perceptive and helpful comments in the development of this paper. Financial assistance received by Mr Bryson from the Alexander von Humboldt foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

[2] The special problems of Cuba, Albania (a former CMEA member) and the Mongolian People's Republic will not be a topic of discussion here. The East European Council of Mutual Economic Assistance will be referred to here as CMEA, rather than Comecon or CEMA, well-known alternative abbreviations.

[3] Egon Neuberger, "Central Planning and Its Legacies: Implications for Foreign Trade," in *International Trade and Central Planning*, ed. by Alan A. Brown and Egon Neuberger (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 349–383.

[4] For typical treatments of Ricardo by socialists see Günther Kohlmey, "Wahl von Produktionsstandorten und internationale Mobilität von Produktivkräften in der Wirtschaftsintegration der RGW-Länder," *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, Vol. 20, No. 9 (Sept. 1973), pp. 1298–1311 and M. W. Senin, *Sozialistische Integration*, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1972, pp. 305–311.

[5] H. W. Schaefer sees the integration movement and the "Complex Programme" (discussed below) as a clear reflection of "the fading hopes of reform and the growing acceptance of a step-by-step integration process." See his *Comecon and the Politics of Integration* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 172. The reforms, of course, can be (and are often) seen as being *complementary* to the reform endeavours. See Senin, *op. cit.*, p. 232. Usually this occurred more in the period before the reforms had bogged down and integration issues became predominant in the literature.

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begin to work in coordination rather than in isolation. Such is the conception of the Complex Programme, or (officially) the "Comprehensive Programme for the Further Deepening and Improvement of Cooperation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the Member Countries of CMEA," passed in 1971.

Rather than to pursue economic integration on a market or financial basis, the aim in Eastern Europe is to achieve an integration of production processes. This should permit, so it is believed, a maturing of the productive potential of cooperative effort. It should bring about the development of institutions and (centrifugal) forces enhancing integration in the region. These forces are generally well known: (1) the common ideology and goals; (2) the geographic proximity of the socialist states and the progress already made in establishing trade relationships within the "socialist world market"; (3) the relative reliability and stability inherent in the economic interaction of planned economies; and, above all, (4) the universal desire to increase foreign trade as a means of increasing general welfare (increasing the political acceptability of the socialist regimes).

In socialist literature, glowing phrases are used to describe integration achievements, especially in the area of new bilateral and multilateral cooperative projects. Coordination of national plans for the period 1976–80, it is affirmed, is well under way. The development of joint forecasts, the drawing up of joint planning contracts and specialization and cooperation in productive efforts are described as commonplace.[6] Economic structures, it is claimed, are "developing increasingly in the context of the socialist division of labour," reflecting an increasingly "close, multifaceted interaction of reciprocal effects between the production processes of these economies.[7]

On the other hand, the real proof of integration is the coordination of investments that will bring about the desired structural changes in the economy. A more critical (Hungarian) view of integration progress reminds us that the coordination of investments for the 1966–70 period did not represent significant progress. The CMEA countries most advanced in the important field of engineering industries submitted

[6] Kormnov and Chebvrakov refer specifically to the signing of treaties pertaining to 18 scientific-technical problems, 35 centres of cooperation employing in excess of 500 scientific researchers, six scientific coordination councils and two multinational production units, *Interatominstrument* and *Interetalonpribor* (instruments for comparative measures). See their "Sovershenstvovanie upravlenia otraslevoi integratsiyei stran-chlenov SEV," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 7, 1973, pp. 103–112.

Neues Deutschland, 29 Nov. 1973, reports on a communiqué issued by the economic commissions of the DDR and the People's Republic of Poland, reporting on meetings held in Warsaw, 26–28 Nov. 1973, to establish general conceptions for the main lines of development of economic relations between the two countries until 1980. Emphasis is to be on cooperation in chemistry and seaport industries, and a mutual project for cotton spinning ("Friendship") in Zawercie. Emphasis in plan coordination is to be on stable deliveries of raw materials and combustibles and a division of labour in metallurgy, chemistry, light industry and construction, and electronics.

[7] Karl Morgenstern, *Sozialistische Internationale Arbeitsteilung*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1972, p. vii.

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investment projects that represented but a small percentage of planned total investments in engineering industries. They thought, in other words, "that the rest could not be made dependable on international coordination.[8]

A reliable Western assessment, which is most probably representative of a consensus of judgment on the progress of attempts to develop common integrative projects in Comecon, expresses in short, apt terms that such projects up to this point represent "*peu de choses*"[9]

The centrifugal forces which tend to act as a brake on expanding trade within CMEA are numerous and complex, and require more extensive treatment. This is the aim of this article, since an understanding of these forces gives an insight into the possibilities for future East European economic and political development.

Centripetal political and economic forces are encountered by the East Europeans at two levels: national and international. Though the problems encountered at both levels have reciprocal, interacting effects, they can be treated (for the sake of simplicity) separately.

At the national level, planners must decide (1) to what degree they wish to discard economic nationalism, i.e. to participate in trade and integrative endeavours, and (2) to what extent external trade should be given a Western, rather than an Eastern emphasis.

The centripetal forces present at the international or community level will be discussed in an order which largely reflects the authors' views on the relative importance of the issues. The most important stumbling block facing East European integration is an economic one.[10] If integration is to proceed satisfactorily, the socialists must ultimately come to grips with some well-entrenched problems: (1) agreeing on some balance of planning and market elements that can best serve the long-term domestic interests of the socialist state; (2) establishing some system of pricing and financial arrangements in the international economic sphere (where market elements have always been of necessarily greater importance for the CMEA countries) that can best oil integration machinery[11]; and (3) undertaking policies to alleviate the problems of technological backwardness, and the scarcity of capital and raw materials.

[8] Sandor Ausch, *Theory and Practice of CMEA Cooperation*, Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1972, p. 217. Ausch points out that "even CMEA countries with less-developed engineering industries have submitted to coordination only a small part (three, ten or twenty-five per cent) of their planned total investment."

[9] See Franklyn D. Holzman, "La Théorie du Commerce extérieur des économies centralement planifiées," *Revue de l'Est*, vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1972), p. 16.

[10] That economic views are treated first arises from the fact that the issue at hand is one of *economic* integration. In our view, an immediate, satisfactory resolution of all the political difficulties confronting CMEA would not begin to guarantee the success of economic integration so long as the fundamental economic problems remain.

[11] One wonders if the Soviet penchant for Mega-planning, probably utilizing the traditional imperative (balancing) methods and supplemented by the techniques of mathematical programming, will continue to stultify economic interaction of the Eastern states. It has been suggested that the Soviet-type mentality is willing to sacrifice some (probably large) degree of efficiency for the purpose of retaining some degree of economic control (political influence) in the planned economies. See Phillip J. Bryson,

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Clearly, these issues cannot be dealt with unless some solutions can also be found for fundamental political problems: (1) agreeing to what extent the interests of "sovereign," individual countries should take priority over the interests of the community of states, (2) determining how community politics can best account for variability in national size (degree of trade dependence), opportunities for geographic integration and the level of economic development, and (3) permitting the increased exposure of community members to Western influences, while still maintaining desired CMEA cohesion.

Largely, though not exclusively, these problems arise from the fact that the CMEA integration project is dominated by a super-power whose interests often differ from those of the smaller associated states.

It should be noted that these various problems interact to an extent that makes it difficult to treat them separately. The degree to which the East Europeans interact with each other or with the West is, for example, a matter not only of optimal economics, but also of political sovereignty. Indeed, when almost any CMEA problem is discussed, the problem of sovereignty soon arises. Likewise, when one treats the problem of scarcity of capital, the closely related (political) issue of levels of economic development cannot be ignored.

National Action in the International Economic Sphere

Economic nationalism is currently (and is for some time likely to continue to act as) a brake on the socialist integration process. It is easy to make the initial general decision to pursue cooperative economic ventures and increased trade as a matter of welfare policy. It is a different matter, however, for planners to specify the first domestic industry they wish to shut down, so that the relevant product can henceforth be imported more cheaply. The issue is not merely one of avoiding problems of unemployment in the period of transition, when productive capacities are being altered to express the logic of specialization rather than the instinct of autarky.[12]

Traditionally, export enterprises attempting to maximize planning rewards produced planned export goods with an eye only to gross output targets, or offered for export those goods that were simply easiest to produce. Often they would ignore potential exports which were actually in greater demand, even though usually these would probably command a significantly better price. The result has generally been that socialist

"Socialist International Economics: An East European Model of Trade, Decentralization and Growth," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* (forthcoming).

[12] The wording here is deliberate. The authors are not unaware that deliberately eschewing economic interdependence remains a national policy option (for primarily non-economic reasons, of course). But the force of Ricardian trade logic and, perhaps even more germane to the non-economist, the thrust of recent international trade history, seem all too apparent. Even in the few instances where it might be feasible, the cost of economic isolationism is so high as to render the policy for all practical purposes imprudent.

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countries must reckon with a frequently unsatisfactory level of import quality. It is quite natural, therefore, for CMEA members to fear that specialization may not only imply an employment problem; it may also assure that future imports will be of lower quality than the displaced domestic output. While some have felt that the matter of supplying other socialist countries with high-quality products demands self-commitment and self-responsibility on the part of the socialist state,[13] others have called for a new set of legal relationships and contract laws to provide security for those willing to abandon autarky.[14]

Though contributors to socialist integration literature have often called for the elimination of certain inefficient branches of production,[15] actually eliminating them might mean that some export possibilities and foreign currency sources in third markets would be endangered.[16]

It is most difficult to persuade a country to abandon an activity in which it has been engaged. The standing commissions of CMEA can recommend all sorts of possible specializations requiring structural adjustments, but few such recommendations are well received. In the final analysis, there simply exists no mechanism to compensate for losses (subsidies, for example, to support a decision to pursue a specialization project) or to cover whatever risks may be encountered in the integration process.[17]

Balancing Western and Eastern Economic Ties

Once national economic directors recognize the positive welfare effects of participating in an international division of labour, it must be determined to what extent external economic endeavour should bear an

[13] See Dimitur Vasilev, "The International Socialist Division of Labour and Its Role in the Increased Profitability of Bulgaria's Foreign Trade," *East European Economics,* Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Autumn 1969), pp. 96–98.

[14] Erich Kern and Klaus Werner, "Probleme der Koordinierung der Pläne für eine längere Perspektive zwischen den RGW-Mitgliedländern, *Wirtschaftswissenschaft,* 19 Jahrgang, No. 11 (November 1971), pp. 1620–1621. Kern and Werner suggest laws of two types: (1) agreements with specific mutual purchase and delivery obligations and (2) agreements pertaining to definite national development assignments.

A similar Russian view is that in the attempt to coordinate the structural development through increased mutual planning activities in CMEA, it is necessary that the economic planning organs involved, not to mention the countries themselves, accept the responsibility to see that commitments are indeed honoured. See Yu Shiryayev, "Sotsialisticheskaya sobstvennost v usloviyakh ekonomicheskoi integratsii stran-chlenov SEV," *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* No. 7, 1973, pp. 94–102.

[15] One of the DGR's most prolific writers on integration, Karl Morgenstern, observes that each socialist country participating in the division of labour must ask "the question, which branches of industry should be brought into existence in industrializing or in already industrialized socialist countries, which industrial branches should be retained, deliberately promoted or de-emphasized and possibly even eliminated in the long run." See his "Probleme der Ermittlung und der Durchführung effektiver Varianten der sozialistischen internationalen Spezialisierung und Kooperation," *Wirtschaftswissenschaft,* 21. Jahrgang, No. 10 (Oct. 1973), p. 1457.

[16] See Werner Gumpel, "Die Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftsreformen auf den RGW," in *Die Wirtschaftsordnungen Osteuropas im Wandel: Ergebnisse und Probleme der Wirtschaftsreformen,* Band II, ed. by Hans Höhmann, Michael C. Kaser and Karl C. Thalheim, Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach 1972, pp. 158–59.

[17] See Franklyn D. Holzman, op. cit., p. 14.

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Eastern emphasis. This problem amounts to finding a balance between cooperation and competition with other socialist states, at least to the extent that such policy manoeuvrability is possible and the requisite foreign currency is available. It is clear that one must proceed with political prudence, but intensified Western economic connections have for some time been quite acceptable.[18]

Intra-bloc trade remains in many respects highly beneficial for the socialist countries. The stability of long-established trade reationships reduces planning uncertainty to a minimum, trade relationships do not imply the necessity of generating markedly scarce foreign exchange, and the less saturated consumer markets do not place such difficult quality demands on export products. Certain goods, however, are simply not available in Eastern markets. When it comes, for example, to modern Western machinery, technical and engineering equipment, computers and other technologically-laden goods, their potential role in helping to "master the challenges of the scientific-technological revolution" has long since been recognized and emphasized by both technicians and politicians throughout the CMEA region. The foreign exchange required for the purchase of such goods in Western markets can be obtained only through an expansion of exports to the West.[19]

The trade behaviour of the East European states is itself the best evidence that East Europeans are anxious to earn the hard currencies which will permit expanded imports of sophisticated Western industrial goods. It is the generally accepted practice for the bloc countries to practice trade discrimination by reserving, for example, better tourist accomodations for Westerners bearing convertible *valyuta* and by exporting higher-quality, better-packed goods to the more demanding Western markets.[20]

Rejecting market forces in resource allocation processes

Many of the questions facing individual socialist countries assume new dimensions when they are encountered by the Eastern European nations acting in concert. Tools for solving the problems of economic integration are different at the international or community level, and constraints placed on the group differ from those relevant to individuals.

[18] While, as is generally known, intra-bloc trade has grown with respectable rapidity in recent years, trade relations with Western countries likewise continue to assume increasingly more significant proportions. The Czechoslovakian case is noteworthy in this regard. The percentage share of Czechoslovakia's trade with other socialist countries declined from 73·2% to 70·0% in the years 1965–70. In the same period, the Western share of the same trade increased from 17·9% to 22·4%.

See Franz-Lothar Altmann, "Tschechoslowakei," in *Die Wirtschaft Osteuropas zu Beginn der siebziger Jahre*, edited by Hans-Hermann Höhmann, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1972, p. 140.

[19] Not excluding, of course, outrageous hotel prices and the required minimum exchanges of currency for Western visitors.

[20] See Alec Nove, "East-West Trade," in *International Economic Relations Proceedings of the Third Congress of the International Economic Association*, ed. by Paul Samuelson, New York, 1969, p. 108.

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The root of socialist economic difficulties lies in the unfaltering allegiance of socialist decision-makers to economic planning, and their mistaken perception of market-type allocation processes as anti-planning. In the view of the authors, even if it could be assumed that the integration process were characterized by a complete lack of disintegrative forces, total integration along the lines of development proposed by the " complex programme " is not technically feasible.

The entrenched bureaucracies of Soviet and other socialist states still dream of the day when the process of integration will lead " to the establishment of a unified economic organism," i.e. the " unified, common plan ordering the economy of all nations under the leadership of the proletariat ", prophesied by Lenin. Socialist planners admit, of course, that " this process will doubtless develop over a long time period with several stages ".[21]

The question, however, must be asked how everything for the CMEA states could be completely planned in Moscow, when Moscow is not currently in a position to overcome the tremendous challenge of putting together an efficient and promptly completed annual economic plan for the Soviet Union alone.

Naturally, the response of orthodox socialism to such objections makes reference to activity analysis and the computerization of the world. However, even in the history of the development of corporate planning in the United States, with much smaller planning units, decentralization ultimately became unavoidable.[22] Additionally, it should not be forgotten [23] that computers are a product of the *pre*-reform era and that socialist specialists themselves have in large numbers rejected the notion that computers of any vintage would ever be endowed with the capacity to treat data describing every preference and production function in the socialist world, even if enough information gatherers could be located to collect such data.[24]

[21] Willi Kunz, " Zur ökonomischen Integration der Länder des RGW," *Einheit*, Heft 8 (Juli), 1970, p. 1047. His quote is a citation from V. I. Lenin, " Ursprünglicher Entwurf der Thesen zur nationalen und zur kolonialen Frage," *Werke*, Bd. 31, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1959, p. 135

[22] Economists have long compared corporations and their management problems with the problems of directing a centrally planned economy. For a good treatment of these difficulties at the corporate level, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr, *Strategy and Structure*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1962).

[23] In a classic article on the excessive bureaucratization of the Soviet Union before the reform era, Smolinski referred to the projections of Soviet cyberneticians that by 1980 the entire Soviet population would be required for the planning process, even if computerized, if its growth continued as it had in the previous period. See Leon Smolinski, " What Next in Soviet Planning," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 4, (July 1964), pp. 602–13.

[24] Czechoslovakian economists emphasized particularly the necessity of utilizing market processes in economic reforms. They rejected the possibility that computers would enable planners to make, for example, the necessary calculations for price planning. Their scepticism was based on the fact that the mathematical theory of optimum processes has not yet been perfected, and that the statistical data required to calculate prices is imperfect and too slowly gathered. Such information does not reach the centre soon enough to generate calculated prices appropriate to the momentary state of the economy. See O.

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But however much central planning persists or expands to accomodate CMEA integration, economic theory demonstrates that the bureaucratic costs of international command planning (i.e., the costs of coordinating and administrating CMEA's " production integration ", and the costs of gathering and processing the required planning information) do not merely make planning more tedious. These costs must be balanced against the higher returns accruing to the production integration process, the latter arising largely from the reduced unit costs of production, associated with the larger scale operations undertaken by more specialized integration participants. According to the fundamental logic of economics, because the costs are higher in socialism, the degree of economic integration achieved (when the most favourable balance is struck between the costs of and returns to integration) will be lower for socialist than for market countries.[25]

Kýn, B. Sekerka, L. Hejl, " A Model for the Planning of Prices ", in *Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth*, Essays presented to Maurice Dobb, Ed. by C. H. Feinstein, Cambridge, 1967, p. 102.

[25] To be more precise, the marginal returns to integrative specialization must be equated to the marginal costs of coordinating the process. In the simplest possible terms, the total returns to integration (TRI) are given as the difference between total costs of autarkic production and the total costs of production after specialization. This difference is, of course, a function of the level of output, so that $TRI=f(q)$, and can be assumed to increase at a decreasing rate with greater volumes of output produced for integration (as the most promising opportunities for specialization are exhausted).

The total costs of integration (TCI) are the sum of the costs of coordination (C), administration (A), information (I) and transportation (T). They are likewise a function of output, increasing at a constant or increasing rate as the level of integrative output rises.

The profitability of integration (πI) is the difference between total returns to and total costs of integration, $\pi I=TRI-TCI$, which can be maximized by equating its first derivative to zero, so that

$$d\pi I/dq=dTRI/dq-dTCI/dq=O, \text{ or}$$
$$dTRI/dq=dTC/dq.$$

This last expression is merely a mathematical statement that can also be stated in prose (see the opening sentence of this note).

The integrative costs are greater under socialism than in the market economies, since $C_s+A_s+I_s>C_m+A_m+I_m$ (where the s and m subscripts represent socialist and market economies respectively), so $TCI_s>TCI_m$. As can, perhaps, best be seen graphically, this higher cost level (which for convenience could be measured in dollars) guarantees that the optimum output of socialist integration (q_s) is lower than that associated with market integration (q_m).



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The claim cannot be made, of course, that socialists fail uniformly to observe the efficiency implications of imperative, physical planning. Relatively progressive forces in Hungary, sometimes in Poland, and in pre-invasion Czechoslovakia have favoured an approach referred to as the " planned market economy." To maintain symmetry, the approach of the Soviet Union and East Germany to national and international economic problems might be expressed as the " planned planned economy."

At the height of the reform endeavour in the late sixties, it appeared that the Hungarian approach had a great possibility of assuming the position of an alternative variant to the classical and Yugoslavian models of socialism. In the area of foreign economics, as domestically, the Hungarian model applied a significant degree of decentralization of decision making.[26]

With the demise, or at least downgrading, of the reform movement, one might question the utility of discussing the integrative implications of the Hungarian model. It is our view that the Soviet-type planning apparatus has not yet reached a final stable equilibrium, and that the need for reform has not disappeared. Moreover, if further reforms are undertaken at a later date, the only other available option would be a more genuine, thorough-going decentralization than that achieved (or really even attempted) in the 1960s. Though it may be some time in coming, it would probably have to appear at least more like the Hungarian or Yugoslavian model than the still prevalent Soviet system.

In any event, as long as the Leninist " single plan " remains a distant, eschatological concept, community economic relationships will be characterized by a substantially greater set of financial problems than those encountered at the national planning level.

Domestically, of course, financial planning and monetary values are of subsidiary importance to physical planning, through which resources can be allocated by direct central commands. At the international level, value and money problems become much more significant. The presence of national values immediately creates, for example, balance of payments considerations that necessarily constrain international resource flows.

The attempts to achieve integration through more extensive decentralization would imply the achievement of transferability and ultimately of convertibility of East European currencies as well as the development of multilateral, rather than bilateral economic relationships within the bloc. This has long been seen by the Hungarians as the *sine qua non* for the development of the East European economic area. This Hun-

[26] For more extensive discussion, see Werner Gumpel, " Die Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftsreformen auf den RGW," in *Die Wirtschaftsordnungen Osteuropas im Wandel: Ergebnis und Probleme der Wirtschaftsreformen* Bd. II, " Analysen wirtschaftlicher Teilordnungen: Funktionswandel der Systemelemente, ed. by Hans-Hermann Höhmann, Michael C. Kaser and Karl C. Thalheim, Freiburg in Breisgau: Rombach, 1972.

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garian goal [27] was seen as requiring a stage of regional development in which the Soviet "clearing ruble" would serve as a reserve currency or real money regionally (rather than as a mere accounting unit). Trade restrictions should be reduced to a minimum, and the reserve currency must be convertible into gold or some capitalist convertible currency, at least under certain conditions. Naturally, numerous structural tensions may be expected to persist, especially in the initial period. Imre Vajda believed these could be overcome only by assuring economic connections with the convertible currency markets.[28] It should be observed that even in the reform milieu, Vajda conceded these thoughts to be politically unrealistic (graciously attributing this to the "currency crisis" of the capitalist countries).

Tibor Kiss,[29] another Hungarian, expressed the view that CMEA integration would have to proceed "along two parallel lines, notably that of coordinating national economic plans and that of market integration. It is in the framework of the latter that the convertibility of socialist currencies, multilaterality in regional trade and CMEA customs union should be achieved."

Today, optimism is much less prevalent in Hungary. Though many feel that a genuine economic integration would be impossible without the triumvirate of liberalization, multilateralism and convertibility, they have apparently accepted in recent years a disassociation of these elements [30] and resigned themselves to the hope that they might be achieved in the distant future.

It has already beeen seen that the Soviet mentality would favour the implementation of mega-planning, and ultimately a single plan for the socialist world. The emphasis here is on an integration of production through physical balancing techniques rather than through decentralization and financial refinements. The East Germans likewise tend (at least officially) to be suspicious of anything resembling market-type economic arrangements. Integration is dutifully described in East German literature as a process requiring greater interdependence of economic structures. It is to be achieved through mutually determined research exercises, joint investment projects and greater industrial concentration. These are seen as the means also to avoid developing an import production. Investment efficiency would be pursued through

[27] This goal is largely associated with the now deceased Vajda. See Imre Vajda and Mihaly Simaik *Foreign Trade in a Planned Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 87. Simply and directly, he long held that "in order to bring about multilateral trade and payments and a transferable currency, controlled and planned socialist market economies and a corresponding foreign-trade system must be brought into being in the CMEA countries."

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[29] Tibor Kiss, *International Division of Labour in Open Economies With Special Regard to the CMEA*, Budapest, 1971, pp. 10–11.

[30] Georges Sokoloff points out that this disassociation of the triumvirate's elements "équivaut à l'ajournement du projet." See his "Structures internes et coopération internationale des économies socialistes de l'Est européen," *Economies et Sociétés*, Tome V, No. 1 Janvier, 1971, p. 258.

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extending work on effectiveness criteria and indices of economic efficiency.[31]

The Soviet view is that planning inadequacies of the past are in no way attributable to the "hypertrophy of centralism." Rather, problems have been the result strictly of inadequate coordination in CMEA. Decentralization is consequently not required; rather, the development of common planning activities, comprehending all economic processes in the framework of an integrated community is needed.[32] In other words, everything should be centrally planned.

The problem extends beyond mere over-ambitiousness, however. Also very disadvantageous is the apparent failure of the Soviet planning apparatus to comprehend the implications of general equilibrium in an economic system, *viz.* that everything to a greater or lesser degree, directly or indirectly, affects and is affected by almost everything else. Patchwork planning changes affect not only the areas under direct consideration, but have numerous, sometimes very significant indirect effects in other areas of the economic system. A careful reading of socialist planning literature reveals complaints that imply the existence of this shortcoming.[33] Ironically, the tendency reflected in the literature of Soviet persuasion is to seek to solve all problems by bringing more economic activity under the influence of planners.[34] Even where writers express dissatisfaction with past outcomes, the demand for improvement never insists on less planning, or even the implication that more planning would not be desirable, but only that planning should be better and that multinational coordination should be improved (likewise an enlargement of the labour burden of planning officials).[35] In sum, the Soviets

[31] For samples of the views of two of the best known GDR economists espousing this view, see Karl Morgenstern, "Probleme der Ermittlung . . . ," op. cit., and the senior author: Günther Kohlmey and Gerhard Kraft, "Volkswirtschaftliche Akkumulationskraft und sozialistische Integration," *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, 19. Jahrgang, Nr. 8 (Aug. 1971), pp. 1193–1206.

[32] Yu. Shiryaev, "Razvitie nauchnykh osnov sovmestnoi planovoi deyatelnosti stran SEV," *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, No. 4 (April), 1973, pp. 65–66.

[33] As a typical example one might cite Karl Morgenstern, "Erfordernisse und Wege zur Weiterentwicklung der sozialistischen internationalen Spezialisierung und Kooperation," *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, Heft 5, (Mai), 1970, p. 1449. He expresses regret about the attempt merely through a large number of individual measures, "usually unrelated (*losgelöst*) to each other," to solve the problems of integration. The attempt "to promote specialization and cooperation without having defined and coordinated the fundamental directions of relationships in the division of labour among the CMEA countries, and without ordering individual planning measures, where these bring about reactions (*Rückwirkungen*) in later attempts to profile fundamental directions, must in many cases necessarily cause additional difficulties later, or even doom some projects to failure."

[34] The work by Sorokin and Alampiyev is typical. "In our view", they instruct, "greater success will require increased centralization of planning activity" if the lag in several branches of industry behind their counterparts in capitalist countries is to be overcome. See their *Problemy ekonomicheskoi integratsii stran-chlenov SEV*, (Moscow, Ekonomika, 1970), pp. 62–63.

[35] The difficulty planners have in imagining the world other than as it currently is can also be encountered, of course, outside the CMEA region. Experience with governmental control over West German dwelling unit construction and agricultural planning,

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view computer and programming possibilities with tremendous optimism, expect the old techniques somehow to suffice, or wish to retain tight control, regardless of the efficiency costs. Soviet writers are not unwilling to admit that multilateralism and convertibility will someday be achieved in CMEA trade relations. The welfare losses of bilateralism [36] may be greater than socialists generally realize, but there is no question that the benefits of multilateralism have gradually become apparent in Eastern Europe.[37] Attempts to multilateralize trade through the establishment of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation [38] reflects their awareness, even if "commodity inconvertibility," insufficient capital and other traditional trade difficulties have kept CMEA's International Bank from having any substantial impact on traditional, bilateral trade patterns.[39] Finally, whereas the Hungarians have tended to view multilateralism as the means to assure improvements in the structure and volume of trade activity, the Soviets seem to have a different view of cause-effect relationships in this respect. Senin expects the bilateral relationships of CMEA "unavoidably and objectively" to be transformed into multilateral relationships. "The first cause of this," he believes "is the existence and the intensification of the international division of labour and cooperation." [40] This seems to be yet another form of the Russian planning maxim: "do more of what we're already doing, and do it better, then everything will turn out right."

CMEA Pricing Problems

The unusual pricing practices of socialism is one of the main sources of behaviour impeding the development of increased regional cooperation in CMEA. Because each socialist country practices centralized price fixing, individual pricing systems yield no common, internationally

and EEC agricultural planning are not the only examples that come to mind in this regard.

[36] See J. M. P. van Brabant, *Bilateralism and Structural Bilateralism in Intra-CMEA Trade* (Rotterdam: Rott. U. Press, 1973).

[37] The degree of recognition seems to be inversely related to the geographical size (and therefore directly related to the degree of trade dependence) of the country represented by the recognizer. Van Brabant reminds us why this is so, pointing out that "the cost of bilateralism is in proportion much larger for the smaller countries than for the larger one, simply because the latter has profited less from free trade. The greater the divergence in available resources, the smaller is welfare forgone due to bilateralism." See his op. cit., p. 41.

[38] For a recent book on the basics of CMEA international banking institutions, see Diethard Stelzl, *Die Internationalen Banken des Rates für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe*, (München: Olzog Verlag, 1973).

[39] If bilateralism makes little sense economically, it remains true that there are also political and administrative arguments that should not be ignored. Wiles, op. cit., reminds us that "bilaterial arrangements between small STEs (Soviet Type Economies) have the supreme advantage that they involve no imperialism. Sovereignty is sacrificed, as in all international treaties, but voluntarily and to a body in which each country has equal weight. Moreover, administratively all bilateralism is very much easier" (p. 324).

[40] M. W. Senin, *Sozialistische Integration*, (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1972), p. 209.

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acceptable values for international markets.[41] Since prices do not reflect economic reality, it becomes impossible to determine at the community level just who can produce what commodities most cheaply. Only in cases where extremely obvious comparative cost advantages exist can specialties be perceived. Since no precise and accurate pricing comparisons can be made, the degree of integration CMEA can achieve will be more modest than is possible where markets are at least minimally free to function in a normal way.

Because the socialists mutually agree not to accept their domestic prices for purposes of international trade, a separate socialist international price system has been developed. It is alleged that the foreign exchange prices applying to their trade are negotiated on the basis of world market prices, though cleansed from monopolistic distortions prevailing there.[42]

In each socialist country, foreign trade enterprises receive domestic prices for their outputs, but these are sold by the state foreign trade monopoly for a completely separate set of international prices. The foreign trade enterprises do not receive actual foreign exchange earnings (or suffer foreign exchange losses incurred). This "price equalization system" (*Preisausgleichsystem*) requires, of course, that the foreign trade monopoly within the framework of the two separate (foreign and domestic) price systems balance the aggregate of the economy's foreign trade transactions, with an eye towards avoiding balance of payments deficits.[43]

When a socialist country trades on the world market, a second (non-socialist) international price system is encountered. The existence of two international sets of prices logically has to be a hindrance to the development of intensified CMEA cooperation. So long as individual socialist countries can deal independently of CMEA on the world market, the differences in CMEA and world market price levels tempt the socialist

[41] Because prices remain inflexible over long periods and do not adequately express real economic conditions (supply costs are distorted through structural anomalies that reflect planners' preferences and hardly any attempt is made even to consider consumer preferences and other demand factors), prices applying in a given planned economy are quite arbitrary from the point of view of any non-national economic agent.

[42] Research has shown, however, that in fact the trends observed in CMEA import prices are identical to those prevailing in world markets, while the export prices of the centrally planned economies have not been noticeably related to world market prices. See Paul Marer, *Post-war Pricing and Price Patterns in Socialist Foreign Trade: 1946–1971*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972). Searching investigations by the Hungarians are also of interest here. Sandor Ausch (op. cit., p. 94) reveals that a large volume of socialist trade is merely transacted at national prices of yesterday, in which actual costs of current national inputs are not correctly reflected. Research directed by Ausch has revealed "after a study of the domestic prices and rates of price equalization subsidies applied to the products of some enterprises that the prevailing 'socialist world-market prices' almost exactly (at most with differences of 5 to 10 per cent due to bargaining) correspond to the inland prices, whereas they considerably differed from the prices of the capitalist world market."

[43] It is not easy to determine to what extent a given socialist country will succeed in this endeavour in a given year, since these countries publish no balance of payments accounts. It is clear, however, that foreign exchange is always in short supply.

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countries to behave rationally, importing from the cheaper market and exporting to the one with higher earnings potential.

Beginning from either a world market price or a price prevailing in the domestic market of an East European country, a particular commodity's actual price is negotiated for CMEA trade. Assume that it is lower than would be given by a competitive market outcome. With an artificially low price, the producing country will not be able to meet demand and cover costs. Although this may be impossible to calculate and difficult to notice, it will become evident that foreign exchange earnings aren't going very far. Economic pressure to give up the production of the commodity or adjust the price will increase. An upward adjustment of the price may be perceived as an embarrassing admission that the producing country really has no comparative advantage. The danger exists that political pressure (not to mention bereaucratic inertia) will militate against the recognition or, at least, the admission of this disadvantageous economic outcome.

Assume now the opposite case, *viz.* that the established price is artificially high. Economic pressure builds in this case for buyers to look westward to find better bargains. In the case of long-term contracts for the purchase of over-priced goods, the socialist buyer would tend to work within the CMEA political arena for more open individual and community relations with the West, or at least to become a hard bargainer in future trade negotiations. Another possibility is, of course, that an artificially high price will ultimately indicate in the planning coefficients of the purchasing country that the relevant commodity could more reasonably be produced domestically. In short, if an East European partner's price is too high, one either goes shopping in the West or opts for the "do it yourself" (autarkic) solution. Either outcome acts as a brake on CMEA integration.

The problems of two international markets do not end here. It would be logical for the socialist countries at least to divide up the capitalist markets among themselves in some jointly profitable manner. The Hungarians complain, however, that data show sales prices to be "highly uncoordinated." Because CMEA countries even underbid each other in their desire to earn hard currency, they incur substantial price losses. Moreover, it sometimes even becomes impossible for some Eastern sales to be made in Western markets.[44]

Likewise, when it comes to the matter of purchasing licences from capitalist countries, the socialists have failed to achieve a sufficient degree of cooperation. Apparently the individual CMEA countries are

[44] See ibid., p. 109. Ausch indicates that even in the cases where agreements are made to divide up capitalist markets among the CMEA countries, these agreements are often not respected. Moreover, "in other cases, CMEA agreements dividing up the sources of imports cover the *whole* export surplus of the countries in question, and therefore prices are bound to be pushed up even if the agreement is observed."

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willing to wage their own individual competition in capitalist world markets.[45]

A final, crucial problem of CMEA pricing is particularly intriguing. The trade institutions discussed above have resulted in recent years in an unusual economic quasi-exploitation of the Soviet Union by the satellite states. The Soviet Union has, of course, nobody else to blame for the universal East European adoption of Stalinist-style development of heavy industry. But this phenomenon, combined with the use of world market-based prices, has resulted in high prices on relatively plentiful heavy industrial outputs and lower prices on increasingly scarce raw materials and fuels.[46]

As is well known, the Soviet Union has committed itself through long-term trade agreements to exporting raw materials to the East Europeans (at prices which in recent years have been very low) in exchange for heavy industrial equipment (of poorer quality and of less attractive technological characteristics than could be obtained in the West). These highly disadvantageous terms of trade are doubtless part of the motivation behind Brezhnev's *Westpolitik*, and cannot help but have negative implications for future bloc cohesion.

Capital Scarcity, Technological Backwardness and The Raw Materials Crisis: Searching for Options

As a Polish economist has observed, the necessity for balance of payments equilibrium and the absence of a free flow of labour and investment between cooperating countries meant that national industrialization drives and the levelling-up of the productivity of social labour between countries occur "primarily on the basis of each country's internal resources.[47] Traditionally, more rapid and sophisticated development of industry had been pursued by planning extremely high levels of investment, which were in turn achieved by techniques of forced savings. Even so, capital has remained in short supply. Since the Complex Programme has specified the levelling of economic development of member countries as a primary objective of CMEA integration, one would anticipate a community attempt to achieve some international mobility of capital, mutual investment projects, capital assistance, etc. Since capital is scarce, however, any given bloc country can export it only to the detriment of domestic development goals and at the cost of a lower growth rate.[48]

Investment requirements for the bloc are likely to remain (or become

[45] See Tibor Kiss, op. cit., p. 103. Kiss adds that "differences in their internal economic mechanisms also prevent them from entering into export cartels to strengthen their competitive position."

[46] See Paul Marer, op. cit., and Edward A. Hewett, *Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

[47] See Zygmunt Knyziak, "Economic Criteria of the International Specialization of Production in Socialist Countries," in *Economic Development for Eastern Europe*, ed. by Michael Kaser (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 127.

[48] See Kiss, op. cit., p. 79.

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even increasingly) burdensome. This is a result of the need for extensive capital investments to exploit large deposits of raw materials on the territory of the USSR for export to the other bloc countries. Not only the Russians recognize that other investment projects currently appear more attractive to the Soviet Union. Covering the requirements for raw materials of brother socialist countries implies not only heavy capital outlays, but future commitment of raw material deliveries to a region that yields substantially lower returns (especially since the energy crisis) than could be enjoyed by rechannelling this trade to Western countries. Even loyal non-Russians recognize that the resolution of this problem will require the labour, capital and financial participation of other East European states in the further development of raw materials industries in the USSR, receiving future deliveries of the required materials in return.[49] Without being sure of some control over the production and utilization of raw materials outputs, of course, it is difficult to imagine that the East European states will be anxious to participate in such capital investments. That the Soviet Union would grant such control seems no less difficult to imagine. In any case, East European planners are most assuredly weighing up what other sources of raw materials supply might be pursued and whence the foreign currency might come to finance them.

Given these conditions, it is of importance that CMEA's international financial institutions are not in a position to contribute significantly to the resolution of the capital scarcity problem. The International Investment Bank cannot be relied upon to supply more than "two or three per cent of overall net investment activity"[50] in any given period. After all, the IIB is limited to resources generated internally in the CMEA region.

It had been hoped, with the creation of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC), that long-term credits for common investment projects could be financed from the bank's own funds. Not surprisingly, the bank turned out to be playing merely an intermediary role, allocating resources contributed by member countries over and above their prescribed quotas.[51]

One pleasant outcome had not been anticipated, however, *viz.* that the Bank might (though in a modest way) demonstrate the possibility of tapping Western investment capital. This possible source of capital is particularly important, because reliance upon forced savings as the impetus to industrial development has come to be an increasingly

[49] See, for example, Morgenstern, *Sozialistische Internationale Arbeitsteilung*, pp. 53–54.

[50] See van Brabant, "Essays on Planning . . . ", p. 95. He makes the believable statement that "if no additional funds are put at the bank's disposal, the investment activity of the following decade will be influenced negligibly by the bank's investment policy, for its resources will be essentially tied up in a few selected projects."

[51] See Stelzl, op. cit., p. 87. After 1964, the USSR, East Germany and Poland all expressed official regret over the disappointing effect of the International Bank, so that in 1970 the International Investment Bank was founded.

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unsatisfactory proposition. Planners throughout the socialist world have pronounced the securing of a higher standard of living to be the main task of current five-year plans. If this objective is not achieved by (very optimistically estimated) gains in labour productivity, either the goal will have to be discarded once again, or resources will be channelled from investment. It is quite possible that regimes enjoying little popular enthusiasm would regard the latter policy as too risky. This constraint on potential investment resources argues for more ambitious attempts to attract resources from the non-socialist world.

The capital shortage problem of the centralist world is compounded by the need to import technology-laden capital goods to reduce the severity of the East-West "technology lag," [52] a phenomenon which would render capital imports desirable even in the absence of an investment resources problem.[53]

Although Stalinist mistrust of the West and willingness to suffer through the onerous difficulties of autarkic development are strictly historical phenomena in the era of Brezhnev's *Westpolitik,* it is inconceivable that the centralist world savours the prospect of the inevitable growth of its economic dependence on the West. Additionally, economic interaction with the West may imply another negative consequence: inflation. The domestic economy can be sheltered from this possibility, of course, merely by retaining the traditional command trade apparatus domestically, but this, once again, militates against the adoption of currency convertibility, multilateral trade relations, and the more rapid growth of social product these imply.[54]

Sovereignty: The State vs. the Community

It might be of some use to observe that sovereignty has both political and economic components, both of which assume importance in the process of economic integration. Several of the economic issues already treated have apparent (and therefore not explicitly discussed) sovereignty implications.

[52] Happily, much of the work done on the problem of importing technology can be found in a single volume. See especially part II of S. Wasowski (ed.), *East-West Trade and the Technology Gap,* New York, 1970.

[53] Though the political objectives of individual, or groupings of, Western states in their relationships with Eastern Europe are not appropriate matter for this essay, it should be mentioned that the desire of non-socialists to provide capital for socialist development cannot simply be assumed. If provided at all, one must ask how this should occur. Western credits to the IBEC would likely enhance Soviet domination in Eastern Europe.

[54] It is to be expected that advocating the retention of the old apparatus would imply an emphasis of the benefits rather than the costs of such a policy. Konstantinov and Larionov insist that, in the planned economy, currency convertibility simply cannot be combined with a spontaneously functioning market mechanism. "The planned regularity of the development of the national economies, of the socialist international division of labour and of foreign trade precluded convertibility of the capitalist type, which frees money from its real (not nominal) base and opens the door to currency speculation and inflation." See their "Valyutno-finansovye otnosheniya i sotsialisticheskaya integratsiya," *Kommunist,* No. 7, 1973, p. 101.

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The degree of interdependence in international trade (the degree, in other words, to which autarky is repudiated) has an obvious bearing on a nation's freedom of policy action. The fact that East Germany, for example, is required by formal trade contracts to direct about half of its machine tool exports to the Soviet Union cannot help but influence the degree of independence enjoyed by East German planners.[55]

Although, in the case of integration, most sovereignty issues have both political and economic components[56] (the relative weights of which would be impossible to specify), this section will emphasize political aspects. Of primary importance for an integrating nation's political sovereignty is the fact that the implementation of integration schemes requires limitations on the jealously guarded prerogatives of national economic planners. By its very nature, integration requires at least some minimal, probably very considerable, community control over the resource allocation processes of member countries. When member countries balk at relinquishing this control, the process of integration is threatened. The question is, therefore, whether group economic interests should be considered of greater importance than those of individual CMEA members.

The question reminds us that politics is of paramount importance in the external relations of any sovereign country. This is no less true for socialist countries. It might even be said that CMEA, because its members, up to this point, have not been prepared to sacrifice national planning prerogatives, remains a more political than economic organization.

If it could be done at all, only the Soviet Union could exercise the political influence to coerce individual socialist states to co-operate in integration. In reality, the Soviet Union's power is finite—there are political limits beyond which the Soviets cannot (and probably do not wish to) go.[57]

Nevertheless, Soviet influence is sufficient to generate the constant feeling that disclaimers must be made about Soviet power. Frequently, it is even denied that CMEA integration implies limitations on the sovereignty of individual socialist countries. A sophisticated version of

[55] Or take the somewhat analogous case of the relationship of Opel in Rüsselsheim to General Motors in Detroit. Surely many of the decisions taken in Rüsselsheim correspond to policy preferences one would find in Detroit, though they may be taken strictly on the basis of economic consideration pertinent to Rüsselsheim operations. This does not, of course, deny the possibility of Detroit also giving direct suggestions from time to time.

[56] The issue of legal ownership of the individual national states in the overwhelming amount of the means of production could have been mentioned as yet a third component. The issue is of particular interest as joint production endeavours are entered into by CMEA members. See Yu. Shiryaev, op. cit. For the sake of simplicity the authors are inclined to treat the ownership questions as the legal reflection of the economic and political components. We are fully aware of the fact that this is not entirely so.

[57] P. J. D. Wiles holds that "one of the worst misunderstandings is to present the CMEA as simply an extension of Soviet power. It is, on the contrary, by its very nature a brake upon the more extreme manifestations of that power." See his *Communist International Economics* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 315.

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this position [58] holds that the integrative process, though it may affect the form and content of sovereignty, does not imply that it must be reduced. Each national government plans its own economic development, though in the matter of determining what investments will achieve structural developments corresponding to community specialization preferences, sovereignty takes a new form "through the acceptance of common resolutions with other governments or their representatives." [59]

As is commonly known, Rumania has consistently been willing to utilize whatever influence she could bring to bear in preventing encroachments by CMEA on the rights of individual members.

It may or may not be an exaggeration that Rumanian demands for "respect for sovereignty and national interest" were the greatest obstacle to Soviet pursuit of the single plan concept of economic unification (especially under Khrushchev) in the 1960s.[60] In any case, it is doubtful whether Rumania really stood alone on that issue. The Soviets were probably aware that other CMEA members found it unnecessary to argue the sovereignty case openly, only because a vociferous spokesman was already getting the job done.

Ceausescu of Rumania finally came around to accepting the Complex Programme for integration in the centralist world, only because it contained nothing new in the way of integrative technique that would threaten national independence,[61] and because integration was defined (or rather left undefined) [62] so as not to "affect national independence and sovereignty, nor lead to common planning and superstate forms of organization." [63]

The strong position taken by the Complex Programme against intervention "in the interior affairs of member states" is extremely impres-

[58] A. P. Butenko, *Sozialistische Integration: Wesen und Perspektiven* (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1972), pp. 58–59.

[59] *Ibid.* When resources are allocated to integration, a nation loses power over the sole determination of what happens to them, since the other seven countries participate in the decisions. But now, however, such a country can participate in decisions pertaining to the resources supplied by the other seven countries. "Consequently, the extent of its rights have not been constrained at all, they remain as before. Only the form of the realization of these rights has changed."

[60] For at least part of the interesting history, see Hertha W. Heiss, "The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—Developments since the Mid-1960s," in *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe,* Washington: Joint Economic Committee, 1970, pp. 528–542.

[61] Schaefer, op. cit., p. 172, indicates that the programme did not expand on the nature or methodology of joint planning. It also failed to "decide on the regulation of direct ties or on the regulation and authority of joint organizations."

[62] An acceptable definition is not to be found anywhere in the Complex Programme. For our purposes, a general one such as van Brabant's is worthwhile. He defines integration as "a process aimed at the conscious elimination of barriers to trade and economic cooperation between economic units belonging to at least two different national states. . . . As a result (of integration), relative scarcities between any pair of goods and services are expected to converge to identical values." See J. M. P. van Brabant, *Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration in Eastern Europe* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), p. 39.

[63] Ceausescu's quotation is cited by Schaefer, op. cit., p. 113.

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sive.[64] The unanimity requirement of CMEA, its foremost institutional sovereignty safeguard, demands that substantive decisions and recommendations adopted remain unopposed by all the brother states. But, as has become evident, establishing institutional limitations to assure that only unanimously desired economic processes be undertaken is tantamount to guaranteeing that substantial integration will not occur.

What can be the practical meaning then of the tremendous increase in organizational and literary output pertaining to economic integration in Eastern Europe in recent years? [65] The sceptical viewpoint might be that it is really little more than a smoke screen to camouflage dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the reform period.

To assume a more sympathetic stance regarding the possibility of a fortuitous union of national independence and international integration is no easy task.[66] Some evidence that such a union is genuinely being pursued is available, however, even if it is scanty. First, the single exception to the unanimity principle is possibly significant, at least symbolically. For substantive questions facing the International Investment Bank (confirmation of annual accounting, disposition of earned revenues, appointment of management, etc.) unanimous action is still required, but all other actions require only a three-fourths majority.[67] Second, CMEA's "principle of interestedness" implies that certain mutual integration projects can be undertaken by a limited number of "interested" members. Others need not participate in such projects, but they cannot veto them in CMEA councils. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that these rather minor organizational innovations can be considered substantive new integration possibilities.

Regional and Developmental Integration Considerations

It has been observed that economic integration must "create, ultimately, between the various areas belonging to an *economic region*,

[64] Socialist economic integration, it is proclaimed, "occurs on a completely voluntary basis and is not connected with the creation of supranational organs. It does not affect the question of internal planning, or the financial and economic accounting activities of national organizations." Moreover, the activity of the international economic associations (organizations) may in no case "constrict the interests of individual member countries of CMEA or those of the member countries of CMEA as a group." *Mnogostoronnee ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstv: sbornik dokumentov*, ed. by P. A. Tokarevoi (2nd edition), Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1972, "Kompleksnaya programma dalneishego uglubleniya i sovershenstvovaniya sotrudnichestva i razvitiya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomicheskoi integratsii stran-chlenov SEV." Paragraph 1, section 1, p. 31.

[65] The literature produced by the Soviet publishing apparatus pertaining to the desirability of socialist economic cooperation reaches well back into the 1950s. So the vast *increase* in published output on integration (rather than its initial appearance) is of interest here.

[66] The contradiction in terms here should be apparent, but the pursuit of its policy implementation in postwar Eastern (and Western?) Europe is a matter of history. It might be worthwhile to attempt to coin a new term for the phenomenon. Might we consider "inter-independence" ("*unabhängige Verflechtung*")?

[67] See Heinrich Machowski, "Organisatorische Probleme der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit im Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe," *Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung*, No. 4, 1970, pp. 286–8.

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the same type of relations that exist within the national economies." [68] A great diversity of economic problems faces the member states of CMEA: the Soviet Union has vast natural resources and a large market, and depends little on foreign trade; Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are developed industrial states with high trade dependence; Bulgaria and Rumania are developing countries. Even casual observation makes it apparent that CMEA is a political union attempting to achieve economic integration. Machowski has observed [69] that it would make more sense from an economic standpoint, for example, to encourage East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to form an economic unit—a "Central European Economic Union" (*Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsregion*).[70] Virtually nobody expects that such a notion could receive *de jure* currency in the contemporary Soviet world, but the principles of the Complex Programme open the way for at least a partial *de facto* realization of the concept.[71]

For Eastern Europe, the question of the formation of an *economic* region is in large measure a question about the manner in which national size is to be accounted for by policymakers. The Complex Programme is fortuitous in that it makes possible increasingly intimate economic relationships among the small, trade-dependent states of CMEA on the basis of multilateral plan coordination [72] and joint production projects.

Extending from the kinds of relationships developing between East Germany and Poland,[73] the four central European countries mentioned could (on the basis of the principle of "interestedness") extend the degree of economic interaction, working in a *de facto* fashion towards the

[68] Ausch, op. cit., p. 30.

[69] Heinrich Machowski, "Die Funktion der DDR im RGW," in *Die DDR vor den Aufgaben der Integration und der Koexistenz* (Tutzing: Akademie für Politische Bildung, 1974), pp. 3–19.

[70] This is evident, Machowski holds, on the basis of these countries' similar economic structures, resource endowments, labour market conditions, national economic history, etc. In Machowski's "etc.," geographic proximity is worthy of emphasis. See ibid., p. 18. Naturally, this suggested grouping is also not strictly a geographic or an economic one, but once again a political one. For example, sovereignty considerations make it unfeasible to exclude Southern Italy from the EEC. Clearly the same national-regional development phenomena (e.g. in Czechoslovakia) appear in CMEA. They would merely be minimized in the political groupings suggested by Machowski.

[71] Machowski himself holds that this would begin in the form of "*Ad-hoc Arbeitsgruppen*" (ad hoc groupings in CMEA). See the article co-authored with Fritz Franzmeyer, "Willensbildung und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und im Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe," *Europa Archiv*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1973), p. 60.

[72] Coordination of plans is described by the Complex Programme as the "main method of organizing cooperation and intensifying the international division of labour."

[73] On the basis of the Complex Plan's advocacy of "common planning of individual branches of industry and production types," Poland and East Germany have jointly (capital costs being equally shared) developed a huge textile operation. Additionally, an experiment in free tourism has been undertaken. The latter had to be modified, since planners failed to foresee and prepare for the flood of people anxious to take advantage of the absence of all customs, currency and other restrictions. When a Polish buying spree threatened to aggravate severely the shortage conditions of East German consumer goods supplies, the modifications adopted restored the tourist situation to something more like what planners had originally expected. See Machowski, op. cit., pp. 16–18.

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development of institutions which might one day permit the evolution of an integrated region of planned market economies, obviously with the achievement of currency convertibility and trade multilateralism.

This would not be without benefits for the Soviet Union. In early phases, such a union would present the possibility of spreading East Germany's relative affluence over a substantial share of the north-western CMEA region. Later on, as the union became substantially stronger, rising levels of national welfare there could be tapped for the entire CMEA area in two ways. First, capital assistance (already expected to some degree from East Germany and Czechoslovakia) could become a meaningful possibility for the developing members of CMEA. Second, the Soviet Union might begin to hope for better cost-sharing outcomes in the Warsaw Pact.[74] Finally, the USSR desires to operate on a bilateral basis in her trade with the EEC. Rumania has sought special status as a developing country in dealing with the EEC. Why should the smaller Central European socialist states not be permitted to face the difficult task of dealing with the EEC (which is expressing unwillingness to see West European members dealing individually with non-member countries) as a bargaining group?

Unfortunately, probabilities are strongly against intensified integration along Central European lines, and consequently, perhaps, against integration in Eastern Europe in any form. It is likely that the political costs to the Soviet Union of such a development would prevent its occurrence. In the first place, the Soviet Union has little desire to see East Europeans beyond Soviet borders enjoying a level of affluence denied the Soviet people. This source of aggravation is probably already extant owing especially to the economic success of East Germany. More important, however, would be the accretion of countervailing political power to the Soviet Union's reluctant allies.

SIMILAR in nature to the problems of regional integration facing CMEA are the considerable difficulties arising from differences in the level of development of member countries. The Complex Programme refers to the necessity of a step-by-step equalization of levels of economic development, though nothing substantial is said about how this is to be achieved (other than through " maximal mobilization and effective use of countries' own efforts and resources as well as by utilization of the advantages of the international socialist division of labour ").[75]

[74] A glance at statistics serially published in *The Military Balance* (The Institute for Strategic Studies, London) shows that the official financial situation in the Warsaw Pact closely approximates that in NATO. The super-power of each alliance devotes around a tenth of its national output to defence projects—often over two (sometimes even over three) times as great a percentage as that which the smaller allies spend for defence purposes. For a survey of Soviet defence outlay estimates see Herbert Block's " Value and Burden of Soviet Defence," in *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, A Compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 175–204. See especially pp. 189–190.

[75] *Mnogostoronnee ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo* . . . , op. cit., p. 30 and p. 34.

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Socialist economic literature insists that the perpetuation of deep-rooted differences between CMEA members would inhibit long-run optimization of growth for the socialist world as a whole, not to mention that of individual members.[76]

Since the level of development is usually defined in terms of per capita incomes, and since the best socialist performance is usually achieved where population growth rates are lowest, the equalization goal will clearly not be achieved through the means provided by the Complex Programme. Moreover, it is *not* a foregone conclusion that community welfare can be maximized in the short or intermediate run by policies consciously designed to force post-haste equalization of development levels.[77] It may be that the bearers of political and economic power acted wisely (as opposed to having fortuitously failed to act) in neglecting to develop means to pursue the goal of development levelling. In any case, this largely ideological aspect of socialist literature has recently seemed more a formality than a pressing issue.

But putting the question of levelling aside, how will the integration effort account for discrepancies in the development of CMEA members? The more advanced socialist countries (East Germany and Czechoslovakia) are interested in developing specializations based on "efficiency," while the less-developed countries show more interest in diversification, industrialization and exploitation of all their resources, whether or not this may be efficient.[78] The ideology of the Soviet strategy of industrialization is most convincing to socialists, especially those who still have the process before them.

For the more-developed socialist states, an attempt to achieve integration with partners undergoing a retarded industrialization programme may entail some high costs. As was earlier observed, relying on supplies from abroad (*Fremdversorgung*) may mean incurring more expense and/or inconvenience than simply producing a (possibly higher quality) pro-

[76] J. Novozamski, "The Development of the International Division of Labour Between Countries at Different Economic Levels," in *Economic Development for Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 147.

[77] Ostensibly, conscious planning techniques (including intra-CMEA capital assistance, educational, manpower and management training programmes) could beneficially reduce development level disparities in the long run. A standard growth model would cast doubt upon the welfare implications of policies designed, however, to assure extensive short and intermediate-run capital flows, e.g., from East Germany and Czechoslovakia to Rumania and Bulgaria. In Eastern Europe, capital poverty conditions suggest *a priori* that potential capital earnings may be larger in the more-developed socialist states. Additionally, the "residual effect" of the growth equation—the technological and organizational possibilities—may likewise be substantially higher in the more-developed countries. For a short-term maximization of community welfare, one would do well to supply capital to those countries equipped to use it best, and to develop mechanisms to distribute the greater earnings throughout the socialist world. The distribution problem for this approach, however, may also be of little consequence, so long as the socialist system remains largely what Leontief has described as an "input-input system."

[78] The relative scarcity of raw materials existing in the bloc is to some extent a result of this preference. See M. C. Kaser, *Comecon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), (2nd edition), chapter 10 and Holzman, op. cit., p. 14.

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duct at home. But even more seriously, when the East Germans, for example, forgo the opportunity to integrate their economy technologically upwards into the more advanced and demanding world market, the corresponding technological *niveau* cannot be achieved. On the other hand, of course, the East Germans are fully prepared to cooperate in CMEA for political reasons. East Germany perceived in an intensified integration milieu an opportunity, through (technologically downward) CMEA integration, to increase East German political weight and consolidate the political basis of its international recognition.[79] Moreover, it is convenient to have guaranteed markets for products that would not sell so readily in the West.

Another development problem is created by the scarcity of foreign currency in the less-developed CMEA states, who must hope to export raw materials for good returns, so that the foreign currency essential for capital imports will be available. They are attempting, to the dismay of their more-developed brother states, to direct a larger share of their exports of raw materials to Western markets. Facing a constricted supply, the more-developed CMEA countries are coerced to use scarce foreign exchange in Western markets for the necessary basic materials. For these countries, integration also comes to mean purchasing " increasing quantities of finished goods (mainly machines), regardless of quality or price, and often regardless of the real needs of their own national economy." [80]

But what about the needs of the less-developed socialist countries? Interestingly, Bogomolow has suggested that of the two integration alternatives facing these countries (to forgo the benefits of specialization until a higher level of development has been achieved or to begin immediately to specialize in the integrative framework) immediate participation is best *if* (a) a mechanism exists for making good specialization choices and (b) technical assistance, credits and other assistance are available for the developing countries.[81] Bogomolow would doubtless have a different view from that of most non-socialist analysts about the availability of such assistance in contemporary CMEA. Rumania's resistance to integration, however, may well be an indication that, lacking these prerequisites, the non-integrative development alternative would really be preferred.

Western Contacts and East European Cohesion

It has become fashionable in recent times for Soviet writers to begin works bearing on international problems with the observation that the economic relationships being developed among the socialist countries

[79] See Werner Bröll, " Die wirtschaftliche Rolle der DDR im RGW: Das Spannungsverhältnis von System, Struktur und Integration," in *Probleme des Industrialismus in Ost und West*, ed. by Werner Gumpel and Dietmar Keese (München: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1973), p. 332.

[80] Ausch, op. cit., p. 195.

[81] See O. T. Bogomolow, *Theorie und Methodologie der internationalen sozialistischen Arbeitsteilung* (Berlin: Verlag die Wirtschaft, 1969), pp. 83–84.

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" by no means imply a repudiation of economic connections with nations of other types." [82] The statement is not surprising, of course, in the light of the manifest desire of the socialist countries to develop economic, scientific and technological ties with the developed capitalist states.

But it is also true, as has already been observed, that in direct conflict with such statements, the Soviets are not above heralding the need to pursue integration " in the struggle against imperialism and its policy of undermining the positions of world socialism." [83]

The contradiction can easily be explained away as representative ideological matter, not necessarily related to contemporary policy intent. It is mentioned here because it reflects, in addition to an ideological question, a genuine policy dilemma for CMEA as an institution. To what extent should the socialist states pursue economic excellence through methods of regional autarky? To what degree is interaction of the CMEA states as a collective with the Western economies prudent policy? For the East European community, the question of autarky *v.* interaction is similar to the question of economic contacts with the West treated above from the perspective of the single socialist state.

Clearly, this is the headache of the Soviet Union. Though loyal socialists in all countries probably also feel concerned with the problem, the elicited response will, in large measure, reflect the fact that in a crisis CMEA, to some degree, can serve as an institutional arm of Soviet foreign policy. The Russians must find a way of receiving required technological transfusions from the West into the bloc without souring blood relationships tediously nurtured in postwar Eastern Europe. How an influx of Western capital and commodities can be obtained without increasing the velocity and magnitude of centripetal forces in the CMEA region probably remains a matter of speculation in Moscow.

IN spite of the establishment of some common interests and affinities under Soviet leadership in post-war Eastern Europe, CMEA remains a long way from the achievement of the integration called for in the Complex Programme. Strong centrifugal forces militate against progress towards any form of economic union.

Even though individual CMEA states see the need to increase the effectiveness of external ties, there almost seems to be more avid interest in doing so with Western countries. Important uncertainties are still attached to the proposition of further specialization within the bloc, including problems of supply consistency, product quality, technological inadequacy of imports, etc.

Of the constraints facing the community as a whole, the authors deem fundamental economic problems to be of supreme importance. Even if no headway were made on some of the thorny political problems facing

[82] See G. L. Shagalov, *Problemy optimalnogo planirovaniya vneshneekonomicheskich svyazei* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), p. 5.
[83] See Schaeffer, op. cit., p. 188. The quote comes from Pravda, 30 July 1971.

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the CMEA region, integration could be noticeably enhanced by a more satisfactory attack on the problem of over-centralization in socialist national planning mechanisms. The intractability of planning bureaucracies generates higher costs of information, coordination and administration in the integration process, which simply guarantees that less integration can occur.

The process of physical planning through plan directives and the resultant "commodity inconvertibility" results in inefficiency domestically. It is possibly even more costly in international economic relationships, since it stultifies the development of value, monetary and financial improvements that are even more essential for international planning and integration. Central planning requires the continued utilization of separate domestic and foreign pricing systems, not to mention the dichotomy between socialist and world market prices. The unavailability of comparable, allocative prices means that it remains impossible to establish cost comparisons indicative of potential production specializations for participants in integration. Additionally, the use of artificially adopted prices not reflecting conditions of East European economic scarcity (i.e., underpriced scarce raw materials are exchanged for overpriced, relatively abundant heavy-industry goods) has given rise to the interesting terms of trade "exploitation" of the Soviet Union by the East Europeans. Additionally, scarcity of capital, technological inadequacy and problems of raw materials all cause behaviour militating against progress in integration. Removing these economic obstacles is a necessary condition for greater progress in CMEA integration. Complete success, however, would require solving the problems of political constraints on CMEA integration.

When we turn to politics, the sense of urgency is somewhat less. Still, the resolution of political problems, particularly that of sovereignty, is, likewise, a necessary condition for complete success in integration.

The East European states are endowed with enough political sovereignty to veto the idea of implementing a singe economic plan for the entire CMEA region and to block substantive proposals for integration. They enjoy too little sovereignty, however, to integrate in CMEA subgroupings more profitable to the smaller member states. For the time being, it appears that socialist countries will be able to continue national pursuits of often conflicting individual interests, *viz.* those of a superpower, those of smaller (more highly trade-dependent) states, and those of developing countries. The disparateness of these interests will very often prove detrimental to the attempt to integrate.

When one reviews the number and intensity of problems and forces hindering economic union, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that integration will simply not be achieved in the foreseeable future. This does not mean that CMEA will disappear and the economic order in East Europe will dissolve. It does mean that we have not seen the end of attempts of the magnitude of the reforms of the 60s and the Complex

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Programme of the present to find some innovation that will render economic difficulties more manageable.

Surveying obstacles to integration also lends increased weight to an interesting proposition. The socialists emphasize economic integration as a policy *goal*, saying very little about the largely hypothetical stage of the single plan and political unification. This is in contrast to the EEC's adoption of economic integration as a *vehicle* to reach the goal of political unification. Even if one assumes that the goal of the EEC will never be obtained (or is not even being seriously pursued), this comparison is not merely a matter of semantics. The significant point is that the EEC's economic integration incorporates forces of automaticity. As time passes, West European markets are automatically becoming more integrated, and the possibility of the withdrawal of individual members, for example, continually becomes more costly and less conceivable. The element of automaticity is completely lacking in CMEA. Each step towards integration can be achieved only after tedious negotiations, countless bilateral agreements and inordinately involved planning arrangements. The proposition is, then, that the integration process is proceeding very slowly, because the East Europeans simply don't want integration very badly.

Abandoning a longer-range perspective now, there remains an important logical conclusion bearing on inter-CMEA relations over the next few years. Because of the imposition of the Stalinist (heavy-industrial) development pattern on the satellites, and because of international trade pricing techniques adopted by CMEA countries, the Soviet Union finds its economic ties with Eastern Europe increasingly costly and less rewarding. As the Soviet Union makes this discovery and turns to the West in search of ways to alleviate domestic economic difficulties, the bloc countries are following suit. It is most likely that developing relations with the West will enhance centrifugal political, economic and cultural forces in Eastern Europe. What means are at the disposal of the Soviets to preserve cohesion and loyalty in the CMEA region? Economic assistance seems unlikely, since the Soviets are coming to perceive that too much of that has already been given. One hopes that some pleasant alternative will be found, or that the Soviets will be able to accept a position of less influence in East Europe. It is, unfortunately, very likely, however, that a more recalcitrant Soviet Union may have to be dealt with. Because of the logic of the current economic situation in CMEA and the Soviet Union, it may be necessary to face the future of inter-bloc relations with some concern.

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Marx's *Grundrisse* and the Asiatic Mode of Production

Samuel H. Baron

AMONG the many contributions of Marx and Engels to social thought, perhaps none has caused more controversy among their followers than the construct which they variously called Asiatic or Oriental society, Asiatic or Oriental despotism and the Asiatic mode of production. Events concerning India in the 1850s stimulated a lively correspondence between the two men on the nature and roots of Oriental societies and prompted Marx to write a pair of arresting articles on the subject. With further study and reflection, the matter assumed such importance in Marx's eyes that by 1859, in his famous Preface to *The Critique of Political Economy*, he named the Asiatic along with the slave-holding, feudal and capitalist "modes of production" as one of the four "progressive epochs in the economic formation of society."[1] Some 70 years later, in the course of an extended dispute on the concept in the USSR, the Asiatic mode of production was, in effect, declared null and void and purged from Marxist-Leninist socio-historical discourse. In a dramatic reversal, however, shortly after the 100th anniversary of the publication of Marx's *Critique*, the Asiatic mode of production exploded into prominence in the Marxian world once again.

As the title indicates, I am primarily concerned here with only one aspect of what is a long and complex story. I shall make no effort to trace the development of Marx's and Engels' thought on the Asiatic mode of production, a matter already much studied.[2] It is important, however, to recall the general outlines of the concept, as it has been pieced together from their scattered and unsystematic remarks in works

[1] Discussions in the British Parliament, called forth by the imminent expiration of the East India Company's charter, attracted Marx's attention to India. The two articles, "The British Rule in India" and "The Future Results of the British Rule in India," are reprinted in *The American Journalism of Marx-Engels. A Selection from the New York Daily Tribune*, ed. Henry M. Christman (New York, 1966). For the quotation on the several modes of production, see Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Chicago, 1904), p. 13.

[2] George Lichtheim, "Marx and the 'Asiatic Mode of Production'," reprinted as "Oriental Despotism" in his book of essays *The Concept of Ideology* (New York, 1967); F. Tökei, *Sur le Mode de Production Asiatique* (Budapest, 1966); N. V. Ter-Akopian, "Razvitie Vzglyadov K. Marksa i F. Engelsa na Aziatskii Sposob Proizvodstva i Zemledelcheskuyu Obshchinu," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, Nos. 2 and 3 (1965); G. Sofri, "Sul 'Modo di Produzione Asiatico', Appunti per la Storia di una Controversia," *Critica Storica*, Vol. V (Nov., 1966), pp. 708–40; V. I. Nikiforov, "K Marks i F. Engels ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva," in G. F. Kim *et al.*, *Problemy Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv v Stranakh Vostoka* (Moscow, 1971). Lichtheim's piece is, in my view, the most sensitive of the lot, and, because he has no axe to grind, his treatment is also the most reliable.

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published during their lifetimes and for several decades after their deaths.

Asiatic societies had arisen in response to special geographical conditions, they believed, particularly inadequate rainfall. To sustain agriculture under such conditions, large-scale irrigation works were required, and powerful states arose to organize their construction and maintenance. In these basically agrarian states, the mass of the population was organized in village communes. Because they carried on crafts as well as agricultural production, the communal organizations were economically self-sufficient. A key feature of the Asiatic society was the absence of private property in land: the communes enjoyed its use, but the state owned it. The ruler was a despot who, together with his governing apparatus, exacted surplus value from the producers in a form that was at once rent and tax. The conditions of production (state rather than private ownership of land, and communal self-sufficiency rather than the separation of agricultural from non-agricultural production in a social division of labour) endowed the Asiatic societies with extraordinary stability and endurance. A violent shock from the outside was required to jar them into further historical movement.

For several decades after the deaths of Marx and Engels, their followers, except for G. V. Plekhanov, appear to have made little use of this dimension of their masters' thought.[3] Then, just as events involving India had drawn the attention of Marx and Engels to Asia in the 1850s, so in the 1920s revolutionary action in China impelled a number of Soviet Marxists to direct their thought to the Asiatic mode of production. A need was felt to define the nature of the Chinese revolution and that, in turn, required a correct understanding of Chinese social forces and traditions. In this context, a controversy arose as to whether the Asiatic mode of production had prevailed in China in the past. The question was far from resolved on the basis of evidence and argument, when, at a conference in Leningrad in 1931, a politically motivated and supported decision to deny the existence of the Asiatic mode of production in Chinese history was handed down. Those who persisted in the contrary view were indiscriminately damned as Trotskyists, and what they had perceived as a distinct Asiatic mode of production was declared to be merely an Asian variant of feudalism.[4]

In the course of the thirties, China's ancient society came to be characterized as slave-holding rather than feudal. The change reflected

[3] See my articles "Plekhanov's Russia: The Impact of the West upon an 'Oriental' Society," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (June, 1958); "Plekhanov, Trotsky, and the Development of Soviet Historiography," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (July, 1974).

[4] Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, 1957), Chap. 9; Konstantin Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1962), pp. 71–88. For a different perspective, see V. N. Nikiforov, "Diskussiya Sovetskikh Istorikov ob Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskom Stroe v Kitae (1925–1931)," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 (1965). See also L. V. Danilova, "Stanovlenie Marksistkogo Napravleniya v Sovetskoi Istoriografii Epokhi Feodalizma," *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, No. 76 (1965), p. 99.

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the crystallization of a viewpoint which envisaged slave-holding as the prevalent socio-economic formation almost everywhere after the breakdown of primitive communism.[5] This attitude was itself but one dimension of a general movement in Soviet thought towards a unilinear historical conception that minimized the differences between European and Oriental societies and history. In 1938, in a famous chapter of the *History of the CPSU: Short Course,* Stalin sanctified the new gospel—which he blandly represented as a restatement of the basics of Marxism-Leninism—when, in listing " the five *main* types of relations of production," he omitted the Asiatic mode.[6] In the same year, the Soviet orientalist V. V. Struve undertook to provide the scholarly scientific underpinnings. Struve " proved " that, though Marx and Engels did for a time employ the concept, they later abandoned it; and, moreover, that Lenin had settled the matter conclusively when, with no hint of equivocation, he designated the slave-holding order the first class-divided society in history.[7] Deprived of canonical authority, the Asiatic mode of production disappeared from Soviet scholarly discourse. And not only Soviet, for, with few exceptions, Marxists the world over followed the Soviet lead and strove to accommodate the history of all societies to the five-stage scheme: primitive communism, slave-holding, feudalism, capitalism and socialism.

So the situation remained until 1956, when, at the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev thundered his denunciation of Stalin. The de-Stalinization programme then initiated summoned historians to a struggle against dogmatism and to more critical and creative work. Many responded enthusiastically, and, as a result, the sixties produced a richer harvest of historical speculation and scholarship than any decade since the revolution. The Asiatic mode of production was evidently considered an especially sensitive matter, however; and, therefore, even though it had some covert support in the USSR, the primary impetus to bring it back into circulation came from the Marxist scholarly community outside.[8] The initiative was taken by two East

[5] Ironically, Russia came to be viewed as an exception: it was said to have skipped the slave-holding stage.

[6] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course* (Moscow, 1939), pp. 123, 130–31. The Russian edition was published in 1938.

[7] V. V. Struve, " Marksovoe Opredelenie Ranneklassovogo Obshchestva," *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* No. 3 (1940). Struve cited in support of his claim a popular lecture, " On the State," that Lenin had given in 1919, but was first published in 1929. In 1967, the Czech Marxist scholar J. Pečirka pointed out the absurdity of using Lenin as an authority on the character of ancient societies, a subject he had never independently studied. See his article, " Von der Asiatischen Produktionsweise zu einer Marxistischen Analyse der frühen Klassengesellschaften," *Eirene,* Vol. 6 (1967), pp. 156–57. For the relevant passages in Lenin, see his *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii,* Vol. XXXIX, pp. 68–70.

[8] Extremely valuable for details of the revival of the Asiatic mode of production, as well as for some larger insights, are the articles of Jean Chesneaux: " Le Mode de Production Asiatique. Quelques Perspectives de Recherches," *La Pensée,* No. 114 (Apr., 1964); " Le Mode de Production Asiatique: une Nouvelle Étape de la Discussion," *Eirene,* Vol. 3 (1964); " Ou en est la Discussion sur le ' Mode de Production Asiatique '?," Parts I, II, and III in *La Pensée,* No. 122 (July–Aug., 1965); No. 129 (Sept.–Oct., 1966); No. 138 (Mar.–Apr., 1968); and two articles by J. Pečirka: the one

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European scholars, Elizabeth Welskopf of East Germany and Ferenc Tökei of Hungary, who published articles in 1957 and 1958 expressing scepticism about the view that ancient China was a slave-holding society.[9] Their work did not at first attract much attention, but in the early sixties a striking surge of interest in this and related problems became manifest. In 1961 and 1962, a number of British Marxists vented dissatisfaction with the five-stage scheme; in 1963, critical discussions got under way in Czechoslovakia; and, in the same year, several articles in the Italian press underlined the significance of the Asiatic mode of production for the Marxist historian.[10]

A group of French scholars affiliated to the *Centre d'études et de recherches marxistes* (CERM) in Paris played an especially critical role. Beginning in 1962, they launched an energetic—and as it turned out, a very effective—campaign to promote research and dialogue on the Asiatic mode of production on an international scale. In the journal *La Pensée,* which served as their vehicle, they published studies of the thought of Marx and Engels on the subject and proposals for further development and refinement of the concept, papers on particular societies whose structures and history appeared more intelligible when viewed in terms of the Asiatic mode of production, and chronicles and discussions of the developing dialogue, backed by bibliographical compilations that gave the gist of Marxist articles and books on the subject as they appeared.[11] In 1967, several leaders of the French group edited a special number of *Recherches Internationales à la Lumière de Marxisme,* which brought together in French translation 21 articles on the theme that had earlier been published in German, Soviet, English, Czech and other periodicals.[12]

In 1964, pressure to lift the ban on the Asiatic mode of production in the Soviet Union mounted and perhaps became irresistible. No. 114 of *La*

cited in note 7 above, and an earlier piece, "Die Sowjetischen Diskussionen über die Asiatische Produktionsweise und über die Sklavenhalterformation," *Eirene*, Vol. 3 (1964).

[9] E. Welskopf, "Probleme der Periodisierung der Altengeschichte: die Einordnung des Alten Orients und Altamerikas in die Weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* No. 3 (1957); F. Tökei, "Les Conditions de la Propriété Foncière dans la Chine de l'Époque Tcheou," *Acta Antiqua Scientarum Hungaricae,* Vol. VI (1958). The Welskopf article gives the gist of some of the principal themes she elaborated in a weighty volume published the same year: *Die Produktionsverhältnisse im Alten Orient und in der Griechisch-Römischen Antike* (Berlin, 1957).

[10] See the comments of Arnot, Simon, Pulleyblank, Hobsbawn and many others, under the title "Stages of Social Development," in numbers of *Marxism Today* for 1961 and 1962; the article "Existierte in China eine Sklavenhaltergesellschaft?," *Archivnyi Orientalyni* (Prague, 1963), Vol. I; and articles in the 5 Oct. and 23 Nov. 1963 numbers of *Rinascita* (Rome).

[11] On the role of the CERM group, see the first two articles of Chesneaux cited in note 8 above, and the article by C. Parain in *La Pensée,* No. 114. For writings of the first type published in *La Pensée,* see the Tökei and Godelier articles in Nos. 114 and 143; of the second type, among others, the Suret-Canale, Antoniadis-Bibiscou, Boiteau, Parain, Dambuyant, and Divitçioglu articles in Nos. 117, 127, 129, 144, and 151; of the third type, the Chesneaux articles in Nos. 114, 122, 129, and 138.

[12] *Recherches Internationales,* Nos. 57–58 (1967).

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Pensée carried five items on the subject and made a powerful, many-sided case for reopening the discussion. One need not speculate on the impact that this and later numbers made in Soviet scholarly circles. In 1965 and after, they were much cited in Soviet journals; and, as Jean Chesneaux, one of the CERM group, later reported: "Our Soviet friends have frequently, orally and in writing, thanked *La Pensée* for having contributed to this 'reopening' of the discussion." [13] In April too, the Czech Jan Pečirka presented to an international congress of Marxist students of antiquity in Leningrad a paper entitled "Remarks on the discussion of the slave-holding formation and on the Asiatic mode of production." His brief communication featured an account of the discussions of the Asiatic mode that had begun the preceding year in Czechoslovakia. The first open consideration of the subject in the USSR in decades, Pečirka's remarks, according to a negatively-inclined scholar, evoked "great interest." Pečirka himself reported that his presentation brought a "lively response—polemical and concurring," both at the session and afterwards in the corridors. It made him aware that the "suppressed question remained a matter of real concern among Soviet ancient historians." [14]

A couple of months later, E. Varga, the famous Soviet economist and a proponent of the Asiatic mode of production during the earlier controversy in the USSR, shattered the long silence on the part of Soviet scholars. In a book devoted to the investigation of important problems of contemporary capitalism, he unexpectedly turned his attention in the last chapter to the Asiatic mode of production. There he denounced the high-handed conduct of the earlier discussions, reaffirmed the great and enduring importance of the Asiatic mode in the thought of Marx and Engels, and called upon "competent *Soviet* Marxist scholars" (my emphasis—SHB) to "reopen this discussion and rehabilitate Marx's and Engels' correct teaching ... on modes of production." [15] Varga's book evidently created a sensation: the first printing of 10,000 copies rapidly sold out, and preparations for a second got under way hardly more than six months after the appearance of the first.

The CERM group planned to carry their campaign to Moscow, where the VIIth International Congress of Anthropology and Ethnology was to convene in August. Two of its members—Jean Suret-Canale, a historian of pre-colonial, tropical Africa, and Maurice Godelier, an economist and anthropologist with a flair for social science theory—prepared papers for presentation. A book by Suret-Canale had been published in Russian in the Soviet Union in 1961, but the passages in which he spoke in support of the Asiatic mode of production had been excised. In his 1964 paper,

[13] *La Pensée*, No. 138, pp. 47–48.

[14] On the Pečirka matter, see his article "Von der Asiatischen Produktsionsweise," loc. cit. p. 143; "Konferentsiya po Izucheniyu Problem Antichnosti," *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii*, No. 3 (1964), pp. 277; Ya. Lentsman, "Neskolko Predvaritelnikh Zamechanii. K Obsuzhdeniyu Voprosa ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva," ibid. No. 3 (1965).

[15] E. Varga, *Ocherki po Problemam Politekonomii Kapitalizma* (Moscow, 1964).

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he presented the results of his research in summary form, together with his conclusion that, although it required considerable refinement, the Asiatic model corresponded far better to the realities of pre-colonial tropical Africa than either slave-holding or feudalism. Godelier prepared a more broadly focused examination of the Asiatic mode of production in the writings of Marx and Engels and its vicissitudes through time. His trenchantly argued and hard-hitting contribution was calculated to meet the objections that had been raised earlier against the concept and to expose the shameful and profoundly damaging consequences of its suppression. The two also offered some original thoughts on how the Asiatic mode of production might be understood and fruitfully employed in current research.[16]

As it happened, neither of the two men actually attended the congress; and, for reasons that may only be surmised, instead of their papers being read, brief summaries in the form of "theses" were circulated. They were accompanied by a commentary composed by Struve.[17] The long-time opponent of the concept began his remarks with these words: "The term and the concept 'the Asiatic mode of production' was rejected for decades by Soviet historians, and the term *Aziatchik* was a word of abuse, despite the fact that it was none other than Marx and Engels who introduced the concept into historical science." Struve went on to welcome the Suret-Canale/Godelier initiative, and even made some concessions to their point of view. Although he also took issue with some of their ideas, it was a startling reversal, a sure sign that one of the most stubbornly defended bastions of Stalinist orthodoxy was giving way.

In response to Varga's earlier appeal, at the end of 1964 a torrent of discussion, writing, and publication was unleashed. Within the space of six months, conferences on the subject were staged at three divisions

[16] The full text of Suret-Canale's paper, "Les Sociétés Traditionelles en Afrique Tropicale et le Concept Marxist de Mode de Production Asiatique. Le Marxisme et l'Etude des Sociétés Africains," was published in *La Pensée*, No. 117 (Sept.-Oct., 1964); Godelier's paper, as a separate pamphlet, *La Notion de "Mode de Production Asiatique" et les Schémas Marxistes de l'Évolution des Sociétés* (Paris, 1964). Godelier published an article with the same title, and with much but not exactly the same content, in *Les Temps Modernes*, May 1965. Suret-Canale's book *L'Afrique Noire Occidentale et Centrale* (Paris, 1958), was published in Russian in 1961. Chesneaux referred to the excision of Suret-Canale's favourable reference to the Asiatic mode of production in *La Pensée*, No. 117, 38n.

[17] Jean Chesneaux and Charles Parain, as well as Suret-Canale and Godelier, had planned to attend the meeting—they are listed in the French delegation—but for reasons unknown none of the four did. Abbreviated versions of the Suret-Canale and Godelier papers cited in the preceding note were published in the congress proceedings: *VII Mezhdunarodnyi Kongress Antropologicheskikh i Etnograficheskikh Nauk* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 4, 411–422. (For the membership of the French delegation, see ibid., pp. 1, 38–39.) Severely edited versions of the papers—the theses—together with Struve's commentary, were published in *Narody Azii i Afriki* (1965), No. 1. Reporting the circulation of the theses rather than the reading of the full papers, two Czech writers expressed their reaction with an ironical exclamation point. See P. Skalnik and T. Pokora, "Beginning of the Discussion about the Asiatic Mode of Production in the USSR and the People's Republic of China," *Etrene*, Vol. 5 (1966), pp. 181. The theses and Struve's commentary were later published in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 (1965).

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of the Academy of Sciences—the Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of History, and the Institute of the Peoples of Asia—and others followed in the next six months or so. In 1965, no fewer than 18 articles relating to the Asiatic mode of production appeared in such diverse journals as *Voprosy istorii, Voprosy filosofii, Vestnik drevnei istorii, Sovetskaya etnografiya,* and *Narody Azii i Afriki.*[18] In the following years the flow of articles continued at a brisk rate, and by 1971 at least five books relating to the problem had appeared.[19] This eruption of activity testifies both to the pent-up interest many Soviet scholars retained in the Asiatic mode of production through the period of its outlawry, and to the potential or actual relevance a wide range of investigators believed that it had for their work.

This is not the place to canvass the mass of material on the Asiatic mode that appeared in the Soviet press from 1965 on, but some general observations are in order. First, it should not be imagined that the proponents have driven the foes of the Asiatic mode of production from the field, even though some of the latter complained—irony of ironies—that the debate was at first carried on one-sidedly. From the beginning of what has been a remarkably free-wheeling discussion, numbers of historians, philosophers and anthropologists have taken a positive attitude to the newly revived concept, but a majority of the scholars concerned with the peoples of Asia and Africa have been negatively inclined. The latter range from G. F. Kim, who associated the resurgence of interest in the Asiatic mode with the alleged desire of "right-wing bourgeois sociologists" to disprove the applicability of Marxism to Third World Societies, to the more restrained V. N. Nikiforov, who, though he polemicized against the Asiatic mode, nevertheless asserted in 1965 that the term had "regained the right of citizenship."[20]

[18] Reports on these conferences in the Soviet press are: L. S. Vasilev, "Obshchee i Osobennoe v Istoricheskom Razvitii Stran Vostoka," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6 (1965); O. A. Afanasev, "Obsuzhdenie v Institute Istorii ANSSR Problemy 'Aziatskii Sposob Proizvodstva,'" *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 6 (1965); and L. V. Danilova, "Diskussiya po Vazhnoi Probleme," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12 (1965). Still another conference on the problem, held in December 1965, at the Institute of Ethnography, is reported in M. A. Vitkin, "Novaya Faza Diskussii," ibid. No. 8, (1966). Bibliographies of Soviet publications on the Asiatic mode of production are given, for 1965, in L. V. Danilova, "Diskussiya po Vazhnoi Probleme," loc. cit. 149n; a more comprehensive list of 1965 and 1966 publications as well in Pečirka's 1967 article in *Eirene*, pp. 149–51 and *passim*; and the most comprehensive one, including both Soviet and foreign publications, numbering more than 300 items, in Yu. Kachanovskii, *Rabovladenie, Feodalizm ili Aziatskii Sposob Proizvodstva* (Moscow, 1971).

[19] Besides the last-mentioned item in the preceding note, there are: G. F. Kim *et al.* (eds.), *Obshchee i Osobennoe v Istoricheskom Razvitii Stran Vostoka* (Moscow, 1966); *Obshchina i Sotsialnaya Organizatsiya u Narodov Vostochnoi i Yugo-vostochnoi Azii* (Leningrad, 1967); L. V. Danilova *et al.* (eds.), *Problemy Istorii Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv* (Moscow, 1968); G. F. Kim *et al.* (eds.), *Problemy Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv v Stranakh Vostoka* (Moscow, 1971).

[20] Strong support was expressed for reopening the question, and also evidently for the concept itself, at the conferences at the Institutes of History and Philosophy. By contrast, a majority of those at the conference organized by the Institute of the Peoples of Asia in 1965 ranged themselves against the Asiatic mode of production. On these matters, see the first three reports cited in note 18. For the statements by Kim and Nikiforov, see *Obshchee i Osobennoe v Istoricheskom Razvitii Stran Vostoka*, pp. 3–4, 9.

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Among orientalists who emerged as proponents of the Asiatic mode of production were the Near Eastern specialist Yu. Semenov, the Egyptologist I. A. Stuchevskii, the sinologist L. S. Vasilev, the Indologist L. S. Gamayunov and the Africanist I. L. Andreev.[21] Some members of the guild with no specialist interest in the controversy sided with the supporters of the Asiatic mode in the course of the wider discussion about socio-economic formations and their sequence which its revival almost immediately stimulated. Appealing both to theory and to empirical findings, they have taken the opportunity to build a case for greater flexibility of historical interpretation in all areas of study. Perhaps the most remarkable of such efforts are the Introduction and the Danilova article published in the symposium *Problemy Istorii Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv* in 1968. There can be little doubt that the widening of options has, in fact, encouraged fresh and more interesting work.

In the Soviet discussion, the proponents of the Asiatic mode appear to have been influenced to some extent by foreign Marxist writings. The proponents, let it be further noted, have interpreted the conception variously, and, on that score, their opponents have branded their ideas as insubstantial and indeterminate.[22]

THE THAW that followed the 20th Party congress was no doubt a necessary condition for the revival of the Asiatic mode of production, but it was not a sufficient one, and some others should be mentioned. The emergence of the Third World in the wake of the second world war stimulated research that brought a mass of new information about its societies into play. Indian, Egyptian, African and Vietnamese Marxists produced studies that emphasized the very distinctive character of the history of their societies. They expressed grave doubts about the applicability of concepts derived from the European experience, and, by contrast, they discovered institutions and relationships that called to mind the concept of Marx and Engels that had been declared null and void. Their findings encouraged European Marxists, some of whom had reached similar conclusions, to press the attack. Their will to do so was hardened as they became more conscious of the circumstances surrounding the 1931 Leningrad conference.[23]

As much as anything else, those who threw down the gauntlet were

21 Though no very conspicuous effort has been made to determine whether the Asiatic mode might have figured in Russia's history, I believe that some Soviet historians have entertained the idea. I have a paper on this theme in preparation.

22 See Nikiforov's "Zaklyuchitelnoe Slovo" in *Obshchee i Osobennoe v Istoricheskom Razvitii Stran Vostoka*, and his and Kachanovskii's contributions to *Problemy Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv v Stranakh Vostoka*. Vitkin, a supporter of the Asiatic mode, distinguished 9 different variants of the concept ("Novaya Faza Diskussii," loc. cit. pp. 141–142); Chesneaux ("Ou en est la Discussion," *La Pensée*, No. 129, pp. 37–38) differentiated between four distinct variants.

23 See Chesneaux's article in *La Pensée*, No. 114, and also the brief summaries of published work, under the title "Recents Travaux Marxistes sur le Mode de Production Asiatique," in the same issue.

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humiliated and outraged as they contemplated the incalculable damage which they thought had been done to Marxist historical scholarship by the imposition of the five-stage scheme, that other face of the ban on the Asiatic mode of production. "Some of the most fruitful points of [Marx's and Engels's] analysis have ... been allowed to sink from sight," wrote the British historian Eric Hobsbawm, and "creative Marxism was often allowed to ossify." Historical materialism, the French writer Godelier bitterly declared, "was transformed and degraded from an open system of hypotheses to be verified into 'a recipe,' a scheme to which one could accommodate [all] historical epochs.... But the facts are stubborn," and so this "sterile dogmatism" created endless problems for scholars, especially those concerned with pre-capitalist societies. In the words of the Soviet historian L. V. Danilova, "the exceptions and deviations" from the rule "according to which class society passes through three successive stages, slave-holding, feudalism and capitalism, turned out to be more numerous than [the cases that conformed to] the rule." [24] All three envisaged the utilization of the Asiatic mode of production as a way of transforming Marxism into a multilinear historical approach, and, thereby, to help overcome a crisis in Marxist historical scholarship.

They and others were certain that ample support for the existence of the Asiatic mode of production was available in the writings of Marx and Engels, and above all in Marx's *Grundrisse*. This work was published for the first time long after Marx's death, and subsequent to the Leningrad conference as well. It is a collection of memoranda and drafts that Marx inscribed in a series of notebooks, as he prepared to write his *magnum opus*. Much of the material found its way into *Das Kapital*, but not all. Among the contents not included is a section entitled "Forms which precede capitalist production" (*Formen die der Kapitalistichen Produktion vorhergehen*—hereafter *Formen*), which constituted the most extended and systematic treatment of the subject that Marx ever produced.[25] In the campaign to resurrect the Asiatic mode of production, it had a central place—and so did one of the first to "discover" it, the Hungarian sinologist Tökei.

In 1958, Tökei published a longish study of land ownership in the Chou era of Chinese history, in which he concluded that the pattern there differed markedly from the "ancient" and the "Germanic"

[24] Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction to K. Marx, *Precapitalist Economic Formations* (New York, 1965), p. 65; Godelier, *La Notion de "Mode de Production Asiatique,"* p. 25; Danilova, "Diskussiya po Vazhnoi Probleme," loc. cit. p. 153. Danilova's ideas are boldly and brilliantly developed in the essay she published in *Problemy Istorii Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv*.

[25] Data on various editions of the *Grundrisse* will be given below. It may be noted here that the first complete edition in English, translated and with a foreword by Martin Nicolaus, was published recently (1973) in New York by Random House. The first English translation of the *Formen* was published in London, under the title *Precapitalist Economic Formations*, in 1964. References to the *Formen* hereafter will be to the latter edition.

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forms, and instead was much like the one Marx considered integral to the Asiatic form.[26] These categories, taken directly from the *Formen*, correspond to three alternative pre-capitalist socio-economic formations —the slave-holding, feudal and Asiatic modes of production. Tökei's study was an attempt to determine with which of the three ancient Chinese society was most congruent, and his conclusion flew in the face of the solutions advanced in the USSR from the thirties on. In this investigation Tökei constantly employed the *Formen* as a theoretical frame of reference: he cited it more frequently than any other single work of Marx, and, indeed, more than all the other works of Marx and Engels combined.

In a three-part essay that he wrote in 1960, Tökei made explicit the high significance he had implicitly attached to the Asiatic mode of production and to the *Formen* in the earlier study. The first part traced the development of the thought of Marx and Engels on Asiatic society from the beginnings until 1857, the second focused on the *Formen*, written in 1857–58. Tökei struck the dominant note of the essay in the first part, where he went so far as to say: "the views of Marx on the Asiatic mode of production are essential elements of his work, and without them ... the composition of *Capital* would have been unimaginable." [27] In the second part, he persuasively argued that the *Formen* was of crucial importance because it rendered Marx's thought on the Asiatic mode of production most concisely and coherently. The *Formen*, Tökei went on, served as the source upon which Marx drew for his comments on the subject scattered through the volumes of *Capital*. Moreover, inasmuch as Marx had continued to work on the latter portions of *Capital* until his death in 1883, and nothing in the posthumously published volumes contradicted the analysis given in the *Formen*, it followed that Marx never forsook the views he had advanced in that sketch.[28]

The two parts of the essay to which we have referred were first published in the Hungarian journal *Valósár* in 1962 and 1963, but in the same period Tökei secured a much wider audience for his ideas. In the course of a visit to Paris in the spring of 1962, he was invited to address a meeting of the CERM, some of whose members had, since 1960, taken an interest in the Asiatic mode of production. In what proved to be a fateful occasion, Tökei presented the second part of his essay to the assemblage. The magnitude of the impression it created may be gauged by what ensued. Some of those who had heard Tökei formed a special working group to spur discussion and research. Investigations, meetings and conferences followed, and all this activity generated the large number of articles that found their way into *La Pensée* between 1964 and 1968. The chapter Tökei had presented was duplicated and distributed "very widely" both in France and abroad. And the Paris group

[26] Tökei, "Les Conditions de la Propriété Foncière," loc. cit.
[27] Tökei, *Sur le Mode de Production Asiatique*, p. 19.
[28] Ibid. p. 39.

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resolved to bring out a French translation of the *Formen* as soon as possible.[29]

A French translation did not actually appear until 1966 (in *L'Homme et la Société*, No. 1), but, whatever the reasons for the delay, there is no mistaking the extraordinary importance the French Marxists imputed to the *Formen*. All of the five pieces published in *La Pensée*, No. 114, the first of its issues that brought the Asiatic mode of production to the centre stage, contained numerous references to the *Formen*, to Tökei's work, or both. The first of the five, an introductory piece by Charles Parain, the CERM group's chairman, featured the *Formen* especially prominently. The second was the initial chapter of Tökei's essay discussed above. In Britain, independently of the French, but quite possibly stimulated in part by Tökei's work, a decision was made to produce an English translation. It was made in 1963, and published in 1964 with a long and useful introduction by Eric Hobsbawm. Qualifying the *Formen* as the " result of fifteen years' research " that " shows Marx at his most brilliant and profound," Hobsbawm observed: " any Marxist historical discussion " that antedated its publication " must be reconsidered in its light." [30] His analysis of the work was on the whole consistent with Tökei's.

At an early stage in the revival of the concept, a number of scholars called for a change in its name, on the grounds that the phenomenon was by no means restricted to Asia, but had cropped up as well in African and pre-Columbian American societies. On the latter score, *La Pensée*, No. 114 aroused great interest in Latin America, so much so, in fact, that steps were taken in 1965 to bring out a Spanish translation of the *Formen*.[31] Thus, the *Formen* having inspired the work of Tökei, his efforts in turn did much to awaken world-wide interest in the *Formen*. I do not pretend to have examined the more than 100 publications on the Asiatic mode of production that appeared between 1963 and 1968 in twenty countries, from China to Peru, but, on the basis of the sample I have seen, it is safe to say that its proponents everywhere relied heavily on the *Formen*.[32] With the lifting of the ban in the USSR, we must add,

[29] C. Parain, " Le Mode de Production Asiatique: une Étape Nouvelle dans une Discussion Fondamentale," *La Pensée*, No. 114; Chesneaux's article in *Eirene*, Vol. 3, p. 136. Tökei's entire essay was published in French at Budapest in 1966.

[30] The Parain article is the one cited in the preceding note. Chesneaux (*La Pensée*, No. 114, 35n.) first noted the coincident decision of the French and British Marxists to translate the *Formen* into their respective languages. A note on p. 64 of Hobsbawm's Introduction to the English edition shows that he was familiar with the mimeographed edition of Tökei's chapter on the *Formen*. The quotation is from the Hobsbawm Introduction, p. 65.

[31] It appeared in *Historia y Sociedad*, No. 3 (1965). See also R. Bartra, *El Modo de Producción Asiático* (Mexico City, 1969), which includes a collection of articles from the international press and a substantial Introduction by Bartra.

[32] Yu. Kachanovskii's survey of the foreign literature on the subject in these years plainly underrates the importance of the *Formen*, but his bibliography of the literature is useful. See his " Diskussiya ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva na Stranitsakh Zarubezhnoi Marksistskoi Pechati " in *Problemy Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv v*

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the revisionists there also found it a sturdy weapon in their cause, as the following examples will show.

In a long article on Marx's and Engels' views on our theme, the Soviet writer N. V. Ter-Akopian introduced the section in which he considered the *Formen* with these words: "Towards the end of the fifties, Marx had at his disposal sufficient material to examine theoretically once again his conception of the Asiatic mode of production. He solved the problem in the economic manuscripts of 1857–58, and the results of the research were summed up in [the Preface to] *The Critique of Political Economy*." Yu. Semenov cited the *Formen* in support of his contention, grounded in his research, that the ancient Near East was not a slave-holding society but approximated more closely to the Asiatic mode of production, as Marx described it. L. S. Vasilev and I. A. Stuchevskii produced a theoretical scheme centred on "three models for the origin and evolution of pre-capitalist societies," which was powerfully shaped by the ideas in the *Formen*. And in her remarkable essay which highlighted the difficulties that Soviet historiography had run up against because of its dependence on the five-stage scheme, L. V. Danilova counted heavily on the *Formen* to help decipher the riddle of pre-capitalist societies.[33]

REFERENCE has been made to English, French and Spanish editions of the *Formen* in the sixties, but these were not the first editions of the work in Western languages. An Italian translation published in 1956 may have been a result of ferment produced in Italy by the 20th Party congress, but it does not seem to have brought further scholarly developments in its train. An edition of the *Grundrisse* in the original German, published in East Berlin in 1953, was used by both Welskopf and Tökei. Accordingly, it may be considered the well-spring of renewed interest, in so far as that interest depended upon fresh evidence of Marx's commitment to the Asiatic mode of production. Earlier still, in 1946, a Japanese translation of the *Formen* had appeared—concern with the Asiatic mode of production did not abate in that country even when it had disappeared elsewhere—but this edition was inaccessible to European scholars.[34]

In tracing back the history of the publication of the *Grundrisse*, one discovers with a start that the Berlin edition of 1953 was not the first in German. As a matter of fact, it was a photocopy (with some appendices added) of an earlier edition published *in Moscow* in 1939–41. The Mos-

Stranakh Vostoka, pp. 47, 48, 89–94. Some Marxist writings on the subject that Kachanovskii does not list are treated or mentioned in the various articles by Chesneaux.

[33] N. V. Ter-Akopian, "Razvitie Vzglyadov K. Marksa i F. Engelsa na Aziatskii Sposob Proizvodstva i Zemledelcheskuyu Obshchinu," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 (1965), pp. 84–87; Yu. Semenov, "Problema Sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo Stroya Drevnego Vostoka," ibid. No. 4, pp. 88–89; L. S. Vasilev and I. A. Stuchevskii, "Tri Modeli Vozniknoveniya i Evolyutsii Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv (k Probleme Aziatskogo Sposoba Proizvodstva), *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 5 (1966); L. V. Danilova, "Diskussionye Problemy Teorii Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv," loc. cit. pp. 54–66.

[34] Chesneaux (*Eirene*, Vol. 3, 138) reports on the Japanese edition. The Italian edition is: *Forme Che Precedono la Produzione Capitalistica* (Rome, 1956).

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cow edition brought out by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, the possessor of the original manuscript, was the first complete one of the *Grundrisse* published anywhere.[35] With these facts before us, we are brought face to face with a perplexing problem: how could the *Grundrisse,* with its compelling evidence in the *Formen* on behalf of the Asiatic mode of production, have been published in the USSR in 1939–41, a decade after the Leningrad conference; and, what is even more to the point, hard on the heels of Stalin's canonical pronouncement that tacitly denied the existence of that mode of production?

Suggestions that the work could have been expected to cause no difficulty because it was being released at a time when all attention was directed elsewhere—the second volume, which includes the *Formen,* appeared in 1941—will not stand up. Nor will suppositions that it could have been expected to escape attention because the work was coming out in German rather than Russian, or because the *Formen* was but a short section within a massive work. For the *Formen itself was published in Russian three times in 1939 and 1940, in the Soviet Union.*[36] It might be imagined that covert foes of Stalin in the scholarly community published the *Formen* in order to expose him, however indirectly and to however limited a readership, as a subverter rather than an upholder of Marx's teachings. However, all such speculations fall when confronted with certain circumstances surrounding the publication of the *Formen* in Russian.

A clue is found in Struve's paper, referred to above, which he delivered at the end of 1938 to a meeting convened to mark the 120th anniversary of Marx's birth. At the outset, ironically enough, Struve linked his remarks to a party demand, that coincided with the release of the above-mentioned *Short Course,* for an end to "pedantry, dogmatism, scholasticism, vulgarizations and banalization of certain theses of Marxism-Leninism." After identifying the idea that the Asiatic societies had undergone a distinct process of development as "one of the most characteristic examples of this pedantry and dogmatism," he explained why the advocates of the Asiatic mode of production had erroneously interpreted Marx's views: "Not having at their disposal the works of Marx devoted to the study of pre-capitalist formations," he said, "our scholars mechanically juxtaposed isolated quotations from Marx."[37] Struve did

[35] K. Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf)* (Moscow, 1939–1941). A part of this work (The Chapter on Money) has been published in *Arkhiv Marksa i Engelsa,* ed. V. Adoratskii, 2nd series, IV, but not the subsequent parts which include the *Formen.*

[36] First in *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya,* No. 3 (1939). It was reprinted, with an introductory essay added, in *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii* (1940). It was also published separately in Moscow in 1940 under the title *Formy, Predshestvuyushchie Kapitalisticheskomu Proizvodstvu.* We should add that it also appears in Vol. 46, pt. I of K. Marx's and F. Engels' *Sochineniya* (1968). No separate edition of the *Formen* has been published in the USSR since the ban on the Asiatic mode of production was lifted.

[37] See the first page of Struve's "Marksovoe Opredelenie Ranneklassovogo Obshchestva," loc. cit. This essay appears in French translation in *Recherches Internationales,* Nos. 57–58 (1967).

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not carry this line of argument much further, but it is obvious that: (1) he was familiar with the as yet unpublished *Formen,* and (2) he implied that it disposed conclusively of allegations as to the existence of an Asiatic mode of production.

In a little over a year following Struve's address, the *Formen* appeared thrice in Russian. An introduction to one of the printings—it was entitled " The significance of Marx's manuscript *Formen* . . . for the history of antiquity "—spelled out what Struve had only intimated. Early in the essay, its author, one A. Ranovich, correctly notes: " Marx establishes basically three forms of property for antiquity—the Asiatic or Oriental, the ancient [Classical], and the Germanic." Immediately afterwards, however, he sets down the astonishing pronouncement that is the central message of the piece: " This puts an end once and for all to the efforts of some historians to find in Marx a special ' Asiatic ' socio-economic formation. Asiatic society is a slave-holding society; it has its specific features, but it is no more a distinct socio-economic formation than is the Germanic." [38]

If this statement has any meaning, it depends upon a distinction the author makes between forms of property and socio-economic formations, a term he uses—and it is generally so used—as more or less synonymous with " mode of production." However, such a distinction contradicts Marx, who says in the *Formen*: " The unity between a specific form of community . . . and the property in nature connected with it . . . which appears in one sense as a particular form of property, has its living reality in a specific *mode of production.*" [39] " Forms which precede capitalist production " is concerned precisely with particular forms of property that have their living reality in specific modes of production. When, in the *Formen,* Marx speaks of three forms of property, he envisages each as a component of a complex network of socio-economic relationships. Thus, in treating the Asiatic form, he goes beyond the definition of its distinctive property system to observations on agricultural production and manufactures, the self-sufficiency of the communes, the relative unimportance of towns, the form of appropriation of surplus value and the character of political power.[40]

In the passage cited, by putting the Asiatic form on the same plane as the Germanic, a category that figures little, if at all, in Marx's other works, Ranovich seeks to diminish the significance of the Asiatic form. In the *Formen,* however, we find Marx referring to " the Middle Ages (the Germanic period) " [41]—which establishes an identification of a form (the Germanic) with a period (the Middle Ages). The Middle Ages is, of

[38] " Znachenie Rukopisi Marksa ' Formy, Predshestvuyushchie Kapitalisticheskomu Proizvodstvu ' dlya Istorii Drevnosti," *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii,* No. 1, 3 (1940). The name of the author does not appear with the essay, but he has been identified as A. Ranovich by J. Pečirka in *Eirene,* Vol. 3, p. 159. What Marx meant by the " Germanic " form will be considered presently.

[39] *Precapitalist Economic Formations,* p. 94.

[40] Ibid. pp. 69–71.

[41] Ibid. p. 78.

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course, the *locus classicus* of feudalism, one of Marx's principal socio-economic formations. Marx employs the term "feudalism" very little in the *Formen*, but he plainly uses the word "Germanic" as a synonym both for feudalism and for the socio-economic circumstances that led to its crystallization. Therefore, to state, as Ranovich does, that the Asiatic "is no more a distinct socio-economic formation than the Germanic" makes about as much sense as to say that a pear is no more a fruit than is a peach.

In the body of the essay, Ranovich turns about and argues that a pear (the Asiatic form), though it possesses distinct qualities, is really a species of apple (slave-holding). Because he faithfully reproduces a whole series of striking contrasts that Marx noted between the ancient (Greco-Roman, slave-holding) form and the Asiatic, the argument is hardly convincing. Thus, though both derive from an earlier, primitive communal form, the first exhibits the breakdown of communal property and the old mode of production that corresponded to it, the emergence of private property on a certain scale, the separation of industrial from agricultural production and the rise of commerce, a combination of circumstances which partly explains why "ancient, classical history is the history of cities." In the second, communal organization and landholding persist, as does the combination of agricultural and manufacturing operations within the commune, and towns are of little consequence. In the Asiatic form, as distinct from the antecedent primitive communal one, however, the communes are united by and subject to the state authority which has organized and perpetuates the indispensable irrigation works.

In the comparison that he draws, Ranovich says precious little about slave-holding, even though in his scheme it is supposed to be the central characteristic that unites the Asiatic and ancient forms. Apropos of the slave-holding character of the former, his entire case rests on the quotation of a single interesting passage from the *Formen*: "since the individual in [the Asiatic] form never becomes an owner but only a possessor [of land], he is at bottom property, the slave of that which embodies the unity of the community." [42] Ranovich of course knew that, for Marx, the ancient form involved the performance of the basic work of society by a class of slaves who were *neither owners nor possessors* but the chattels of a slave-holding class; and a social abyss separated the slaves from the free men who owned them. By contrast, Marx used the word "slave" for the individual in Asiatic society in a different and special sense. There is no suggestion that in this system a class of free men own and dispose of the labour of a slave class; rather, all men are, in a sense, the slaves of that which "embodies the unity of the community"—the state. The distinction was fundamental to Marx, who, at one point, contrasted slavery in the generic sense with "the general

[42] Ranovich, "Znachenie Rukopisa Marksa," loc. cit. p. 6.

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slavery of the orient." [43] By citing Marx's use of the word slave in reference to Asiatic society, Ranovich deliberately blurred the distinction. This shabby manoeuvre was part and parcel of a calculated attempt to rationalize a predetermined position rather than to allow the evidence to shape conclusions.

The country in which the *Grundrisse* was first published was virtually the last in which its significance for the Asiatic mode of production was openly recognized, because, in Stalin's Soviet Union, its meaning was distorted beyond recognition and its manner of interpretation was not subject to challenge. This is not to say, however, that, with the lifting of the ban, Soviet scholars have unanimously recognized the *Formen* as incontrovertible evidence of Marx's commitment to it. Marxists of other countries (with the exception of China) have, on the whole, proved much more receptive than Soviet investigators to the revival of the Asiatic conception.[44] Whether the reasons are personal, political or professional, however, those who are unwilling to consider the Asiatic a distinct socio-economic formation cannot avoid coming to terms somehow with the *Formen*. To illustrate, in a recent, important collection of articles by nay-sayers, the lead piece, which once again considers the thought of Marx and Engels on the Asiatic mode, necessarily devotes substantial space to the *Formen*.[45]

Its author, V. N. Nikiforov, one of the most articulate opponents of the Asiatic mode of production, here stakes out what appears at first glance to be a centrist position. He disagrees equally with those who deny that Marx and Engels were ever partisans of the Asiatic mode of production " hypothesis " (the term he favours) and those who insist that from the 1850s until their deaths the founding fathers remained its steadfast adherents. He scornfully disposes of tortuous arguments advanced to prove, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, that in the Preface to *The Critique of Political Economy* Marx did not envisage the Asiatic as a distinct socio-economic formation. Indeed, in Nikiforov's judgment, the Preface proves, beyond a shadow of a doubt, Marx's advocacy of the Asiatic mode; and it was written in January 1859, immediately following the two-year period when the *Formen* was composed. Therefore, even though Nikiforov does not consider the *Formen* in and of itself conclusive, its intimate connection with the Preface leads him to assert: " Strictly speaking, the hypothesis on the Asiatic mode

[43] *Precapitalist Economic Formations*, p. 95. One perhaps sees here the enduring influence on Marx of Hegel's conception of " the oriental world." G. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York, 1956), pp. 18, 112–13 and *passim*.

[44] In reference to China, see " Récents Travaux Marxistes," *La Pensée*, No. 14, p. 68; Chesneaux, *Eirene*, Vol. 3, p. 137; and Skalnik and Pokora, ibid, Vol. 5, pp. 185–87.

[45] V. N. Nikiforov, " K. Marks i. F. Engels ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva," in *Problemy Dokapitalisticheskikh Obshchestv v Stranakh Vostoka*. Earlier in the controversy of the sixties, at least one other writer had denied the interpretation of the *Formen* advanced by proponents of the Asiatic mode. See N. A. Pavlovskaya, " Po Povodu Diskussii ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva na Stranitsakh Zhurnalov ' *La Pensée* ' i ' *Eirene* '," *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii*, No. 3 (1965).

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of production was formulated in 1858–1859." "To the present time," he also writes, "no weighty proofs have been adduced against the proposition that K. Marx considered the Asiatic mode of production a basic, distinct, socio-economic formation" in the period 1853–59 and for some years thereafter.[46]

In the period 1879–84, as a consequence of their exposure to the writings, first, of G. von Maurer, then of Lewis Morgan and M. Kovalevskii, contends Nikiforov in the latter part of the article, Marx and Engels abandoned the Asiatic mode of production as superfluous to their scheme.[47] A full evaluation of this contention is beyond the scope of this article, but we are bound to consider the author's assertion that the jettisoning of the concept was already anticipated in the *Formen*. As this assertion suggests, Nikiforov considers the *Formen* an equivocal source. For one thing, he argues, Marx showed there an awareness that the primitive communal order might be a universal form rather than one limited to the Orient. For another, citing the same passage as did Ranovich on the individual as a slave in Oriental society, Nikiforov states that Marx was becoming disposed, while recognizing the distinctive features of Asiatic society, to regard it as a variant of the slave-holding formation, and, by implication, to incorporate it into a universal, unilinear scheme. He refrained from renouncing the Asiatic mode at this time, only because he remained convinced that private property in land, a feature to which he attached great importance, did not exist in Asiatic society. But by 1879–84, the argument goes, Marx and Engels neither could nor did retain this belief.[48]

To Nikiforov, then, the *Formen* shows Marx as an proponent of the Asiatic mode of production who has some reservations about what he is advocating. This assessment obviously differs from that of Struve and Ranovich, both in its greater complexity and in its more positive reading of the *Formen* as a support of the Asiatic mode. Nikiforov's article differs from Ranovich's also in its more sober and scholarly tone, and in the great care with which it examines certain pieces of evidence and certain arguments advanced by other scholars. It is worth noting that, as against Ranovich, whom he does not name in this context, Nikiforov represents Marx and Engels as thinkers, according to whom, "different forms of property are precisely what distinguish one social order from another." Despite these contrasts, however, in the final analysis, Nikiforov's position is very close to Ranovich's—or, better, Struve's. Indeed, he explicitly recognizes that his view is very like Struve's.[49]

However, his case for the ambiguity of the *Formen* is so unconvincing

[46] Nikiforov, "K. Marks i F. Engels ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva," pp. 3, 10–13, 18–19.

[47] Ibid. pp. 22–23 *et seq.*

[48] Ibid. pp. 17–18.

[49] Ibid. pp. 5, 18. Nikiforov's view is even more like Struve's than he admits. For, contrary to what Nikiforov says here, in his 1938 article Struve also conceded that Marx and Engels had for a while favourably considered the Asiatic mode.

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that, in spite of the appearance of impartiality, it is difficult to avoid the impression that, like Ranovich, Nikiforov concocted the arguments to substantiate a preconceived conclusion. To be sure, no few statements in the *Formen* are less than crystal clear and, therefore, open to divergent interpretation, but Nikiforov fails to recognize that the work as a whole, nevertheless, sets limits to interpretation, and that to go beyond those limits is arbitrary and illegitimate. Thus, contrary to the plain intent of the work, and to just about every other reading of it that we have, Nikiforov evidently confuses the primitive communal form—Marx often uses the term "tribal" for it in the *Formen*—with the Asiatic form. Actually, in the *Formen* Marx had already thought of the primitive communal stage as universal, and envisaged the Asiatic, the slave-holding and the Germanic (feudal) as three alternative formations that succeeded it in different places, dependent upon differing circumstances. Of the three, the Asiatic was closest to, but far from identical with, the primitive communal stage.[50] The work of Maurer, Morgan, and Kovalevskii might well have provided empirical support for Marx's conception of the first stage of human development, but it certainly did not inspire it. That being the case, their work could have given no cause to revise the overall scheme, no reason to scrap the idea of the Asiatic mode of production.

Nikiforov's allegation that in the *Formen* Marx was already inclined to view slavery in the Asiatic and slave-holding societies as variants of a single, universal form is no more persuasive. In contrast to some other matters in the article to which he gives close and sustained attention, his treatment of this important point is surprisingly brief and casual. Nikiforov scarcely bothers to produce evidence in support of his claim, and what he does bring forth is anything but compelling. Thus he cites Marx on the development of slavery through the conquest of one tribe by another, following which Marx says: "Slavery and serfdom are, therefore, simply further developments of property based on tribalism [i.e. communalism]. They necessarily modify all its forms. This they are least able to do in the Asiatic form"—and he then goes on to explain why, by referring to some of the distinctive features of the Asiatic form. The thing to note here is that Nikiforov quotes the first of the three sentences I have quoted, but not the following two.[51]

Weak though it may be, Nikiforov's argument is the last word of present-day Soviet opponents of the Asiatic mode of production, insofar as their case relates to the *Formen*. When, in 1971, Yu. Kachanovskii published a full-length book, whose focus is indicated by its title—

[50] *Precapitalist Economic Formations*, pp. 68 *et seq*. Nikiforov's reading of Marx on this point is contrary to that of Lichtheim, Tökei, Hobsbawm, Vasilev and Stuchevskii, and Sofri.

[51] Nikiforov, "K. Marks i F. Engels ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva," p. 17. For the full quotation, see *Precapitalist Economic Formations*, p. 91. Nikiforov also cites Lenin's lecture "On the State" to bolster his case (pp. 33–34), adding *en passant*, but without a shred of supporting evidence: "Lenin was undoubtedly abreast of the most recent literature on the ancient Orient" and its stand on behalf of slavery there.

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Slave-holding, Feudalism, or the Asiatic Mode of Production—he devoted no more than a six-page chapter to the thought of Marx and Engels on the Asiatic mode.[52] The chapter is very short and it offers nothing original, because its author is content to endorse the position staked out by Nikiforov, who also happens to be the editor of Kachanovskii's book.

Because they stand where they do, men like Nikiforov and Kachanovskii take a much less severe view of the 1931 Leningrad conference than their opponents. They pay abundant tribute to the work of Struve (who died in September 1965), the *bête noire* of the other side. And, consistent with the line developed in the thirties, their rejection of the Asiatic mode of production is intimately bound up with unwavering allegiance to the five-stage scheme. It is a matter of some interest that, whether they are aware of it or not, these persistent adherents of Stalin's historical scheme are at one with their country's political and ideological foe, the Chinese. Whatever other reasons may be at work, men of their ilk seem impelled to preserve the integrity of the five-stage scheme, because they consider it not merely an interpretation, but the only possible interpretation of Marx's historical teachings. Hence the compulsion to minimize the distinctive features in the development of different peoples: when the pecularities are diminished it becomes possible to assimilate the particular developmental patterns as mere variations of a universal, unilinear norm.

THE future of the Asiatic mode of production in the USSR cannot be predicted with any great confidence. Because at the beginning of the 1970s a majority of Asian and African specialists found the conception unsuitable or unpalatable, and because in Nikiforov's work they have a basis, however spurious, for dismissing the counter-evidence embodied in the *Formen*, it might seem that the Asiatic mode is destined for re-renewed oblivion. However, that outcome seems no more likely to occur than its opposite—the general acceptance of the concept by Soviet scholars. A significant number of investigators consider the notion fruitful, and they have the support of theoretically-minded historians, philosophers and anthropologists who have found the five-stage scheme incongruent with the accumulated evidence and a fetter upon creative research. This is not to say that they are destined to prevail, but they cannot be easily silenced—not so much because they are a great force in themselves, but because any such action would create a furore among Marxists abroad. Those who in the sixties denounced the earlier reign of dogmatism in the USSR and who have been armed with the *Formen* cannot be browbeaten into accepting dictation of their thought. They must be reckoned with and, should their sensibilities be disregarded, the USSR would bring new denunciations upon itself and forfeit whatever remains of its claim to be the legitimate interpreter of the Marxist canon.

[52] Kachanovskii, *Rabovladenie, Feodalizm ili Aziatskii Sposob Proizvodstva*, Chap. 10.

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For such reasons, at least in the short term, a kind of peaceful coexistence between the Soviet proponents and opponents of the Asiatic mode of production seems the most likely outcome. It is perhaps significant that although Nikiforov sought in 1971 to demolish the case for the Asiatic mode, insofar as it rests on the writings of Marx and Engels, he made no suggestion that its " right of citizenship " should be withdrawn again. Peaceful coexistence, of course, implies continuing struggle. Continuing struggle there is sure to be, but the ultimate outcome is not likely to be unaffected by the quality of the evidence and argument adduced by the contending sides. This judgment relates, of course, to the comparative merit of empirical studies produced on each side, but the relative persuasiveness of the conflicting interpretations put upon the *Formen* will also continue to shape the destiny of the Asiatic mode of production in Soviet thought.[53]

[53] This article had been completed when the writer had an opportunity to check some of the notions expressed in the last two paragraphs in an interview with the Soviet orientalist G. F. Kim at the International Slavic Conference held in Banff, Canada (October, 1974). According to Dr. Kim, a majority of the investigators in the Institute of Peoples of the East reject the Asiatic mode of production, but others who accept it continue to employ the concept in their work. He was certain that new confrontations and debates between the two sides could be expected in the future.

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Lenin's Last Phase

Adam B. Ulam

WITH his stroke on 26 May 1922, Lenin's ailment of some two years' standing was revealed as a cruel and relentless illness which was to claim his life in nineteen months, and, even more cruelly, to strip him completely of the capacity for work in ten. From the period of his relapse in the middle of December to what we are told is his last intervention in politics on 6 March 1923, Lenin could work but little and intermittently; his last writings consist mainly of reflections and memoranda dictated to his secretaries. To a casual reader, these writings may appear to have a random and disjointed character: a bit about co-operation, some reflections on a book about the Russian Revolution, a homily on administration and the need for improvements in some Soviet agencies, bitter reactions upon hearing of his collaborators' methods in dealing with the nationality problem, etc. For most people, the crucial document to emerge from Lenin during those days is his so-called *Testament*, containing succinct characterizations of six leading Soviet figures. It is, indeed, the interplay of those personalities, the drama of the stricken leader struggling against both disease and the solicitude of his doctors and attendants who wanted to isolate him—who could not conceive of life without political activity—from the turbulent world of Party and state affairs, which have inevitably attracted the most attention and put into shadow the historico-philosophical reflections and strictures on the art of governing and administration which appear simply to repeat what Lenin had said before. Are those, then, the mere musings of a sick man realizing that time is growing short and that he must once more, perhaps for the last time, impart counsel and warning to those whom he had led in revolution and war?

Lenin's last writings represent much more than that. When read carefully, against the background of current Soviet politics, they impress one with their unity of purpose and main concern. They can be grouped under three headings. There is, first, the stream of historico-philosophical reflections on the October Revolution: the "permissibility" of revolution under the circumstances prevailing in the Russia of 1917, the future fortunes of the revolution, the possibility of it spreading. There is, in the second place, a whole series of admonitions on administration, the art of governing, the need for culture and for civilization when it comes to that art, etc. And, finally, what will always attract the student and the general reader, to the neglect of the other two: Lenin's reflections on the personalities of his closest collaborators, as well as his criticism of some of their policies, in both the *Letter to the Congress* and *About the Nationality Quest*.

The unifying thread of these main themes can best be discerned by

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noting how frequently in the last writings of Lenin there occurs the word *culture*, and how his concern with culture or its absence colours the writer's references both to historical events and to personalities: "If for the building of socialism you need a certain level of culture . . . we need a cultural revolution to become a completely socialist country. . . . It would be an unforgivable piece of opportunism if we, on the eve of the entrance of the East [onto the main historical stage] and its awakening, were to undermine our authority there through the slightest act of *rudeness*. . . . Stalin is too *rude*. . . ." [1] Those quotations, derived from such seemingly unconnected pieces as reflections on Sukhanov's book, an article on co-operation, a memorandum on the nationality problem, and, of course, the *Letter to the Congress*, could be multiplied many times over. Culture and its relatives, so to speak, toleration, politeness, the ability to "attach people to oneself" (a necessary qualification for the Chairman of the *Gosplan*!), etc., are constantly cited by Lenin as necessary prerequisites of the art of governing, as both the means and the ends of the achievement of socialism. As against them, one sees and has to combat rudeness, chauvinistic insensitivity, illiteracy (both in the literal and the metaphorical sense of the term) and similar phenomena reflecting lack of culture and lack of civilization, and which are important not only in personal relations but also from the political, indeed, the historical point of view. It is a high standard of conduct which Lenin would require of the rulers: as a private person, Ordzhonikidze may well have been justified in hitting a man who insulted him. Ordzhonikidze, however, was not a private person, but a virtual ruler of the Caucasus. Hence he had no right to indulge his irritability and his behaviour was gross and inexcusable.[2]

Lenin, as is well known, was not prudish in his language. When an occasion seemed to warrant it, he could use a vigorous expression. Thus a recent *Lenin's Miscellany* shows him (and in a letter to a lady!) using a word which, though much favoured by the New Left, was usually eschewed by the orthodox Marxists with their late 19th century sense of decorum, even though the Master himself was not averse to employing it in the heat of a polemic.[3] But Lenin's concern for manners reflected a very basic tenet of his: socialism was possible only through a progression in culture. That progression, to be sure, was dependent not only on the growth of the material base, but also on purely human considerations. Tsarist Russia had been condemned not only on account of her political and economic backwardness, but also because that system spelled out the uncivilized, sometimes inhuman relationship of the ruler towards the ruled. The uncivilized behaviour of the Tsarist bureaucracy was particularly evident in its treatment of the non-Great Russian nationalities. To overthrow the Tsarist system and burgeoning

[1] Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 45 (Moscow, 1964), pp. 381, 377, 362, 346.
[2] Ibid., p. 358.
[3] *Leninskii Sbornik*, Vol. 37 (Moscow, 1970), p. 35.

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capitalism was therefore not enough. When it came to human relations, the new socialist state, even in its initial phase of development, had to demonstrate its superiority over the pre-revolutionary world. There could be no question of softness toward the class enemy. But "it is another thing when we ourselves, even when it comes to trifles, fall into imperialist ways towards the oppressed nationalities, thereby completely undermining the genuineness of our principles. . . ."[4], wrote Lenin in reference to Georgia and the means being employed by Ordzhonikidze in integrating the Caucasian republics. Grossness and bullying on the part of officialdom seemed to have survived the Revolution and, unless they were soon to be remedied, not only could the whole achievement of the last five years be called in question, but the appeal of Communism to the nations of the Orient would be undermined. Suddenly a minor personal squabble in Tiflis had in the sick leader's mind become symptomatic of a major danger which threatened the progress of the Revolution throughout the world. To the majority of his collaborators, Lenin's fears must have appeared vastly exaggerated, the product of excessive sensitivity and apprehensions fed by his illness, and so they were to be described at the 12th Party Congress by Abel Enukidze. But, as one ponders the lessons of the fifty years which have passed since Lenin's warning, one must render homage to the acuteness and foresight of his perceptions.

THE problem of how men behave in power, the realization that a devoted and courageous revolutionary could still exhibit characteristics making him unfit for a position of political authority increased Lenin's already deep interest in the general and vastly important question of government and control in a socialist state. Beyond the personal qualification, the personal culture of those in authority, lies the dilemma of political power. The question of how to deal with it had preoccupied Lenin since the early days of the Revolution. But now the problem received a new twist: his illness prevented him from that continuous supervision of and intervention in administrative affairs, in which he had delighted when well. As he could no longer struggle personally against the sheer inertia of the administrative machinery, his mind turned more and more to problems of organic solutions and devices against what he had always viewed as the original sin of the Communist state: bureaucratism. Its root cause again he identified as the lack of culture: in his *Pages from a Diary* the problem of education, of literacy, becomes basic to all others. "We ought to try to deal with that semi-Asiatic lack of culture, from which we still have not been able to emerge, and from which we would not be able to emerge without serious efforts, even though the opportunity for it is here, for nowhere else are the masses so interested in cultural improvement as in

[4] Ibid. p. 362.

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our country." [5] Lenin's impatience appears at first excessive: Russia had barely emerged from years of devastating foreign and civil war, her economy was still in ruins, and here the creator of this new world demands something which usually takes years of patient and strenuous effort and of domestic stability: a vast educational uplift of a whole people. But Lenin's hurry becomes understandable in the context of the other preoccupations and writings of his last phase: just as authoritarian abuses are to be checked before they harden into an administrative routine and a threat to the Revolution, so a dramatic effort must be undertaken to raise the level of the culture of the masses; only then can the government which rules in their name become truly theirs.

In the background of all those disquisitions on culture, undoubtedly lies the problem tackled by Lenin in his notes *About Our Revolution*, which are reflections on Sukhanov's book on the tumultuous events of 1917. Sukhanov's invaluable book (long slighted abroad in comparison with Trotsky's *History*, a work of undoubtedly higher literary, but lesser historical merit) must attract every reader by its vividness, its wealth of detail and the directness of its narrative. It avoids that pomposity which so often mars Trotsky's style. It is, in fact, the Russia of the old radical intelligentsia viewing half sardonically, half sympathetically its own progeny, the Revolution. But those details and the inherent irony of the situation on which, at another time, Lenin's attention would have fastened and which would have provoked his own ironic comments, now had for him but secondary significance. His interest is centred around those elements of Sukhanov's book which a casual reader, in his pursuit of the unfolding drama, would most likely overlook: fragments of theoretical reflections and what Lenin classifies as Menshevik pedantry: " Russia has not reached that level of development of the forces of production which would allow the establishment of socialism." [6] Lenin is properly scornful: here, if you please, is something new! Haven't all the Mensheviks, all the heroes of the second International, repeated that piece of wisdom a thousandfold? But Sukhanov and those other gentlemen have not seen anything yet! If they believe that the Russian Revolution was " against the rules," let them but wait: there will be other revolutions, in the Orient, which will be even more " impermissible " by the canons employed and revered by those pedants.

And yet, for Lenin, as for every other genuine follower of Marx, such answers, or rather taunts, could not be entirely convincing. There is another and almost pathetic *motif* in his rationalization of October: what else could we have done? " What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, having by the same token increased the strength of the workers and peasants tenfold, opened for us the possibility of laying the foundations of civilization in a different way from all other Western European states."[7]

[5] Ibid. p. 364.
[6] Quoted in Lenin, *op. cit.* p. 380.
[7] Ibid. p. 360.

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". . . Laying the foundation of a civilization . . ." Here is once more a variant of that theme of culture which veritably obsessed the sick man. He is arguing not only against Sukhanov and his ilk, but also against his own doubts on the subject, doubts which he had communicated to his memorandum on the nationality problem dictated three weeks before. Have such foundations really been laid, and if so are they secure? Against the background of the Caucasian affair, that of Lenin's bitter disappointment in his colleagues, his continuous irritation, even when he was well, at the countless incidents of bureaucratic red tape and abuse, could one really be sure? In *About Our Revolution* Lenin polemicized not with Sukhanov but with his own thought and doubts. Through his mind must have gone the much more pregnant warning of Plekhanov about the danger of the Russian working class taking over power prematurely and consequently disgracing itself. Lenin concluded with neither an apology nor recantation: yes, the Revolution was both permissible and necessary and history will show it as such.

But if it was not in his nature to admit the possibility of defeat, neither would he gloss over an inherent difficulty or defect. And so, in his last weeks of political activity, he devoted a great deal of time to measures which would cure the "unculturedness" of the Soviet system, which would remove those blemishes which threatened its historical role, both at home and as an inspiration to and leader of oppressed people elsewhere. The most abstruse historico-philosophical problem becomes the next moment a very concrete one. Here the laws of history, what Marx had to say in 1856 about processes which would take decades, if not centuries, are discussed. Yet the very next page, or, rather, session with his secretaries, finds Lenin urging an exemplary punishment for Ordzhonikidze, discussing what administrative and personnel practices would cure the twin evils of bureaucratism and Great Russian chauvinism. And through all those preoccupations runs one thought, the one and the same concern.

PERSONAL considerations added poignancy to this concern. Lenin found the regimen imposed upon him in his illness at first irksome and then something even worse. He became convinced that the extent of his isolation from political affairs was dictated not by medical, but by other considerations. "Vladimir Ilyich has become convinced that it is not the doctors who give guidance to the Central Committee, but the Central Committee which instructs the doctors." [8] In brief, he was persuaded that there was a determined effort to keep him away from the affairs of state. The General Secretary of the Central Committee had been designed to be a liaison man with the doctors. Stalin, with whom Lenin had had some prior clashes concerning the method of setting up the U.S.S.R., was also in his eyes the man bent upon whitewashing the line adopted by

[8] The Record Book of the Secretaries attending V. I. Lenin in *Problemy Istorii KPSS* (1963), No. 2, p. 84.

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Ordzhonikidze. All in all, there is no question that it was Stalin who was the main target of Lenin's irritation. But this fact, and for quite understandable reasons, was allowed to overshadow Lenin's general dissatisfaction with the set-up and personnel of the Party's highest organs. Stalin's responsibility vis-à-vis Lenin was laid upon him by the Politburo as a whole; one might have thought that somebody who had been personally closer to the stricken man and his wife would have been a more logical choice for this task requiring the utmost delicacy and understanding. It could not be ignored that the General Secretary had not been abundantly endowed with those qualities and that, unlike, say, Zinoviev, he had never lived for long in Lenin's entourage. We know that Stalin tried at least once to lay down the invidious charge, but continued as the liaison man with the medical men at the urging of his Politburo colleagues. We do not know Stalin's side of the whole affair: we have not been vouchsafed his reply-apology to Lenin's note of 5 March 1923, nor do we know Lenin's reaction to it.

However, it is clear that, though he was especially piqued by Stalin, politically he was disillusioned by the whole personnel of the Party high command. His own characterizations of his six closest collaborators hardly show unqualified praise or enthusiasm for any of them. It is unnecessary to go through again the famous characterizations, but the sum total of all the reservations stated by Lenin is to convey a strong impression that here are six people who, neither separately nor collectively, are capable of leading the Party and the state. Lenin's verdict was that the Politburo of the R.C.P. as then constituted was incapable of exercising what today is known as collective leadership, largely because its members were incapable of harmonious collaboration with each other (certainly Stalin and Trotsky) but also because of certain personal characteristics of all six individuals involved.[9] What Lenin had to say about those six men was not likely to increase their liking or regard for each other. But, most important of all, what would have been the effect on the rank and file of the Party members had the *Letter to the Congress* become known to them at the time Lenin intended it to become known? Most likely the effect would have been devastating: the authority of the Politburo would have been undermined. I have speculated elsewhere[10] that for those who had not been sufficiently *au courant* with Lenin's thinking and his concerns of the moment, the *Letter* contained enough in the way of internal inconsistencies to make plausible the argument that it was the product of illness and the resultant bitterness. But on looking back at the evidence again, I am not so sure. Had the delegates to the 12th Party Congress been allowed to see all the pertinent documents, it is quite likely that they, or at least many of them, would have interpreted

[9] It is one of the minor mysteries connected with the period, on which light may eventually be thrown, why Rykov and Tomsky, two full members of the Politburo, were not mentioned by Lenin in this connection, while Pyatakov, considerably junior in status, was.

[10] *The Bolsheviks*, New York (1965), p. 569.

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the *Letter* as Lenin's vote of non-confidence in the Party leadership as then constituted. It is unlikely that the triumvirate of Zinoviev-Stalin-Kamenev would have been allowed to have its own way, as it largely did at the Congress, and quite possible that the delegates would have forced the Central Committee to abide by Vladimir Ilyich's wish and to dismiss Stalin as Secretary General. If, however, the relevant documents, i.e., the *Letter* and the nationality memorandum were not to become immediately and widely known, Lenin's aim was bound to be frustrated, for the danger to their *collective* position would incline the Politburo members to lay aside, temporarily, their squabbles, fears and resentments of each other. And this is precisely what was to happen at the 12th Congress, and even Trotsky was to be but a partial exception to the ruling group closing its ranks.

BUT beyond personalities and his personal and family feelings, Lenin, as stated before, looked to much more fundamental issues and solutions. The *Letter* begins, after all, " I would strongly advise that the Congress should undertake a number of changes in *our political system.*" [11] Not in the personnel, not in the powers of this or that body, but in the *system.*

The Civil War had barely ended, the guns of Kronstadt had hardly been silenced, when the Party awoke to the realization that it was the sole political power in the Communist state. The intra-party debates touching on the Workers' Opposition and related factions were, at least, connected with this problem. But to many who accepted Lenin's characterization of the dissident groups as largely anarcho-syndicalist in spirit, there still remained the problem of how to prevent the Party from congealing into an elite organization, how to keep it from the almost inevitable corruption consequent to its special position. Some Communist leaders, we know, went as far as to debate in public the desirability of having other socialist parties as a kind of loyal opposition. Such a solution, at least in 1921–22, would have been intolerable to Lenin. He put his faith in the efficacy of the control organs both within the Party and the state. In fact, one might say that Lenin came close to developing a theory of threefold division of powers in government, a theory which, of course, has nothing to do with the classical one of Montesquieu. In the writings of his last period he envisaged the three branches as being policy formulation, administration (in the proper sense of the word) and control.

But how can there be a single party state and yet an effective system of controls and checks upon its rule; how can state administration be infused with the Party spirit, and yet be separate and independent of the Party? Here is Lenin wrestling with the problem which in many ways would remain a fundamental one for Communist-run societies, one which would strain the ingenuity of Stalin, of Krushchev, and more recently of

[11] Lenin, op. cit. Vol. 45, p. 343.

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Mao. But for Lenin even this complex problem was but a part of a still vaster one: how could the Party-administration-control problem be fitted into the task of the cultural uplift of the working class, of making the Soviet state truly one of the workers and peasants? And then a complex historical problem becomes reduced to a practical one: what is to be done immediately and concretely to bring this about? We are reminded of Pokrovsky's dictum that every theoretical problem had for Lenin an immediate organizational or propaganda application. "I envisage the whole business as follows: a few tens of workers entering the Central Committee can better than anybody else undertake the checking and improvement . . . of our apparatus." [12] The Central Committee, then composed of 27 ordinary members, was to be increased to 50 or even 100. Such an increase, Lenin wrote in the *Letter*, would accomplish several aims: better work in the Central Committee, less danger of a major split within its ranks, better supervision of the whole network of the Soviet administration.

Here it is: the character of the highest Party organs was to be basically changed. No longer would there be the central organ composed just of notables, currently forming themselves increasingly into personal factions. There was to be a Central Committee, the majority of whose members would be alien to the petty squabbles of Stalins, Zinovievs and Trotskys, whose very presence could make the Party hierarchs mend their ways. That the newcomers were to be from the rank-and-file workers (and peasants) there can be no doubt: they should not have had a longish period in any official position, for then they would have acquired some undeniable habits and biases. This is a delicate way of warning that the Central Committee should not be expanded merely in numbers, as was to be done at the 12th Congress (and then to only 40 members). No, its whole character was to be changed: those new people were not to be partisans of any of the current bigwigs; they were to be completely independent, completely foreign to the quarrels which were currently splitting and endangering the highest organs, as well as the Party and the country. Lenin recommended truly "changes in our political system."

With this recommendation and its expected effects, all the divergent elements of Lenin's main concern were then brought together: the quarrelling Party potentates were to be restrained, and their individual and collective power seriously curbed. They would not be able to retreat into the more exclusive precincts of the Politburo, for there, also, those "simple workers and peasants" were to be present, vigilantly watching and, if need be, censuring their leaders' behaviour. The infusion of those workers was bound to take the curse off the Menshevik talent: it would be the workers' and peasants' government. If, like many in his situation, the dying leader grew disillusioned with his closest collaborators, then he still retained his faith in the common proletarian. Being present while the highest matters of policy are discussed, those unspoiled

[12] Lenin, op. cit. Vol. 45, p. 347.

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proletarians would grow more sophisticated and cultured, and would most likely provide material for the next generation of Party and state leaders. Hopefully they would also be free from those habits and biases which their seniors had acquired and would not repeat the errors and transgressions of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze or Trotsky.

There is, at the same time, at least a hint that the newcomers should not for a while take an active part in determining policies. Otherwise, why emphasize that they are to be present at all meetings of the Central Committee and should read all its documents, something which should go without saying. Did Lenin, without formally proposing such a division, envisage the Central Committee as consisting for some time in the future of two categories of members: "professionals" as well as the "watchers," the former discussing and enacting policies, the latter keeping them straight, so to speak? If so, the new members' function reminds one of Bagehot's monarch whose prerogatives were to be informed and to give advice and warning. Or one might reach for another variant of the same idea: the practice in the C.P.S.U. in the late fifties and early sixties of holding some Plenums of the Central Committee in the presence of a large number of non-members, but who were officials and experts interested in the subject under discussion. In all cases, the germ of the idea, if not the motivation, is the same: to provide checks and control on the highest political bodies: the Cabinet, the Central Committee and the Politburo.

FROM his disquisition on the problem of control, Lenin passed to the closely related subject of administration and the struggle against bureaucratism. The extent to which the two problems were enmeshed in Lenin's mind is best illustrated by comparing his draft of the article on the *Rabkrin* with its final version. The phrases relating to the Central Committee in one version are at times applied to the Central Control Commission in the other. Or take this passage: "Our Central Committee has turned into a highly centralized and authoritative group, but its work does not correspond to its authority. This should be remedied by the measure I have proposed, and members of the Central Control Commission ought to be present in a stated number at every meeting of the Politburo, ought to become a cohesive group which 'without regard for personalities' ought to make sure that nobody, neither the Secretary General nor any other member of the Central Committee should bar them from making inquiries, checking documents and making absolutely sure that they know everything and that [political] affairs are being settled correctly."[13] Here, if you please, is to be the second line of defence against arbitrary authority and the oligarchical transformation of the Party: not only the new members of the Central Committee, but also the C.C.C. are to watch over the Politburo as well as over the "old"

[13] Lenin, op. cit. Vol. 45, p. 387.

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members of the Central Committee.[14] That Lenin wanted members of the C.C.C. delegated to meet with the Politburo to act as a "cohesive group" has an eloquence of its own. He felt—justifiably—that when it came to its perogatives, the Politburo (with but one partial exception) was itself quite a cohesive group.

But the problems of control and administration, while closely connected, are not quite the same. Lenin's criticisms of the *Rabkrin* have always been related to his personal feelings about its former head, Stalin. But this element was perhaps overstressed by many commentators and made them overlook or slight some very interesting sidelights of his remarks. Lenin's criticisms have a paradoxical character. Ostensibly he demanded a closer link between the Party and state control institutions. The *Rabkrin*, he wrote, like most other branches of the state administration, was not properly imbued with Party spirit. But what was the exemplary institution in this respect, one to be emulated by the *Rabkrin*? None other than the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs! Such characterization of the *Narkomindel* must have led to considerable bewilderment in Party circles: if there was one state institution which by current standards appeared virtually apolitical, it was the foreign ministry. Headed by a man eschewing Party disputes and high policy matters, the Commissariat was already becoming a haven for ex-Menshevik experts and those Bolshevik dignitaries who, because of their past political sins or indiscretions, were believed better suited for diplomatic rather than political work. The whole thrust of the *Narkomindel's* work was to secure foreign recognition and credits for Russia, and, in the pursuit of this task, Chicherin would feel constrained to clash occasionally with the Comintern, and with those Party zealots who looked contemptuously at the whole business of formal diplomacy and international amenities. To set up the Foreign Commissariat as a model for the *Rabkrin*, for the whole Soviet administration, must have appeared incomprehensible, possibly further evidence of Lenin's declining powers.

But the paradox does not appear as great when we reflect on what Lenin meant to convey when he said that the state apparatus, with the exception of the *Narkomindel*, represented for the most part but a relic of the past. The statement in itself is, of course, a considerable exaggeration, just as is Lenin's categorical declaration in the draft of his article on the *Rabkrin* (the part dictated on 13 January) that the foreign ministry was superior insofar as, unlike other commissariats, it had been completely transformed in spirit and personnel. Were there more rank-and-file workers and Party members in the *Narkomindel* than in the *Rab-*

[14] Here we may quote a couple of utterances at the 12th Party Congress. VI. Kosior: "Comrade Zinoviev spoke about collective judgment of the Party. But comrades . . . collective judgment ought not to be formulated by [a few] individuals. . . . We have no clubs, no other groups where Party members might exchange opinions. . . ." Lutovinov: ". . . it would appear that the Politburo has become the infallible pope, everything I do, I do correctly, don't you dare to criticize, no one has the right to criticize." *Dvenadtsatyi Syesed R.K.P. (b)*, Moscow (1970), pp. 109 and 116.

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krin? Most unlikely. But then Lenin specified that the *Narkomindel* was freer than other agencies from the sins of bureaucratism and that it worked directly under the Central Committee of the Party. The ministry, in brief, was more efficient, and it worked, not at the behest of some Party bigwig or faction, but for the Party as a whole.

Thus, in a somewhat roundabout way, Lenin defined his prerequisites for sound administration: efficiency and non-involvement in the personal side of politics. The state administration was to be imbued with the Party spirit, but it was to be free of Party politics. In his *Better Less But Better*, Lenin developed the notion of this scientifically trained, non-partisan (in the sense mentioned above) civil service. He recommended examinations and special training for this elite corps of 300–400 civil servants within the *Rabkrin*. It went rather against his grain to urge such a non-political development, and so, in his typical fashion, he made the reservation that by learning to administer he did not mean learning in the school-room sense. What he had in mind was obviously what we have been calling managerial skills. For where were these Soviet officials to learn these skills and collect relevant literature? In the U.S. and Canada. Only when these should prove impractical were the neophytes in public administration to go to Britain. One almost suspects that it would be the Harvard Business School of the Elton Mayo period which would best suit Lenin's requirements.

LENIN'S last writings, though not fully developed, because of the peculiar circumstances and because of the peculiarities of his style, represent then, in a kaleidoscopic form, a theory of government. If in the Revolution and the Civil War the key word was "struggle," then for the preservation and development of socialist society it is "culture." Culture precludes arbitrary or intrigue-riven political leadership. Hence at the highest level of political decision-making Lenin wants to erect a multiple system of control which would keep one man or one faction from having full power, or, contrariwise, to prevent constant strife and intrigue in the Central Committee and the Politburo. Within state administration, reforms projected by Lenin look to an elite, scientifically trained public service, free from the sins of old and new Russian officialdom. It is only such a system of government which will expedite a great cultural uplift of the working class, enable it to become the ruling class in the true sense of the word and propel society as a whole towards socialism. To Lenin in his last phase, all aspects of government became interconnected; seemingly small details assumed great historical importance. One man's manners may become of great consequence, the reorganization of an agency a key to vast political transformations: "... for me everything is connected with the tasks which the *Rabkrin* upon its reorganization will face; our whole labour, policies, tactics, strategy." [15]

[15] Lenin, op. cit. Vol. 45, p. 405.

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It is not proposed to go here into a detailed discussion of how Lenin's last writings affected the course of Soviet history. The development of the control organs and their role in the configuration of Soviet politics following Lenin's death is well known. If there was one key suggestion Lenin made in his final reflections, it was about the Central Committee. It is sometimes asserted that the 12th Congress acted in the spirit of the ailing leader's mandate by increasing the number of Central Committee members from 27 full members and 19 candidates to 40 and 17 respectively. But a cursory look at the names of the newcomers will not discover any plain workers or peasants, whom Lenin had wanted there to act as a check on the Party elite. And on many of Lenin's other proposals and concerns the record of the 12th Congress speaks for itself. But what can be seen even from this cursory survey is the breadth of Lenin's perspectives during those last months, and how some of his reflections touch on problems which are as relevant and perplexing to Communist systems in 1975 as they were in 1923.

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Stalin and the Detectives

Michael Heller

INTEREST in Stalin's life and works is growing daily. Three detailed biographies of Stalin have appeared almost simultaneously in English, and they are certain to be followed by more. In the West, that is. In the Soviet Union, too, the collection of " Staliniana " is growing just as determinedly, with the sole difference that there it is the men of letters, not the historians, who are writing about the Leader of the Peoples. The fourth volume of Alexander Chakovsky's epic *The Blockade* (intended to run eventually to no less than six books) had scarcely appeared in 1973, than Ivan Stadnyuk was already publishing the second book of his epic novel *War* (also intended to run to no less than six volumes) in the journal *Molodaya Gvardiya*;[1] and in 1974 Konstantin Simonov won a State Prize for his tetralogy about the war, in which Stalin plays the central part. (In addition, there are the memoirs of those Soviet Marshals who had the good fortune to work under the direction of the Supreme Commander).

It is not only Stalin's military activities that are attracting the interest of Soviet writers. In V. Kolotov's documentary novella *Target—the Future* (*Ustremlyonnyi v budushchee*),[2] which describes the great services rendered by Gosplan chairman and Politburo member Nikolai Voznesensky, the Boss, his creator, does not leave the hero for a single moment: " Voznesensky lifted the receiver and heard the familiar, calm, measured voice with its noticeable accent. . . . " Even today in the writings of Soviet authors the calm, measured voice of Stalin continues to exhort, advise, applaud (rarely) and (more often) punish people according to their deserts and to unmask enemies. But in *Target—the Future* no mention at all is made of the fact that Nikolai Voznesensky, a protégé of Stalin, was shot in 1950 at the whim of the Leader. Kolotov confines himself to the following words: " Nikolai Alekseyevich was too young for death as well: he passed away before he even reached fifty, when he was still in the prime of his life and his talents were in full flower. His untimely decease prevented him from completing yet another new book. . . "

Nikolai Shundik's novel *In the blue-eyed country,* which deals with the celebrated " Ryazan affair "—the Soviet Watergate which ended happily with the suicide of an *obkom* secretary—establishes the image of a model Soviet Party Leader. In the mind of the writer (who has evidently received the appropriate instructions) this Ideal Leader possesses many features of Stalin, first and foremost his iron will and his ruthlessness.

Western historians, in their search for a key to Stalin's character, are

[1] Nos. 6 and 7 (1974).
[2] Published in *Znamya,* No. 6 (1974).

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now turning to psychoanalysis. But in so far as Stalin's private life remains a mystery (Vladimir Gorny's novel *The Hangman and his Master*, which describes—among other things—the Leader's sexual life, is still in manuscript, as are the " memoirs " of the singer Natalia Shpiller on the same subject, now circulating in *samizdat* in Moscow), this leaves historians with an analysis of his political activities. There are, however, opportunities to peep into Stalin's soul which have been neglected by Western historians, not to mention Soviet writers. It is possible today to lay hands on quite a large quantity of material concerning Stalin's literary interests and his attitude to literature. This material includes letters published in his *Collected Works* and also documents which have come to light since 1953.

Stalin, writes Roy Medvedev, " left a very great mark on our literature." The Soviet historian has in mind a bloodstained mark; the extermination of writers, the banning of books. But Stalin did not just destroy writers and destroy literature: he strove to " build " a new literature after his own taste. Stalin's utterances on the subject of literature—which reflect this taste—enable us to enrich his portrait with new colours.

Stalin's mentor in the sphere of literature, as in many other fields, was Lenin. Writers of memoirs have provided us with a great deal of evidence as to Lenin's literary tastes. He regarded even Chekhov as a " modernist," a definition which is nowadays among the most offensive that can be applied in the Soviet Union. After seeing a performance of *Uncle Vanya* at the Moscow Art Theatre, Lenin said: " What splendid actors, and what a splendid theatre, but why do they put on plays like this? Are these the kind of feelings we want awakened? We must call for the spirit of cheerfulness, work and joy." Lunacharsky used to claim that " Vladimir Ilyich never made guiding principles of his aesthetic likes and dislikes." Clearly this is not quite true. In 1958, some of Lenin's letters were published for the first time, and demonstrated that he did not confine himself to the platonic expression of his " aesthetic likes and dislikes," but consolidated them by administrative action. Having described Mayakovsky's poem *150 Millions* as " rubbish, stupid, arrant nonsense and pretentiousness," Lenin added in a memorandum to the director of Gosizdat, M. N. Pokrovsky: " Can't you put a stop to this! You must put a stop to it "! and insisted that the futurists should not be printed " more than twice a year " or in editions of " more than 1,500."

But that was still only 1921 and Lenin was still learning how to supervise " not only politics, but economics and culture as well " [3]. Nevertheless, he was laying the foundations and establishing the precedents. And Ivan Stadnyuk was absolutely justified in putting this formula into Stalin's mouth ' . . . the practical direction of an establishment, enterprise, business or mission must be entrusted to *a single comrade* [Stalin's italics] noted for his firmness, decisiveness, boldness and ability to run a

[3] See A. Dodonova. *Memories of the Proletkult* (Moscow, 1967).

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practical business, and known to enjoy the greatest possible confidence . . ."

From the mid-twenties onwards Stalin gradually, but ever more manifestly, took upon himself supreme control of literature.

This control was expressed in approving, instructive criticism couched in rigid formulae and ready-made clichés. Writing, for example, about the poem *The Maiden and Death*—one of the least distinguished of all Gorky's works—Stalin declared: "This thing is more impressive than Goethe's *Faust*. Love conquers death." "This thing" was immediately included in school syllabuses and studied—instead of *Faust*. After the death of Mayakovsky, Stalin wrote: "Mayakovsky was and still remains the finest and most talented poet of our age. To neglect his memory is a crime." And Mayakovsky was immediately included in school syllabuses, for "he still remains the finest and most talented . . ." The word "crime" rang convincingly enough on Stalin's lips for it to be unthinkable to question his appraisal of the merits of the poetry of this one-time "rebel," now become, along with Gorky, a pillar of Soviet literature; for there could be no finer writers than those who received Stalin's accolade.

Another form of favourable criticism used by Stalin was praise by letter. Only in 1949 were some of these letters published in the *Collected Works*, but they had circulated confidently—with Stalin's consent, of course. Thus, in a letter to the poet Alexander Bezymensky, Stalin described two of his poems, *The day of our life* and, in particular, *The shot* as: "models of proletarian revolutionary art for the present," and, in a letter to Feliks Kon, referred to Sholokhov as: "an outstanding writer of our time" (1929).

Stalin's unfavourable criticisms had far wider repercussions. And, to give him his due, he had an amazingly keen capacity to detect anything out-of-the-ordinary, talented or critical. The first individual victim of Stalin was evidently Mikhail Bulgakov, to whose writings the General Secretary was strangely drawn—an attraction which was manifested in the fact that the Moscow Art Theatre was allowed to stage *The Days of the Turbins*—the only theatre in the country to be granted permission—as though expressly for Stalin, who went to see it fifteen times. Another object of Stalin's close attention was Andrei Platonov. After having read his short story, *Doubting Makar*, in *Oktyabr*,[4] Stalin made a scene with the journal's editor, Alexander Fadeyev. "Recently I let an ideologically ambiguous story slip through—Platonov's *Doubting Makar*—and I really got what I deserved for it from Stalin," wrote Fadeyev in a letter to R. S. Zemlyachka.[5] Two years later, Fadeyev, by then editor-in-chief of *Krasnaya Nov*, once again published Platonov, this time his story *For Profit*, and once again "committed an error." Stalin had been keeping an eye on Platonov, and after reading the story wrote in the margin "scum"

[4] No. 9 (1929).
[5] A. Fadeyev, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5.

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thereby virtually destroying the author. It was enough for Fadeyev to read the comment in Stalin's handwriting for him to organize a frenzied campaign against Platonov, whom he dubbed a "kulak agent", breathing "kulak spite like a wild animal", and so on. Stalin realized that Konstantin Stanislavsky was not as quick on the uptake or as willing to serve the Party as was Fadeyev, and so he couched his opinion of Nikolai Erdman's play *The Suicide* in an extremely evasive form. Erdman's brilliant satire had delighted Gorky, and three of the best Moscow theatres had simultaneously begun rehearsing it for production. In 1931 the play was banned by the censor. Stanislavsky sent the text to Stalin in the hope that he would authorize production. The Controller of Soviet literature replied to Stanislavsky thus:

> I do not have a very high opinion of the play.[6] My closest comrades think it is fatuous and even harmful . . . Nevertheless I have no objection to allowing the theatre to experiment and demonstrate its skill. One cannot rule out the possibility that the theatre will manage to achieve its aim.

But Stalin "did not have a very high opinion" of Stanislavsky's theatre either. It was for this reason that he ended his letter with the words: "Our party's cultural propagandist [*kultprop*] (comrade Statsky) will assist you in this matter. Your *supers* will be comrades who know something about artistic affairs. I am a dilettante in these matters."[7]

The man appointed as *super* (wherever did Stalin pick up that word?) was that connoisseur of "artistic affairs," First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee Lazar Kaganovich.

Upon closer acquaintance with Stalin's activity in the field of literary criticism, one is struck by his insistent repetition—in more or less unvarying form—of one particular thought. In a letter to Bezymensky,[8] Stalin writes: "I am not a connoisseur of literature, and of course I am no critic." In a letter to Gorky,[9] he says: "I cannot comply with Kamegulov's[10] request. No time! And besides, what kind of a critic am I, devil take me!" In the letter to Stanislavsky referred to above, Stalin says of himself: "I am a dilettante in these [artistic] matters." Stalin does not want to be a critic. He wants to be a creator, a writer. A letter he wrote to Bill-Belotserkovsky[11] gives us our first opportunity to study the creative ideas of the General Secretary. "I would have nothing

[6] In her memoirs, N. Lunacharskaya-Rozenel relates that when the People's Commissar for Education, A. Lunacharsky, "heard Nikolai Erdman's satirical comedy *The Suicide* . . . he almost laughed until he cried, and several times started to applaud." In the final analysis, Lunacharsky's conclusion was no different from Stalin's opinion: "*The Suicide* is sharp-witted and entertaining . . . but it must not be staged."

[7] *Russian Literature Triquarterly*, No. 7 (1974).

[8] Stalin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Gorky evidently supported the literary specialist Anatoly Kamegulov when the latter asked Stalin if he would write a foreword to a book. Stalin somehow felt he should refuse, and in 1937 Kamegulov was executed.

[11] Stalin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11.

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against staging *Flight* [12] [*Beg*] if Bulgakov were to add another one or two dreams to his eight, in which he might depict the inner social springs of the civil war in the USSR . . ."

Historians who analyse Stalin's character perhaps pay insufficient attention to the publication on 21 December 1939, the Great Leader's 60th birthday, of some newly discovered verses by the youthful Dzhugashvili, apparently composed in 1895 and 1896. There were only a few poems, six altogether. E. E. Smith in *The Young Stalin* proves convincingly that, in all probability, the verses did not come from the pen of " the youthful Stalin." What is important, though, is not that Stalin did not write these poems. The important thing is that he would have liked to have written poetry. If we accept this hypothesis, the significance of Stalin's celebrated and enigmatic conversation with Pasternak about the arrest of Osip Mandelstam in May 1934 becomes clear. On the subject of this conversation, Nadezhda Mandelstam writes: " Stalin informed Pasternak that the Mandelstam case was being reviewed and that everything would turn out well for him. Then he came out with an unexpected reproach: why had Pasternak not gone to the writers' organizations or ' to me ' and appealed on Mandelstam's behalf? " And Stalin added: " If I were a poet, and my friend who was a poet had got into hot water, I would climb up the wall to help him . . ."

" If I were a poet . . ." Stalin telephoned Pasternak as one poet to another. *This* was why he insisted that their talk would be of " a professional nature ": " But he is a master, a master, isn't he? " was the information he tried to elicit about Mandelstam. But the poet Boris Pasternak failed to understand the poet Joseph Stalin . . . The conversation never took place. Mandelstam remained in exile, and then was killed . . .

One can speculate that even if he did not understand it, the playwright Alexander Afinogenov at least divined Stalin's passionate desire to serve the muses. After the wild success of his play *Fear* (*Strakh*), Afinogenov wrote in 1933 another play, *Falsehood* (*Lozh*) and three hundred theatres began rehearsing it. However, realizing the explosive nature of his theme, the playwright asked Stalin to go over the text with " the hand of a master." In the course of his work on the book *The Dramatic Art of Alexander Afinogenov,* the Soviet critic A. Karaganov was given the opportunity to study Stalin's corrections to the text of *Falsehood.* In his book, Karaganov has, unfortunately, included only a part of the comments and corrections made in Stalin's own hand in the margins of Afinogenov's manuscript. But even this is enough to enable us to judge not only the literary ambitions which were devouring Stalin's soul, but also the direction he wished to impart—with his own hand—and which he did impart to Soviet literature. Karaganov writes that Stalin often struck out scenes, soliloquies or repartees which he disliked,

[12] Bulgakov's play, written in 1928, was undoubtedly banned with Stalin's knowledge or on his initiative. First staged in Moscow in 1958, it was later made into a film.

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and in some cases inserted new dialogues in place of the ones he had crossed out, or simply wrote interpolations into Afinogenov's text. The very first phrase of the "review" Stalin wrote in the margin of the manuscript reveals his "line of thought," and it is expressed in his own incomparable language: "Comrade Afinogenov! The idea of the play is rich, but the way it's been put together is not so rich." And so the Supreme Critic "enriches" the idea. The first thing he does is to embellish the text—wherever he can, and even in the most inappropriate places—with the words: "suspicious," "double-dealing" and suchlike. He inserts "explanatory dialogue," political formulae; he demands a positive character to counterbalance every negative one, and that every critical remark should be followed by a rejoinder affirming life and extolling the Party. He insists that there be "a workers' meeting in the play where they unmask Viktor, topple Gorchakov and restore the truth." [13]

Stalin's comments and the emendations he made in Afinogenov's text are a laboratory, as it were, of his thought: primitive, direct, mistrustful and pitiless.

Desirous though he was of this, Afinogenov did not succeed in improving his play to Stalin's satisfaction. After reading a second version of *Falsehood*, the General Secretary accorded it a sharply negative appraisal, but made no new corrections. Evidently he had decided that even the finest Soviet playwrights were incapable of understanding him, and as for writing plays himself—he had no time.

MODERN Soviet literature can be divided into three basic categories. The first is that of the literature which is rejected by the censorship, remains unpublished and banned in the Soviet Union, and often circulates in *samizdat*. This category includes some of the greatest Russian writers of our time: Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Vladimir Maximov, Andrei Sinyavsky. The second category is the literature that is officially published, read by Soviet critics, lavishly endowed by the Soviet government, but little read by the public. In this category, too, there are gifted writers and works of talent—Sergei Zalygin's *On the Irtysh*, some of the writings of Vasily Bykov and Vladimir Tendryakov, Chingiz Aitmatov's *White Steamer*, to name but a few; but these are tiny islands in the ocean of indigestible, "prize-winning" literature. As for the third category . . .

Foreign visitors who describe their impressions on their return from

[13] What Stalin has in mind is *yet another* meeting—for the play consists almost entirely of meetings—a final meeting that will settle all scores with the enemies and leave no doubt as to their future fate. In his only work on a "Soviet theme," the play *Somov and the others*, which is devoted to the "sabotage activities" of some Russian engineers, Maxim Gorky anticipates Stalin's instructions about the need to dot all one's "i"s. A stage direction in the final scene of Gorky's play runs: "A squad of four GPU agents comes on to the terrace. The number of agents gradually increases." It is worth mentioning that Gorky's critical remarks on Afinogenov's play *Falsehood* (in a letter to the play's author, *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* No. 70) bear an extraordinary resemblance to the comments written by Stalin in the margins of Afinogenov's play.

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Moscow invariably and with one accord express their admiration for the way the inhabitants of the Soviet capital are "always reading"—in the underground, on the buses, in shop queues and in the streets—and their amazement at the number of open-air bookstalls everywhere and the crowds of people that are constantly milling around them. This observation is a correct one. However, visitors to Moscow, either because they do not speak the language or out of shyness, rarely look to see what books are being read or bought. As a rule, they are books in the third category: mass Soviet literature, little respected even by the official critics, but published in editions of hundreds of thousands, the true spiritual food of the people. During the final year of its publication under the editorship of Alexander Tvardovsky, the journal *Novy Mir* [14] printed an article by Natalya Ilyina entitled "Literature and the mass edition." The writer had ascertained that the size of a book's edition was inversely proportional to its talent and artistic merit. She wrote: "the novels that are promoted and popularized are the most mediocre, most primitive ones, the ones which pander to bourgeois taste."

For more than thirty years now, the complexion of Soviet literature has been determined by the character of the "positive hero", who is refashioned at every turn in the general Party line. Changes in the "positive hero" correspond exactly to changes in policy. Speaking at the RSFSR Writers' Congress in 1970, Vil Lipatov described the changing succession of heroes thus: "The heroes of the twenties and thirties in Soviet literature were milkmaids, teachers, tractor drivers and workers; the heroes of the forties were Soviet warriors. The hero of the sixties and early seventies is the security officer-cum-intelligence agent working behind the enemy lines."

But this new positive hero is a long-familiar type of hero. As early as 1939, in a speech delivered to the 18th Party congress, Stalin had denounced those who did not understand the role of the "punitive and intelligence organs" in the building of socialism, and those who "indulged in idle chatter to the effect that the secret service in the Soviet state was all trivialities and nonsense." Stalin explained that "underestimation of the secret service" had arisen "owing to the imperfections and inadequacy of some of the general theses of the Marxist doctrine on the State."

One must suppose that "Marxist doctrine" on this subject has finally been perfected, for never before in the Soviet Union has so much importance been attached—in the field of literature, that is—to the secret service. Detective stories are published separately in mass editions, special almanacs (*Adventure World, The Pursuer*) and in monthly journals. It should be said right away that Soviet critics are reluctant to use the term "detective story," preferring to describe the genre as "adventure stories" and latterly "intelligence stories" (*razvedcheskii roman*—a neologism difficult to pronounce in Russian). As early as 1920, Evgeny

[14] No. 2 (1969).

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Zamyatin, in his novel *We*, had pointed out the importance of the precise definition of concepts and the birth of a "double language." "There were spies in the ancient state—and there are spies in our state too . . . yes, spies. I am not afraid of words. But it's obvious: there the spy was the henbane; here it's the lily of the valley that is the spy. Yes, the lily of the valley!" Today the word "spy" (*shpion*) is used only with regard to the enemy, the henbane; the Soviet spy, the lily of the valley, is called an intelligence officer (*razvedchik*).

The phenomenal success of detective literature—for this is what Soviet citizens read at home and in the streets—can be explained by a happy coincidence: the state wants to publish it and the mass reading public wants to read it. Both sides make concessions: the publisher allows his authors certain "liberties," allows them to reveal certain information which would be inadmissible in other genres, and the reader swallows—in "glamourized adventure form"—ideas, heroes and a philosophy which he would refuse to accept in other genres.

The chief ideas propagated by Soviet detective literature are uncomplicated: we are surrounded by enemies, and suspiciousness (always known as vigilance!) is the basic law of society; only the intelligence officer/secret service man can discover, unmask and destroy the enemy; consequently—a second law—each person is duty-bound to assist him. In *Notes of an Old Muscovite*,[15] theatrical impresario Ilya Shneider tells of an incident that occurred in 1919 involving the celebrated Russian ballerina Ekaterina Geltser. The Cheka arrested Geltser's partner, wrecking a planned performance. Ilya Shneider, who had wide contacts among Cheka officials known to be lovers of the art, telephoned Ksenofontov, one of Dzerzhinsky's deputies. Ksenofontov heard the ballerina's petition that her partner be released and was quick to give his consent: "Yes, of course he can," Ksenofontov laughed, "He has been detained to establish an identity in the apartment of an arrested man. But how will he be able to dance? He is probably suffering from tiredness and over-anxiety after these three days . . ." Geltser insisted, and the amused *Chekist* released the dancer, who had spent three days cooped up in a cell "to establish an identity" which had been "established" even before the arrest took place. The affair would have ended happily here, had not a rumour suddenly flown around Moscow that Geltser was a Cheka agent and had once exposed a White Guard conspiracy, and that was why they had been so ready and willing to hand her partner back to her. The ballerina suffered a nervous breakdown, and some of the most eminent Russian artistes—Chaliapin, Stanislavsky, Sobinov, Ermolova—sent a letter to *Izvestiya* to refute the rumour in print and "remove the shameful stigma from Geltser." Ilya Shneider comments: "I would have come out and said that there was nothing shaming in the rumours about Geltser's having allegedly uncovered a plot . . . Nobody understood at the time that the highly talented masters of the arts who had mustered

[15] Moscow (1970).

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forces were still absolute children as far as political matters were concerned . . . taking for a stigma something which they ought to have regarded as the honourable duty of every citizen."

Detective literature sets up the *Chekist* as the positive hero, representing him as a teacher of life. The homily that the *Chekist* in Fyodor Gladkov's novel *Energy* delivered to the heroine—" Strive to prevent blood and death from wounding your soul "—still holds good.

The rapid flowering of detective literature began at the same time as the so-called " Thaw ", and in a certain sense was connected with it. The declining influence of the KGB after Beria's execution, the rehabilitation of the victims of the terror, the encroachment upon that holy of holies, the principle of the infallibility of the organs, which had been established since 1919; all these factors impelled those statesmen who realized that they could not manage without the security organs to embark upon a large-scale advertising campaign. A group of writers was mobilized to deal with the " publicity." The advertising campaign took several directions: books were written about the police force and policemen who went without sleep, put aside all thoughts of their families and children and devoted all their energies to protecting Soviet citizens from the criminal offender; a large quantity of books appeared which dealt with the activities of the Cheka during the first years of Soviet power and the fight against the White Guards who were infiltrating from abroad with insidious intent—in these books the *Chekisty* risked their own lives to defend the peaceful labour of the Republic (two books, by Lev Nikulin and Vasily Ardamatsky, tell of one of the most brilliant achievements of OGPU, a provocation which was staged over several years and which led to the arrest of Viktor Savinkov); and there arose a whole school of literature devoted to the *Chekisty* involved in the organization of partisan warfare against the Germans and claiming that all the partisan detachments had been set up and led by " employees of the organs." In the mid-sixties, Soviet fans of the detective story finally learned of Richard Sorge, who had become a symbol and a patron saint of the KGB. A biography of him appeared in the series " Lives of Remarkable People," which had consisted until then of biographies of great scientists, writers and public figures. The Intelligence Officer had been officially blessed and canonized as one of the Soviet saints.

One of the many books about Sorge has the highly significant title: *The man from whom there were no secrets.* This title is an expression of the secret, morbid dream of the organs: to uncover all secrets, to know everything about everybody. Sorge, his biographers assert, was the ideal *Chekist* and succeeded in realizing this dream. But in the final analysis, Sorge is past history, although, of course, he is still written about, just as novels are still being written about Soviet spies who succeeded in penetrating Hitler's army headquarters during the war and " knew everything." Moscow television has twice already shown a film version of a book by

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one of the chief eulogists of the police force and the organs, Julian Semyonov, *Seventeen Moments in Spring*. The book tells of the exploits of a modest Soviet spy who passed on to "the Centre" information gleaned from Hitler's most intimate associates. But this, I repeat, is past history. In recent years, increasing numbers of books devoted to "the contemporary exploits of Soviet intelligence officers" have been appearing. The name of Colonel Abel has become widely known; not only has he written his own "memoirs" about the running of the Soviet spy network in the United States in the 1950s; he has also appeared on the cinema screen, where, in an introductory speech to the film "The Dead Season," he confirmed the authenticity of the facts presented in that film and also the talent of one of his pupils, Colonel Georgii Lonov, better known in England by the name of Gordon Lonsdale. Then there is Georgii Timofeyevich Lonov himself, who gave an account of his activities to a certain T. Podolin, an author totally unknown in writers' circles. Podolin published his "tale of the exploits of a Soviet spy," calling it *Special Assignment*, in the journal *Molodaya Gvardiya* (circulation 325,000).

George Orwell, on the subject of "good bad books," maintained that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* would outlast the collected works of Virginia Woolf. In the case of Soviet detective literature, there ought to be a special category of "valuable bad books." Valuable in the sense that they are an important source for the sociological and political analysis of Soviet society. The fact that they are essentially outside the category of literature and cannot "survive" even one year in my opinion tends to increase, rather than diminish, their value as source material. Their authors' lack of talent (generally the case) and literary ignorance make them especially receptive to the catch-phrases and directive of the moment. The political line at a particular point in time is reproduced with a purity utterly unalloyed by any artistic talent, an achievement that writers with even the slightest aptitude would find impossible.

The eminent Soviet writer Leonid Leonov, in his celebrated novel *The Russian Forest* (1953), explained the ignoble anti-Russian nature of his vilely negative character Gratsiansky by the latter's corrupt—bourgeois—origins, which made it possible for him to collaborate with the tsarist *Okhranka* (secret police) and then made him hostile to Soviet power. But some residuum of creative talent compelled Leonov to embellish his bare, schematic outline. In Arkady and Georgii Vainerov's novel *Race down the Vertical* (*Gonki po vertikali*) (1974) the negative hero, the thief Alexei Dedushkin, is the grandson of a Tsarist secret policeman. The very surname of the negative hero is an indication of the source of evil: *dedushka*, grandfather! The grandfather, evidently by genetic means, had transmitted a memory of the accursed tsarist regime, together with capitalist habits and vices, to his grandchild.[16] But

[16] We can assume that in the distant communist future, the carriers of evil will be the great-grandfathers and great-great-grandfathers. . .

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it is precisely in the freedom with which the negative hero is depicted that the main value of Soviet detective literature lies, both for the ordinary reader and for the researcher. The well-known film actor and director Alexei Batalov has said some very true things about the advantages enjoyed by the Soviet negative hero over his positive counterpart. What chance has the positive hero against the negative one?—asked Batalov. "They (the negative heroes!) are free, while he (the positive hero) is constrained by the obligation to be "good." They drink vodka, come to work late and love beautiful women, and if they fall out of love with them they desert them . . . They cry, they question things, they play their guitars, they wear fashionable clothes, they laugh, and they talk in double-entendres . . . The positive hero is not allowed to do such things. He always has to wear his old soldier's tunic and love the same woman, and only that woman, year in year out, and he mustn't punch a scoundrel in the face when he deserves to be punched . . ." [17] Bearing in mind that the negative hero in a detective story is doubly negative—for on top of all this he is a criminal as well—the freedom he enjoys in Soviet literature cannot fail to delight the reader.

The Soviet thriller is just as highly appreciated by the researcher too. Detective literature requires detailed and circumstantial representation of everyday life, and thus describes aspects of Soviet life about which so-called serious literature is silent. In Leonid Slovin's story *Station* the reader can learn not only how a Moscow station functions, but also how the automatic luggage lockers at the station operates (the ingenious thief burgles them making use of a fault in the locking mechanism), while in the story *Square of Complexity* (*Kvadrat Slozhnosti*) by Arkady Adamov, a leading thriller writer, the reader can find out not only how Soviet light industry functions and how the consumer goods trade is run, but also ways of circumventing the law in order to meet the demand of the female population of the country for jersey-knit blouses. The negative heroes live, dress and behave as the mass reading public behaves (or would like to behave). And the speech of the negative characters is the colloquial speech of the present day. In "serious" literature, language of this kind is burned out with a red-hot iron. Recently the writer Anatoly Gladilin, in an article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* [18] entitled "I shed tears over the word," complained bitterly about editors who "ironed out" his books and made his characters express themselves exclusively in "civilized" language. The writer realized that his complaint would have no effect "Some readers will wonder why Gladilin is kicking up such a fuss. Just think, they have replaced some of his words by others; that's not such a great misfortune, they edit everybody like that, it's quite normal . . ." This is perfectly true—it is quite normal. Not for nothing does the proverb say a telegraph pole is an edited tree. In detective literature the language of the heroes—the negative heroes—

[17] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, No. 64 (1962).
[18] No. 32, 1974.

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is edited to a lesser degree: the editors hope that nobody will want to imitate the speech of criminals.

The content of Soviet detective literature, irrespective of the subject of a particular book, is restricted to a simple formula: the negative character, either alone or in complicity with a small group of men of his ilk, operates in a society composed of positive characters. Books about Soviet intelligence agents abroad use the same formula in reverse: one positive character (or a small group) operates in a society composed of negative types. T. Podolin's story *Special Assignment* [19] is a typical example of this genre of literature.

The hero has left his home, his wife and children for many years—to carry out a " special mission." This is his duty, for, as a senior comrade who recruits him into the KGB teaches him, " there is a war in full swing. It is a hidden, secret war, but it is going on all the time!" After a lengthy and thorough training the spy goes out into the field, in this case Canada. His training has been so good that when he finds himself, for the first time in his life, in Vancouver, he feels as though he is in his home town: he knows all the streets and all the houses (Soviet spy schools are the best in the world!). From Canada the hero, Gordon Lonsdale, goes as a Canadian to London, where he sets to work. His activities, the reader learns, involve "arguing objectively in the interests of the English." Inasmuch as the chief aim of Soviet espionage is " the prevention of nuclear war," a most noble aim, it follows that, if the English do not want a nuclear war, they ought to be thankful for the activities of Lonsdale. Especially as it turns out that " two ex-Nazi scientists are working on the development of bacteriological weapons in England." This dispels any remaining doubt as to the nobility of Gordon Lonsdale/Colonel Georgii Lonov's aims. This alone, however, is not enough. While trying, " in the interests of the English," to get hold of various secret documents, the Soviet spy recruits an Englishman who has been discharged from the Navy for drunkenness and brawling and who used to work at the Portland naval base. After describing the process of Houghton's recruitment, the author of this Soviet spy story analyses in depth the motives underlying the behaviour of the positive hero: " ' So! ' the over-scrupulous reader will exclaim in indignation, ' That means that Colonel Lonov used the services of some very dubious characters. He may have had the noblest of aims, but ought he to have had dealings with people like Houghton? ' The question certainly is a delicate one. And we shall appeal to Colonel Lonov himself for assistance." More than once the author breaks off his narration to give the hero of *Special Assignment* his say. This time he asks a question of a " moral order." Of course, fifteen years ago such a question would not have been put in a

[19] The first thirteen chapters of *Special Assignment* were published in Nos. 9 and 10 of the journal *Molodaya Gvardiya* in 1971, and the next five chapters did not appear until No. 3 of 1972. The " continuation " promised at the end of chapter 18 had still not appeared by the summer of 1974. Perhaps this was because it would have been necessary to mention the arrest of the hero, the spy Gordon Lonsdale.

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book about a Soviet spy. But the reply Colonel Lonov gives leaves no doubt that the "over-scrupulous reader" could have saved himself the trouble of asking the question. "Objectively," states the Colonel, "Houghton was serving a good and honourable aim. And it was not his fault that his past was far from irreproachable . . .[20] During the course of the few years I was in contact with him, I began to get the impression that Houghton was changing for the better. And if our meetings had gone on longer I am sure that I could have made a man of Houghton, as has happened more than once in my own experience and in the experience of my colleagues."

Thus Gordon Lonsdale not only helped the British to save themselves from nuclear catastrophe, but—like all other Soviet spies—exerted a beneficial influence on the souls of the agents he recruited. True, in the case of Lonsdale it is not entirely clear what effect this beneficial influence had, for he had introduced himself to Houghton as an assistant naval attaché at the American Embassy and the unfortunate and dissolute Houghton was convinced that he was selling British secrets to the United States.

As a reward for the labour of swallowing the morality of this "intelligence" exploit, the reader gets a certain amount of information, perhaps not quite accurate, but certainly interesting, about the West. As a reward he is allowed to look, as it were, through a peephole into another world. The information is a measured mixture of the unexpected and the usual clichés: both in Canada and England the customs examination is "superficial," but, on the other hand, the workers cannot afford to buy the "magnificent goods" which are flauntingly displayed in shop windows; in Canada there is "no passport system" (i.e. there are no internal passports, which must come as a great surprise to Soviet citizens), while in London every telephone kiosk in the street has "a four-volume telephone directory on a special shelf;" but at the same time the proprietor of a country pub where Lonsdale meets his chief who has travelled down from the Centre "from time to time casts rapid and searching glances at his customers," exactly as if the scene were taking place in Moscow.

However, the reader's main feeling as he closes the book is one of conviction that the Soviet spy is an omnipotent, omniscient and noble creature. So as to leave absolutely no room for doubt in the reader's mind, the author of *Special Assignment* recalls another "special agent," and a notorious one, a "star of the English secret service, third man in the Intelligence Service, the mighty Philby, whom the Centre knew as none other than 'comrade Kim,' a senior officer in Soviet intelligence."

AFTER the major part of this article had already been completed, a book came out which, as I discovered, dealt, amongst many other extremely interesting things, with the two themes which I had taken as

[20] It was the fault of decadent capitalist society.

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the subject of my article: Stalin and the Soviet detective story. The book, by a Soviet literary scholar, "D," is called *The Current of the Quiet Don,* and was published in Paris with a foreword by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Death prevented "D" from solving "the riddles of Sholokhov's novel" and completing his researches. Solzhenitsyn, now presenting readers with this unfinished work, underlines its significance —even in its incompleted form—and calls for research on *Quiet Flows the Don* to be continued, with the aim of throwing light on the identity of the author and reconstructing the original text of the novel. Every reader knows that the most important thing in a detective's work is to ask the right question. In the case of *Quiet Flows the Don,* the question is self-evident and has been asked ever since 1929: who wrote the novel? One hopes that the publication of "D's" book will inspire researchers —in the West, if not in the East—to occupy themselves with this question. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the publication of this book under the auspices of Solzhenitsyn is that the question which has been asked in a whisper for the last 45 years has now been spoken aloud for all to hear. But there is one more question which "D" did not ask (or did not have time to ask). It can be expressed as follows: why is it that none of the circumstances which aroused suspicion immediately after the publication of *Quiet Flows the Don*—the manifest lack of literary experience on the part of the 23-year-old Sholokhov, who, before the appearance of the first volume of *Quiet Flows the Don* had published only the dull and imitative *Tales of the Don,* the author's lack of the necessary knowledge, the absence of any manuscripts, etc.—why is it that none of these circumstances was noticed by the authorities? And if they were noticed, why was the question hushed up?

After reading the book, I went back to the letter of Stalin's in which Sholokhov is mentioned (the only occasion) and referred to as "an outstanding writer of our time." The letter itself and the odd association which suddenly prompted Stalin to mention Sholokhov's name seem to me to be of unusually eloquent significance. The letter was addressed to Feliks Kon, a member of the Comintern and editor of *Rabochaya Gazeta,* and the circumstances which impelled Stalin to write the letter were unusual. In May 1929, the General Secretary of the Central Committee wrote an introduction to a brochure entitled *Competition of the Masses,* which was the work of a totally unknown woman journalist, E. Mikulina. Stalin concluded his introduction with these words: "The value of this brochure lies in the fact that it is a simple and truthful account of the deep-seated processes underlying the great upsurge of enthusiasm for labour which is the inner spring of socialist competition." However, no sooner had the pamphlet appeared, than it was discovered to be not a "truthful account," but a journalist's invention; the facts had been entirely fabricated, the heroes of the competition referred to by Mikulina did not in fact exist, and neither did the workshop which was the scene of the "deep-seated processes" that had so gratified the

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author of the introduction. Feliks Kon at once dispatched all the material relating to the forgery to Stalin, asking him what should be done. Should the book be immediately withdrawn from sale?

Stalin replied on 9 July 1929. In his first paragraph he grants that " comrade Mikulina . . . has perpetrated a number of gross inaccuracies, and that, of course, is a bad thing and inexcusable. But is it really the point?" It appears that the point is not this at all, not the " individual details," but " the general tenor." And in this very first sentence, almost in the same breath as his verdict on Mikulina, Stalin recalls Sholokhov. It should be remembered that a letter by A. Serafimovich, L. Averbakh, V. Kirshon, A. Fadeyev and V. Stavsky in defence of Sholokhov had been printed in *Pravda* on 29 March 1929 and had far from reassured the literary community; moreover, it should be stressed that Sholokhov's attackers included some influential proletarian writers: it seems to me that Stalin's letter to Feliks Kon, written as it was at the height of the controversy surrounding *Quiet Flows the Don*—which many communists saw as a counter-revolutionary work—was most probably an expression of his opinion in the debate, and that Mikulina's brochure was merely a pretext. Stalin was answering Sholokhov's opponents: " . . . Sholokhov has committed a number of the most flagrant errors in *Quiet Flows the Don,* as well as presenting some frankly incorrect information . . . but does it have to follow from this that *Quiet Flows the Don* is good-for-nothing and deserves to be withdrawn from sale?" Stalin is against withdrawing both Mikulina's pamphlet and Sholokhov's novel from sale, for what is important to him is " the general tenor." In both cases " the general tenor " suits Stalin very well. To those who believed that Mikulina had pulled a fast one on Stalin " (and doubtless to those who believed that Sholokhov too had " pulled a fast one on Stalin "), the General Secretary of the Central Committee was replying with arrogant self-confidence: " It is not as easy as all that to ' pull a fast one ' on comrade Stalin."

One must suppose that Stalin had collected sufficient material on Sholokhov before calling him—perhaps in a spirit of extreme irony, with his characteristic craftiness—" an outstanding writer of our time." In the summer of 1929, the author of two volumes of *The Quiet Don,* Mikhail Sholokhov, who in the 1931 *Literary Encyclopaedia* was still described as, in the opinion of some, " a proletarian writer " and, according to others, " a spokesman for the prosperous sections of the peasantry," was outstanding first and foremost owing to the controversy over the authorship of his novel.

Stalin himself provides a partial reply to the question of why he patronized Sholokhov. " I believe," he wrote, " that the time has come for us to get rid of this gentlemanly custom of promoting literary ' grandees ' who have already come to the fore as it is . . . One of our tasks is to breach the blind wall and give young forces an outlet . . . " Stalin sets

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about creating his own literary functionaries, writers who are personally devoted to him and indebted to him for everything . . .

ALL this, however, is of course mere speculation and guesswork. Soviet literature affords the detective a vast area wide open for investigation. In the West, matters stand quite differently. Nowadays in the Soviet literary press one frequently comes across gloating, exultant articles claiming that the decline of the detective genre in the West is connected with the fact that the ending of the "cold war" has led to the disappearance of the enemies against whom the secret agents of Western intelligence services should be fighting. To a certain extent this is true. But the exultation of the critics is all the more gleeful because they know perfectly well that the writers of Soviet thrillers will never run out of enemies. In the first place there is the whole of the capitalist world, which—owing to its political backwardness—has to be saved from itself; and in the second place, there are those Soviet citizens who have been poisoned by virtue of their bourgeois forbears. But the possibilities do not end even there. In the second book of her memoirs, *Hope Abandoned*, Nadezhda Mandelstam relates a story which Khrushchev used to tell in his day. Stalin was once watching the celebrated Ukrainian actor Buchma playing the part of a traitor on television. Struck by the actor's *performance,* Stalin declared that a traitor could be played so well only by someone who actually *was* a traitor, and demanded that the appropriate measures be taken immediately with respect to Buchma. As Nadezhda Mandelstam says, " in our mad times anything is possible." If there are no real enemies they can always be invented. If there are no real writers, they can be artificially created.

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Letter to Academician Andrei Snezhnevsky of the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, Moscow

Esteemed Academician Snezhnevsky,

If you remember, three-and-a-half years ago, or more precisely, at the end of 1971, I wrote you a letter. It concerned an interview you had given about the question of the confinement and treatment in psychiatric hospitals of perfectly healthy people suspected of holding dissident views.

You replied to me at the time, but you asked me not to make your letter public, since in it you communicated some thoughts and cited some facts which you regarded as confidential. I complied with your request. More than that: I did not even make public my own letter, because I did not wish to put you in an embarrassing position; and now I very much regret that I did not do so, for both letters, yours and mine, were confiscated from me by the KGB, during a search in January of last year.

What is it that prompts me now to address you again, this time in an open letter?

Firstly: the intolerable situation and grave state of health of my friend Leonid Plyushch, who has been languishing for two years already within the walls of the Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital. I can testify, anywhere and under any oath, to the high intellect of this outstanding mathematician, as well as to his utter sanity.

Secondly: the *Manual on Psychiatry for Dissidents* by Vladimir Bukovsky and Semyon Gluzman, with which I have just become acquainted, is dedicated to the same Leonid Plyushch.

Those are my motives.

And now to the point.

Is it possible that you, an eminent specialist and academician, having reached the autumn years of life in which people usually take stock of their past, lack the courage to acknowledge and disclose to the world in the name of truth and justice, which I hope you do not see as being contra-indicative, the monstrosity of all that you know to be happening to dissidents in psychiatric hospitals? Unfortunately I am not personally acquainted with this brave and honourable man Vladimir Bukovsky, but I know well, and love, the young and talented psychiatrist Semyon Gluzman. Their manual, written in a most restrained and composed style, is a death-blow to the trend in psychiatry which you are leading. It is yet another demonstration, and a very convincing one, of the

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monstrosity and inhumanity of the recruitment of medicine to the struggle against the man who dares to think otherwise than as he is told. He does not throw, or even think of throwing, bombs; he does not take part in plots; he does not try to overthrow the state, or to change the form of government—he simply wants to think. To think, and not conceal his thoughts. Perhaps in this lies the distinction between man and beast.

And yet this turns out to be a crime. A crime for which he is tried. But if his "crime" cannot be squeezed under an article of the law, they call in you—the doctors! And you, the doctors, obediently carry out the will of people for whom psychiatry is not the science of treating the mentally ill, but a means of punishment for those who assert their right to think and to disagree with something.

It was you who developed and perhaps even thought up the diagnoses of "creeping schizophrenia" and "paranoid psychopathy" which can be applied to any right-thinking person, not to mention the outstanding individuals and geniuses whose "mental pathology," according to your diagnoses, is beyond all doubt.

Without the least sign of embarrassment, you operate in concepts such as "reformist delusions" or "persecution mania," running the risk of having your diagnosis of "paranoid psychopath" applied, under the first heading, to Peter the Great or Lenin, and, under the second, to the author of these lines, who even knew by sight one or two of the people who were persistently shadowing him during the last few months of his life in Kiev.

By the way, haven't you ever considered the fact that your own behaviour, too, can be made to slot into some kind of complex? A complex, let us say, of "striving to be submissive and to execute other people's wishes," or—and this has a beautiful ring to it—a complex of "helping the wolf fight the lamb"? . . . What if they start putting people away for that too? Perhaps even you (God forbid!) and your co-obsessives will find yourselves in some ward at the Dnepropetrovsk or Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital? Don't try then to persuade yourselves that it is Ward Number 6 from Chekhov's famous story.

I believe and I hope, esteemed Academician Snezhnevsky, that when you have read the above-mentioned *Manual* you will have a great deal to think about. This document of unbelievable denunciatory power has been written behind prison bars by two young people, one of whom, Bukovsky, has come to know from his own experience what a psychiatric hospital is, while the other, Gluzman, is a doctor who chose to specialize in psychiatry and is now risking everything, even the loss of his own liberty, in the fight to keep his profession pure and uncompromised.

On this note I conclude. I urge you to do one thing only. Look back over the path you have travelled. You have probably done a lot of good for people. So repudiate and unmask the evil which, deliberately or not, you have inflicted upon them. Do you really wish your name

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to stand in the history of psychiatry alongside that of Professor Sikorsky, who disgraced himself in the world-shattering Beiliss case by affirming the possibility of Jews committing ritual murders?

Look back, I implore you, and make up your mind. . . . It will then be easier for you to die.

Oxford,
10 March 1975. VIKTOR NEKRASOV.

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Introduction

Viktor Nekrasov

THE document published below, a *Manual on Psychiatry for Dissidents,* is an unusual one. It is unusual in its character and in its purpose, and, most important of all, it was written by two prisoners who are even now languishing behind barbed wire. I shall not comment on the *Manual*: it speaks for itself. But I would like to say a few words about its authors.

Vladimir Bukovsky is well known both in the West and in his own country. He is a man of unbending will, a man of principle, a man who is prepared to suffer any ordeal for his ideas. He said openly at his trial that if they released him, he would continue doing what he had done before the trial. Bukovsky is an example of rare courage; he cannot be broken. He remains himself under all conditions—a brave, proud, true fighter. He is an example to all of us.

Vladimir Bukovsky is, if I may so express it, a " pen-friend " of mine. I have never met him. Semyon Gluzman, the second author of the *Manual,* I know well. We became acquainted six years ago when he was still a student. Blushing with embarrassment, he brought me some stories he had written. They were a little naïve, but not at all bad; I made one or two comments on them, I can't remember what, nothing very harsh, I think. How could I have imagined then, as I read those half-childish literary exercises, that six years later, and no longer at home in Russia, but here in England, I would be reading a document neither childish nor naïve, a document of uncommon power, and that beneath that document there would be the signature of that modest, bashful Slava, as we all used to call him.

Slava Gluzman is a psychiatrist and still very young. Of his 27 years, two have been spent in a labour camp. He has hardly been able to practise his profession—he was arrested less than a year after he qualified at his institute. But he had already made his contribution to psychiatry. He is the author of a work well known in the psychiatric world, the " in absentia " medical examination of General Pyotr Grigorenko, who passed many years in the Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital, after being diagnosed a schizophrenic solely because he fought for justice, and in particular for an end to discrimination against the Crimean Tatars.

Both Bukovsky and Gluzman are now in captivity, one in Perm Camp, the other in Vladimir Prison. But their voices, calm and confident, have surmounted all obstacles and are now resounding throughout the world. People are listening to them, people are reading them, and people are proud of them.

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A Manual on Psychiatry for Dissidents

(*dedicated to Lenya Plyushch, a victim of psychiatric terror*)

Pushkin: You're a madman yourself!
Chaadayev: Why am I a madman?
Pushkin: You understand equality, but you live in servitude.
Chaadayev (pondering): Then it follows that you are right: I am a madman.

(A. Platonov, " Pupil of the Lycée ")

Introduction

IT is well known that in the Soviet Union today large numbers of dissidents are being declared insane, and there is reason to fear that this method will be used on an even greater scale in the future. It is not difficult to find an explanation for this phenomenon. From the point of view of the authorities, it is an extremely convenient method: it enables them to deprive a man of his freedom for an unlimited length of time, keep him in strict isolation, and use psycho-pharmacological means of " re-educating " him; it hinders the campaign for open legal proceedings and for his release, since even the most impartial man will, if he is not personally acquainted with the patient, always feel a twinge of uncertainty about the patient's mental health; it deprives its victim of what few rights he would enjoy as a prisoner, and it provides an opportunity to discredit the ideas and actions of dissidents, etc., etc.

There is, however, another, no less important side. Dissidents, as a rule, have enough legal grounding so as not to make mistakes during their investigation and trial, but when confronted by a qualified psychiatrist with a directive from above to have them declared non-accountable, they have found themselves absolutely powerless. All this has, inevitably, engendered renewed fear and dismay in dissident circles and is the reason for cases of unexpected " repentance " and renunciation which have occurred in recent months. Forensic psychiatry has thus renewed the fear of persecution, which a knowledge of the law and skill in applying it had previously dispelled. A mood of resignation to one's fate, a sense of one's powerlessness to resist this method of persecution, has become widespread.

All this demonstrates the need for a handbook generalizing the experience gained from many psychiatric examinations and setting out the basic tenets of psychiatric theory, having the format of a guide to the kind of behaviour which will give the experts as little basis as possible for pronouncing the examinee insane. The present authors, one a former " mental patient," the other a former psychiatrist, hope that by combining experience with professional knowledge of the subject

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they will succeed in producing a work that fulfils as far as possible the aim outlined above.

This manual lays no claim to be an exhaustive analysis of the problems of psychiatry; some aspects have been deliberately simplified, as the handbook is designed for as wide a readership as possible.

Legal part (in outline)

You can be seen by a psychiatrist, even without your consent, in the following three cases:

1. Compulsory investigation or compulsory hospitalization within the framework of normal medical regulations. Your convictions, openly expressed public stance, actions or acquaintances have made you an object of the close attention of a KGB operative squad. Because of certain objective circumstances, it is undesirable to institute criminal proceedings against you. In this case, the KGB (often not directly, but through the police, the procuracy, the specifically Soviet institution of informers and collaborators, etc., etc.) will tell medical establishments that they believe you are suffering from mental illness, and will indicate the reason for their interest in you.

A psychiatrist in a clinic, health centre, hospital or city first aid post is, in these circumstances, obliged to examine you and, if he considers it necessary, to have you admitted to a psychiatric hospital of the ordinary type.

A psychiatric examination of this kind may be carried out at home, at your place of work, at the scene of the "incident," in a preliminary detention cell, in an appropriate institution or in some other place.

If the psychiatrist finds that you show symptoms of an illness to a degree which does not require in-patient observation and treatment in a psychiatric hospital, you will be registered at a psychiatric health centre or in the psychiatric department of a clinic. You may be placed in a psychiatric hospital of the ordinary type if you show evidence of the following:

(1) mental derangement constituting a danger to yourself
(2) mental derangement constituting a danger to other people
(3) mental derangement verifiable only by in-patient examination
(4) pronounced mental derangement which cannot be successfully treated in out-patient conditions
(5) state of "acute psychosis" (i.e. what the ordinary person would call "going berserk").

Your removal from an out-patient psychiatric register, or discharge from an in-patient institution depends solely upon medical evidence (i.e. upon a doctor or psychiatrist).

If your condition is diagnosed by a doctor as abnormal, the forwarding (in psychiatric in-patient conditions) and investigation of your complaints, statements, petitions and letters depends wholly on the professional competence and conscience of your doctor, since the law makes

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this his responsibility. Relatives, friends and other interested persons may make requests and lodge claims regarding your case with the medical authorities (to the chief psychiatrist of the USSR, republic, region, area, town or district).

Mistakes can occur in psychiatric practice, as in any other form of human activity; the law does not define the extent of the doctor's liability for a professional error.

This state of affairs may be used by the authorities to explain a compulsory hospitalization which later turns out to have been unwarranted. For the same reason, an incompetent or morally irresponsible psychiatrist can give an incorrect assessment of your mental state without any damage to his own future reputation.

II. Forensic-psychiatric examination following the institution of criminal proceedings. After selecting the preventive measure to be taken in your case (usually arrest), the investigative organs or the procuracy may send you for forensic-psychiatric examination. For this purpose, a document is drawn up listing statements made or actions performed by you which cast doubts upon your mental health.

Normally the investigator (or procurator) does not make his doubts known to you, nor does he show you the relevant documents. He does not inform you, either, of the very fact that you are to undergo a psychiatric examination, or of how long it will take or where it will be carried out.

Forensic-psychiatric examinations are performed by commissions of not less than three psychiatrists. You may be subjected to either of the following forms of forensic-psychiatric examination: (1) out-patient; (2) in-patient.

An out-patient examination is normally carried out in a medical establishment or in an investigative isolation cell; it may last from a few minutes to several hours.

An in-patient examination is carried out in a psychiatric in-patient establishment (the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow, or investigation or ordinary "acute" admission wards in ordinary-type psychiatric hospitals; psychiatric sections of prison hospitals).

The length of an in-patient examination is not specified by law; usually it lasts from a few weeks to several months.

You will most likely not be informed of the experts' decision, if you are declared insane. From that moment, a defence counsel is permitted access to your case and you yourself will probably be barred from participating in the investigation.

The law provides for an unlimited number of repeat and supplementary examinations to be performed. The investigator (or procurator) has the responsibility of deciding which finding is correct, if the opinions of the commissions of experts differ.

Normally a non-accountable person is not asked to attend the court hearing and is not informed of the court's ruling on his case.

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Sometimes the psychiatric examination is performed in court. Essentially, it is no different from the ordinary out-patient examination. On the court's decision, legal proceedings may be suspended while the accused is sent for in-patient examination. The type of hospital to which the non-accountable person is to be sent (an ordinary hospital, or a special psychiatric hospital under Ministry of Internal Affairs jurisdiction) is determined by the court. It is, unfortunately, most unlikely that the court will order observation by a psychiatrist at your home, without compulsory isolation.

III. If you are a witness in a case, it is also possible that you may have to undergo compulsory out-patient examination. In this case, the formal pretext is that doubt has arisen in the mind of the investigator (procurator, court) as to your ability to grasp correctly circumstances which have an important bearing on the case and to give the correct evidence about them. In this case, in-patient examination can take place only with your express consent (which we hope you will not give).

Notarial law gives you the opportunity to safeguard your evidence by arming yourself in advance with an objective psychiatric report on the state of your mental health. At your written request, a notary will issue a decree ordering an examination, with indications as to the form it will take and the place where it is to be held. All you then have to do is pay for this formal notarial assistance and do everything necessary to ensure that if you are arrested and attempts are made to have you declared mentally ill, this psychiatric report on you becomes generally known (see *Statute on RSFSR/State Notarial Law*, articles 66, 67, and " Instructions regarding the procedure for carrying out notarial transactions in state notarial offices of the RSFSR," pp. 139–146).

General information on psychiatry

" Where we lack concepts, words come in time in their place " (Goethe's *Faust*). The principles governing the activity of the human brain are still unclear to us. Neurophysiology and the other concrete brain sciences are still unable to comprehend the " psychological " phenomenon of psycho-pathology. Equally mysterious and difficult to place within the strict framework of a systematic science are the concepts of health and sickness; the conceptual vagueness characteristic of medicine in general is especially marked in psychiatry. Madness is regarded both as a biological and a social (historical, philosophical, legal) problem.

In contemporary psychiatry as a whole, there is no firm basis for the system of categories in use or even for the system of classifying diseases of the psyche. Thus, for example, at a diagnostic symposium in Leningrad, 20 leading psychiatrists pronounced 12 different diagnoses on one and the same patient.

All mental illnesses can be divided into two groups: (1) pseudo-

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determinate, theoretically isolated from the chaotic mass of facts which have accumulated over the centuries, and (2) true mental illnesses with a cause known to science and a characteristic dynamics. If the model for the first is purely " rhetorical," the second type is based on concrete scientific discoveries and its models are " demonstrable."

The basic method of clinical psychiatric investigation is still the subjective observation of the behaviour, speech, memory, etc., of the patient. Used in conjunction with this is information—again subjective—about the patient obtained from his associates, friends, relatives, from official documents and such-like. Other methods (laboratory analyses, ECG investigations) are of secondary importance.

The vagueness with which mental illness is defined does not unduly concern working doctors, since treatment is more often than not determined not by diagnosis, but by particular abnormal manifestations.

In psychiatric theory, there are no generally-recognized standards of " sickness " and " health." A mass of abstract concepts exists from the philosophical to the cybernetic, all of them absolutely useless in psychiatric practice. Nevertheless, the day-to-day activity of the doctor would be impossible without the use of some standard of health, even if it is only an arbitrary one. So practical psychiatry uses an arbitrary standard of mental health which is convenient, simple and easy to understand: that of the so-called " *rentier* living off the income from his shares." A *rentier* is a person of mediocre intellect and bourgeois tastes, civilized, rather than cultured, who is unwilling to take chances. He is content with his low but stable social position (" the higher you fly, the harder you fall "), and never lets himself get carried away; he has no creative aptitude whatsoever, and is the mainstay of any authority; the guiding light in his life is his instinct for self-preservation. His life is monotonous but tranquil: he regards his life-style as the only correct one and indeed the wisest and safest one in our existence fraught with adversity.

The concept of the *rentier* is not a scientific one and is not mentioned at all in Soviet psychiatric literature. But applied psychiatrists use it every day in their work, though not always consciously, and of course, not as a hard and fast rule. (You will see below why the concept of the *rentier* is so dear to the so-called " average psychiatrist.")

Dissidence as a psychiatric problem

The freedom of each of us as an individual is restricted by society's interests. The law and morality are repositories of such restrictions. The behaviour of a mentally ill person who is not breaking the law is " foolish," " odd " and so on, and society regards it as undesirable.

It is with the protection of citizens from behaviour of this kind that psychiatry is concerned. Forcible incarceration in a mental hospital is justified from the social as well as the medical point of view. And if " health " is " desirable behaviour " and " sickness " is " undesirable

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behaviour," then the social aim of psychiatry is the transformation of undesirable behaviour into desirable. Thus, violence perpetrated upon a mentally ill person is justified by the resulting benefit to society. This use of "evil in a good cause" was the reason for the breakaway of an "anti-psychiatry" school of thought from classical Western psychiatry. The "anti-psychiatrists" declare that "the substance of psychiatric science is the repression of the revolutionary subconscious in the name of the state; the history of psychiatry is the history of the methods by which society has striven to break down psychological resistance to the prevailing conditions of life."

You will agree that, in view of the vagueness of the categories it uses and the existence of a multitude of "scientific schools of psychiatry," it is quite possible for psychiatry to extend its competence beyond legally acceptable bounds.

And under the conditions of the "social command" as practiced by various totalitarian regimes, psychiatric norms are defined by the needs of the particular moment, rather than by scientific and historical reasoning (compare this with the "anti-psychiatrists'" assertion that psychiatry, in fufilling the demands of a class society, has always turned revolutionaries into psychopaths).

The Soviet use of psychiatry as a punitive means is based upon the deliberate interpretation of heterodoxy (in one sense of the word) as a psychiatric problem. In his monograph *The Theory and Practice of Forensic-Psychiatric Diagnosis,* Professor D. R. Lunts asserts that any illegitimate act, by virtue of its illegitimacy alone, merits psychiatric analysis (in so far as it does not fit in with the *rentier* concept), and substantiates his remarks by claiming that under socialist conditions there are no social causes for criminal acts. Lunts attributes to *capitalism* crime as a phenomenon resulting from social disharmony.

Exculpation, i.e. declaring non-accountable dissidents who, in one way or another, express their disagreement with particular aspects of the Soviet government's domestic and foreign policy, is now being practised with single-minded determination. Basically, two psychiatric diagnoses are being used for this purpose: creeping (*vyalotekushchaya*) schizophrenia, and paranoid development of the personality. Other diagnoses are hardly ever mentioned, that is, dissidence does not, even in theory, enter into them (fortunately for you, otherwise you would have to familiarize yourself with psychiatry in much more detail).

Creeping Schizophrenia. To quote an expert of some experience, Professor Timofeyev: "The more one studies mild and attenuated (*stertye*) forms of schizophrenia (i.e. creeping schizophrenia—the authors), the more difficulties one encounters in diagnostics." The question still remains problematical, since some psychiatrists do not recognize these particular forms of the disease, while others regard them as having a relatively independent existence. In another work, Timofeyev asserts that "dissidence may be caused by a disease of the brain in which

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the pathological process develops very slowly and mildly (creeping schizophrenia—Gluzman), while its other symptoms remain for the time being (sometimes until a criminal act is committed) imperceptible." Professor Timofeyev recognizes the existence of creeping schizophrenia thus: "It is typical of persons of precisely this age-group (20–29—the authors) to exhibit a heightened propensity for conflict, the desire for self-assertion, the rejection of traditions, opinions, standards, etc.; this has contributed to the creation of the myth that some young people (who are actually suffering from schizophrenia) are being wrongfully placed in psychiatric hospitals and are being held there allegedly because they think differently from everyone else."

By creeping schizophrenia is understood a form of the disease in which all its symptoms are "barely" or "only slightly" manifest, while symptoms as explicit as the presence of hallucinations are absent altogether. Its normal symptoms are (according to a textbook for students at medical institutes): unsociability, sluggishness, loss of interest in life, mild attacks of pessimism and melancholia; concentration on inner experiences, inadequate thoughts and actions, stubbornness and inflexibility of convictions, suspiciousness, etc. So if you are reserved, inclined to be introspective and uncommunicative, if you do not wish to alter your convictions since you do not regard them as "unsound," and if your allegations that you are being shadowed and that your telephone is tapped are viewed as "suspiciousness" and sometimes even as "persecution mania," when these things really are happening to you—the conclusion is obvious. . . . The fact that you are coping successfully with your official responsibilities or your creative work, that you show an interest in them and are even making progress in your career, will not save you. Although formally the presence of pathological psychiatric symptoms does not rule out the possibility that you are still of sound mind, the outcome of your examination is predetermined.

According to the data of the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, approximately one half of all cases of creeping schizophrenia are declared capable. But we know of no case where a schizophrenic has been declared accountable. That most experienced diagnostician Professor Lunts has seen fit to introduce into civil legislation the concept of "limited" or "partial" capability and deliberately pronounces criminal diagnoses of insanity on healthy people, for "every class, every profession has its own ethical code." (*N.B.* limited capability and accountability are indeed necessary, and exist as judicial terms in the legal systems of all civilized countries.)

Paranoid development of the personality. A diagnosis which is, similarly, dubious and unspecific. To understand what lies behind this terminological label, one must be aware of the following:

(1) psychiatry distinguishes three kinds of ideas (apart from the ordinary idea):

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(a) The dominant idea: observed in healthy people who are preoccupied by some aspiration and are wholly engrossed in a developing thought.
(b) The over-valued idea (pathological): a notion, usually rational in content, but the importance of which has been over-estimated beyond all reason. Objectively the importance of an over-valued idea is negligible in comparison with the individual's subjective evaluation of it.
(c) The delusional idea (pathological): an erroneous notion, having no real basis and incapable of alteration. A concentration of such ideas is known as a delusional state.

(2) Two of the several types of delusional states are of interest to us:
(a) Reformist delusions: an improvement in living conditions can be achieved only through the revision of people's attitudes, in accordance with the individual's own idea of the transformation of reality.
(b) Litigation mania: a conviction, which does not have any basis in fact, that the individual's own personal rights as a human being are being violated and flouted; the reasons become "clear" to him, and he begins to send in complaints and demands to have "justice" restored.

(3) A pathological development of the personality is known as psychopathy. Alongside this there exist extreme variants of the normal personality—the borderline between these and psychopathy is indistinct and vague. The dynamics of psychopathy involve what is known as a period of compensations (in the social respect) and a period of de-compensations.

One of the groups of psychopathies is of interest to us: paranoid psychopathy. It is characterized by suspiciousness, mistrustfulness and a greatly increased propensity to over-valued and delusional ideas; rigid, one-track, sluggish thought-processes; a tendency to dwell at length on experiences connected with insignificant events. In conflict situations, paranoid psychopaths have paranoiac reactions. In time, these become a paranoiac development of the personality, that is, an orderly delusional system, in our case, litigation mania or reformist delusions.

Its development takes the following pattern: a dominant idea arises, which then gives way to an over-valued idea, and finally to a delusional idea; the formation of an orderly (that is, outwardly convincing and not absurd) delusional system is followed by a systematized delusional state, then a systematized persecution mania, with a tendency towards over-estimation of one's own personality (all interpretations are those given in the psychiatry course for students at medical institutes in the USSR). As you can see, the demonstrability of this type of psychopathology is highly relative. And vice versa: try proving that your opinions on the occupation of Czechoslovakia or on the absence of democratic freedoms

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in the USSR are not erroneous, with no real basis in fact. . . . Or that the surveillance of yourself and your close friends is not "persecution mania." Or that your own subjective appraisal of internal political life in the USSR is not at all insignificant in comparison with the real facts. . . . Or that your being "relieved" of your job after you had been one of the signatories to a "declaration of protest" is a violation of your rights. . . . Doctors of Medical Sciences Pechernikova and Kosachev, experts at the Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, openly state: "Ideas of fighting for truth and justice most frequently arise in personalities with a paranoid structure," or: "The litigious-paranoid state develops following psychotraumatising circumstances which affect the interests of the person concerned, and is typified by accusations of encroachment upon the legal status of the individual," or: "A characteristic feature of these (over-valued—the authors) formations is the conviction of the individual's own rightness, an obsession with asserting his 'trampled rights,' the importance the sick person attaches to his own feelings as an individual," or: "They use the court hearing as a platform for making speeches and appeals." But how are the psychiatrists to assess the mental state of a Georgy Dmitrov who makes a speech at his trial! . . . Or of many other public activists with their all-consuming belief in an ideal and their renunciation of their personal life? . . . For our psychiatrists, to be healthy means to be cautious, not very clever, "to keep one's wits about one." But wit leads to trouble.* It only remains for a new type of mental pathology to be officially introduced into psychiatry, called the Chatsky complex.

Finally, a diagnosis of paranoid psychopathy and paranoid development of the personality does not automatically mean certain exculpation. According to official statistics from the Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, 95·5 per cent of cases are declared accountable. But this is only in theory. There is a different set of statistics for dissidents, and they are not published. Pechernikova and Kosachev have given a very detailed account of the development of paranoidal litigation mania, but they have "forgotten" to tell us the percentage of "paranoiac litigants" exculpated.

The psychology of the psychiatrist

The twentieth century has confronted us with the problem of communicability. Nowadays, people in different professions who speak the same language have difficulty in understanding each other. In the psychiatrist's consulting-room, too much will depend on your ability to communicate. Try to ensure that the expert understands you in precisely the way you intend: do everything you can to prevent the expert's "goal" to have you declared non-accountable, if such is his aim, from

* In Russian, a pun based on the title of Griboyedov's comedy *Woe from Wit* (*Gorye ot uma*).

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becoming a reasoned deduction. Remember that the psychiatrist is an ordinary man possessing no supernatural powers. The view which exists in certain circles that the psychiatrist can "fathom your soul with his gaze, read your thoughts, or force you to tell the truth" is absurd. There are no therapeutic, hypnotic or pharmacological pressures that can reveal your secret thoughts and make you talk if you do not wish to. Neither is the idea of the psychiatrist as a person of extremely high intellect and with a profound knowledge of human psychology (in the everyday sense of the word) always valid.

The psychiatrist is a doctor who spends the greater part of his time within the walls of a psychiatric institution, amongst people who are mentally ill. He is accustomed to seeing suffering, violence, the most incredible perversions and grief. His patients are madmen—mad children and mad adults, women and men. Hence the very desire of a person to choose this profession, and his successful completion of a "probationary period" in psychiatry (for many people, the critical time), presuppose certain initial peculiarities in his character. Years of daily contact with this "graveyard of lost reason" leave their imprint on the personality of the doctor and work irreversible changes.

Here are the most characteristic types of working psychiatrist. *The Novice Psychiatrist*: sincerely loves psychiatry and regards it as a fully-fledged scientific discipline. Because of his insufficient worldly and professional experience and the paucity of his knowledge, he discerns mental pathology where it undoubtedly does not exist. He does not understand the artificiality of psychiatric concepts. Thus he is very susceptible to suggestion and may sincerely "detect" that you have a pathological mental condition. He does not participate in forensic-psychiatric diagnostic commissions, and he is not dangerous, since it is not he who will decide your fate. The types of mature psychiatrist merit more detailed examination, for it is they who will determine your future.

The Academic: has retained his "youthful" passion for psychiatry and regards it as his vocation. For him, psychiatry is a scientific discipline (though with reservations). As a rule he sees (or "does not see": original unclear—Russian copyist) dissidence as falling within the competence of psychiatry. He does not like participating in diagnoses of non-accountability: "I am a doctor, not an investigator. . . ." He is sober enough to understand the state of affairs, but tries "not to dirty his hands": help him by using the right tactics.

The Writer of a Dissertation: chief characteristic: he is unconsciously extending the boundaries of the disease which he is describing in his dissertation. . . . Persuade him by your behaviour that you are not suitable "material."

The Voltairian: a clever and experienced person and psychiatrist. He has become long since disillusioned with psychiatry as a science. He is highly intelligent, loves art and literature, and can talk at great length

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about them. He is socially inactive, since he does not believe in the success of any social transformations (the wisdom of Ecclesiastes); an outward public position is a possibility, perhaps lecturing. He is something of a coward, and a cynic. He understands the state of affairs perfectly well, but even under " pressure " he will find you mentally healthy, moreover, by virtue of his cowardice he will do it convincingly and demonstratively, to remove any suspicion of " sympathy " towards you; " so that nobody can pin a thing on to him."

The Philistine: intellect and specialist knowledge no higher than average. Considers himself an intelligent and experienced doctor and his life-style a desirable standard for others. Within the framework of the " general course " he is socially active, and he has a well-developed adaptability to external conditions (" social mimicry "). He does not understand phenomena such as surrealist art (" do horses really fly?"), modern poetry (" but where are the rhymes?") and suchlike. He sincerely regards your social position as abnormal; his basic argument is: " But you had an apartment, a family, a job. Why did you do it?" We do not advise you to talk to this contemporary *rentier* about abstract subjects, philosophy, theoretical physics, etc., or about modern art; try to keep to his level. He is dangerous and may detect a psychopathological condition. He yields easily to pressure from above, and always justifies himself (in his own eyes) by citing authorities and psychiatric " schools."

The Professional Hangman: deliberately practises the exculpation of mentally healthy persons. He is usually a competent specialist. Therefore your only possible course is not to allow him to detect a single " symptom." In the circumstances, he may, out of peculiar professional self-esteem, decide he does not want to " dirty his hands " by " blatant forgery."

Practical recommendations on tactics

The punitive organs have one important advantage over dissidents: they are actively amoral. The principle of " the end justifies the means " is used by the state against citizens who behave like the boy in Andersen's famous fairy-tale about the emperor with no clothes. Pseudo-scientific theses on the class character of morals permit the state to take openly immoral measures against " enemies of the Soviet people and the socialist system." But what is morality? Truth is moral, but falsehood is not, sincerity is moral, sympathy is moral, and so on. As a rule, dissidents adhere to precisely this kind of " classless " morality. In the context of the preliminary investigation, trial and psychiatric examination, this kind of morality implies the following:

(1) that you give truthful testimony on all matters which interest the KGB or the court, knowing that this will be your ruin as a person under diagnostic observation

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(2) that you report to the KGB or to the court on circumstances and motives about which they had no knowledge, thus giving the psychiatric expert the necessary "material" to build up a picture of your "symptoms"
(3) that you show impermissible weakness towards the investigator for whom it is "imperative to carry out the investigation successfully," or to the witness who turns coward "for fear of losing his job," and so on.

Unfortunately these are the facts. Lying is a vile thing to do: but bear in mind that your fate hangs on your decision and ability to act immorally towards persons and organizations which profess the morality of savages. On the basis of our own experience and that of hundreds of our comrades, we can tell you that the abstract morality which governs the behaviour of the person undergoing investigation, trial, or psychiatric examination, works against his vital interests. The correct behaviour to display during a period of psychiatric investigation (as during criminal investigation or trial) entails not only a necessary minimum elementary knowledge of psychiatric theory and practice, but also a "worldly" morality. (All our recommendations are aimed at the average dissident). Naturally we cannot take account of the multitude of individual circumstances, interests and fortunes. You are not obliged to follow a specific recommendation if it is objectively at variance with reality in your case. Indeed, to do so would be harmful. It is senseless, for example, to deny a brain injury in the past, if your documents refer to one; or to deny that you stammer, if such is the case, and so on. It is desirable that your potential witnesses should be able to give equally correct and "clean" evidence about your mental character. The information you give a doctor may not coincide with that contained in the materials of the criminal investigation. In the first place, the law does not prohibit a suspect or an accused from giving deliberately false testimony; and in the second place, the information at the disposal of the psychiatrists, although not kept secret from the KGB (in Soviet law, medical confidentiality exists as a purely formal category), may not be used during the investigation or court hearing. Always remember, however, to exercise caution when giving the psychiatrist any information about circumstances which specifically interest the KGB, since this information may in time be "strategically exploited."

General information about your life. Your mother's pregnancy and your birth were normal. You were born a healthy child and you learned to sit up, walk and talk at the proper times. In your childhood you showed an interest in your peers and derived pleasure from contact with them. You showed no preference for playing games alone, all by yourself, nor any propensity to daydreaming, lying or obstinacy; all your habits, actions and opinions were those normal for your age and sex. You showed a moderate or somewhat heightened interest in books, and you preferred books suitable for your age. You did not suffer from

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nocturnal fears, sleepwalking, disturbed sleep, stammering, exaggerated fear of the dark, herds of animals or heights, etc. You displayed no fitfulness of moods, weakness of will, over-sensitivity, no sudden aggressive reactions; you did not play truant from school or home; you made good progress in your studies and never stayed down to repeat a year, you showed interest in classroom, school and playground life and did not try to avoid joining in it; you were liked by your schoolmates (but you were not too " exemplary " or lacking in initiative), your friends were always of your own age. During your teenage years, there were no peculiarities or difficulties with your behaviour. You took failures calmly, but not without some concern; you felt no attraction for quiet and solitary pursuits, nor any aversion to sport, large crowds or mass entertainment. You were absorbed in the interests of your age-group and milieu: you loved the cinema, you loved books (but not just science fiction), you loved games; you felt love for the members of your family; you were absorbed in the interests and concerns of your family; you felt for your near and dear ones, you shared their illnesses, their troubles and their joys; you were not secretive, you shared your interests and your news with your family. Your interest in the opposite sex arose at the right time; you were not apathetic about choosing a career; you always displayed lively, vivid and adequate emotions; you sincerely sympathized with those close to you in their troubles and failures. You are not irascible by nature, your contacts with people are not superficial; you do not restrict yourself to the interests of your home and work environments. If you *are* a secretive and withdrawn person, the reason is that you are shy and not that you lack the need for social intercourse; you are not indifferent towards your professional obligations and feel no aversion towards them; unless your studies or your profession require it, you show no interest (and never have) in philosophical problems (for there is a term " metaphysical intoxication "), in psychiatry, parapsychology or mathematics. Bearing in mind what you already know about the psychology of the psychiatrist, do not display any interest in modern art, and, especially, any understanding of it. You do not devote your spare time only to autistic pursuits such as reading, gardening, or the contemplation of nature and works of art. You have hobbies, you are interested in sport (if only as a fan or a spectator). If you are unmarried, do not explain the fact by saying that you feel no attraction for the opposite sex or that you are repelled by the idea of family life; find some other reason (you have no apartment, your salary is too low, you were about to get married but were prevented by your arrest . . .). In respect of sexual behaviour, you have never overstepped the bounds of " decency." You have never been inclined to make " peremptory judgements," you understand—you have always understood—that " in life the crooked line is often shorter than the straight "; you have never performed any actions that were not justified by circumstances. If there is objective knowledge of any special

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peculiarities in your character, for example, that you have had "breakdowns," show an ability for critical self-analysis. You have never suffered brain injuries or had convulsions, fainting fits, hallucinations, memory disorders or diseases of the nervous system (the brain); you do not indulge in alcohol to excess; if you do drink, you have always preferred dry wines. Your social views have altered with age and have been corrected by the people round about you, by events and by reading books, etc., etc. Your reactions to injustices against you have never been excessively sharp, impetuous, effusive or long-lasting. Your dissident views arose under the influence of books, tales of eye-witnesses and victims of repressions, your home upbringing and school education (if the circumstances allow you to offer this information painlessly), and as a result of a sober, objective appraisal of reality. However disagreeable it may be, the best motivation you can offer for the actions being imputed to you is: "I wanted to become famous, to be well-known; I did not understand the seriousness of the consequences, I did not stand aside and take a look at myself; I did not realise that I had gone too far," and so on. Unfortunately it is precisely unpleasant reasoning like this which will be interpreted in a positive light by the psychiatrist. We do not insist that everyone takes this advice on every occasion; but remember that circumstances may sometimes call for this kind of defence measure, especially as your moral stand (refusal to "ruin" your friends, "blacken" your past, etc.) will not suffer from this enforced tactical device.

During the period of investigation, dissidents are, as a rule, deprived of their freedom as a preventive measure. Denied the opportunity to see your family and friends, torn from your primary environment and your "life-stereotype," you wittingly become a participant in a fight with the KGB which you have already lost. It is in the investigation period that your behaviour and the circumstances of the case will predetermine whether or not you are to be declared non-accountable. The simplest way of safeguarding against exculpation is to give the KGB all the information it wants about all the persons in whom it is interested; not to spare family, friends, or anyone else and to disavow your "criminal past," etc., etc. As a rule, this guarantees that you will not end up in a mental hospital, even if you are a psychopath or a chronic alcoholic. There have indeed been instances of this. Happily, very few people resort to such an objectively and subjectively amoral way of protecting their interests. We hope that this simple, elementary method is unacceptable to you too.

During the period of the investigation, your behaviour will be influenced by the following factors:

(1) total isolation from the outside world
(2) anxiety about the future
(3) psychological pressure from the investigator

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(4) the virtual certainty that you will have to share your cell with a prisoner who acts as an informer and directly or obliquely exerts psychological pressure upon you.

The informer will have been specially planted in your cell and his purpose is to bring influence to bear upon you, by any means, to the KGB's advantage. His methods include persuading you to give evidence, to show sincere repentance and thereby win a pardon; in the process, he cites himself or his friends as examples. Sometimes he "accidentally" finds that you and he had mutual friends in the past, and, referring to what they have told him, he informs you that he knows the "truth" about your wife's or fiancée's "infidelities." He squeezes the information out of you which the investigators need, creates an utterly intolerable psychopathic atmosphere in your cell, and prevents you from sleeping, eating, reading, etc. The investigator is organically incapable of keeping to the law in his actions, of which you yourself will in due course become convinced; he will use persuasion, intimidation, blackmail, infringe procedural norms for compiling investigative documentation, and so forth.

Alexander Volpin's *Instructions on behaviour while under investigation,* which are widely known to readers of *samizdat,* it now appears, have one important defect: the "legal stand" he advocates for persons under investigation (insistence that the investigator adhere to the letter of the law, precise knowledge and assertion of one's legal rights) hampers the investigator from making a "clean sweep" of your case, from intimidating your witnesses during confrontations, from juggling with testimonies in interrogation records, and so forth. This exhausts the investigator and forces him to resort to seeking mental flaws in your character and to apply to have you sent for psychiatric investigation. You run a special risk of having the "experts" brought in, if you refuse outright to testify (although this is not prohibited by law). We therefore recommend that you only resort to such means of conducting your case in extreme situations.

If circumstances permit, do not carry on conversations with the investigator about subjects which have "emotional" significance to you; often the investigator deliberately conducts talks of this kind on subjects to which you are not indifferent, and in a tenor calculated to provoke you to an emotional reaction. This is how Leonid Plyushch, for example, was "prepared" for his examination, so that a documentary record of his "fantasies" could be compiled.

Be prepared in advance for the investigator to make false claims that he has "evidence" against you and "depositions which expose you." Remember that you will not be able to prove to the investigator (nor to the court) that you have been shadowed, that provocations have been staged against you, and so forth, for obvious reasons. If you do, the experts will add "persecution mania" to your "diagnosis." For the same reason, do not insist on these aspects if the circumstances

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of the case allow. Try to argue your opinions, not on the basis of personal experience nor by analyzing reality, but by referring to literary sources, statements by authorities, etc. (Otherwise the experts' findings will include " over-estimation of your capabilities.") Do not be shy of expressing anxiety about your family, relatives and friends. This is essential evidence in favour of your " emotional integrity."

Protest hunger-strikes are desirable only in extreme necessity: if you want to strike, your refusal to take food may be interpreted as a pathological symptom of mental illness (which happened in the case of Pyotr Grigorenko).

In no case should you make any mention of disillusionment with life, lack of the desire to go on living, or of plans to put an end to your life. This will immediately incur the suspicion that you are mentally sick and may be a weighty argument in favour of exculpation. You must not utter a single word about any thoughts or plans to do away with yourself.

Do not be afraid that pharmacological substances may be put into your water or food; do not refuse treatment if you are ill—the facts about such methods have not, as a rule, been confirmed. We do not believe that these methods of exerting pressure are practised, since they involve certain purely technical difficulties and would not, in fact, be very effective.

There are no " scientific " methods which can force you to act against your will and your conscience. The same applies to hypnotic suggestion, which is totally ineffective in such situations.

The period of psychiatric investigation and actual diagnostic examination. We shall take in-patient investigation as an example of the most complex situation.

You have been taken under escort to the reception room at a psychiatric institution, where, from the moment of your arrival, you find yourself under observation by medical personnel. In the reception room you undergo a health and hygiene check and have your first talk with a doctor. Don't refuse to submit to the health and hygiene routine, to talk, or to undergo the medical examination, since this may be interpreted as " mental negativism." In the ward (or cell) you will meet other patients under investigation. They may include people who are mentally sick, and you will have to get used to their presence. Don't be frightened of them; even aggressive mental patients are not as dangerous as rumour would have it, especially in the hospital environment, of a psychiatric institution where methods of " deterrence " are practised. Remember that even here the possibility of the presence of an informer cannot be entirely ruled out. Usually each ward has an orderly or medical assistant who is there at all times and whose duties include continuous surveillance and, when necessary, the controlling of aggressive behaviour, over-excitement, etc., by means of injections, drugs and various forms of the " chemical straightjacket" (*fiksatsiya*).

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The medium-ranking medical personnel in psychiatric establishments keep a diary of their observations, to mantain a detailed record of all the peculiarities in the behaviour of patients and persons under investigation, their statements, their requests, etc. Therefore you must keep a check on your every action and word: all will be reported to the doctor in charge of you (the so-called " reporting doctor " who will submit your case to the commission of experts). Your conversations with the " reporting doctor " will largely determine the commission's diagnosis. Be reasonably polite to him (whatever your feelings about him), answer all his questions, as far as is possible; some questions may seem " stupid " (" What is the date today? What day of the week is it? What year? What is a hundred minus thirty? What is the meaning of the proverb: ' You are sitting in the wrong sleigh '? " and so on). You will have a chance to determine the psychiatrist's intellectual level and his way of conducting a conversation; your aim should be to talk with him " in the same language, on the same conceptual level."

We have already given a great deal of advice on the tactics to use when talking to a psychiatrist and the content of your conversation in other sections of our manual. Try not to make use of expressions which may be regarded as " symbolic associations " (for example, Grigorenko was asked to give the " reasons " for his " anti-social activity." He replied: " I couldn't breathe.")

Do not categorically state that you nave been shadowed, victimized, eavesdropped upon, provoked, etc. (Pechernikova and Kosachev: " As paranoid reactions develop and escalate into a pathological development of the personality, the basic psychopathological formations gradually begin to acquire ramifications of delusional ideas of persecution, attitude, ' interpretation.' ")

Hunger strikes should only be declared in extreme circumstances, since they, too, will be interpreted as a manifestation of " psychopathic negativism." You will be unable to convince the psychiatrist of the objectivity and the social causes of your convictions (precisely because he too is well aware of the fact); consequently, we do not advise you to become involved in discussions on socio-political themes, otherwise you may be discovered to be " over-estimating your capabilities." (Pechernikova and Kosachev: " over-valued notions give place to interpretative delusions, which acquire the characteristics of incorrigibility, conviction, para-logicality; then there arises over-estimation of the individual's capabilities.") " Circumstantiality of thought " may also be noted (as happened with Grigorenko).

Naturally, if the psychiatrist has made up his mind to bring to light your pathological condition, any answer or action by you may be interpreted accordingly. Zhores Medvedev, for instance, was found to have a " split personality " on the grounds that he was a biologist by profession but wrote poetry.

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Your behaviour must be as natural as possible; do not hide your fears about the future, about your family, close friends and acquaintances, lest you be diagnosed as " emotionally dulled " or "cold."

Deny all knowledge of our manual, do not tell the doctor that you have ever been interested in psychiatry, parapsychology, philosophy or religion (if possible, base yourself on objective facts and circumstances).

Remember that a Soviet doctor cannot give you any assurances that he will observe his code of professional secrecy. Do not give him any " strategic " information which might be used against you or your friends.

After a certain time, the " reporting " doctor will present you to the commission, inform its members of his observations, and of the nature and content of his conversations with you, offer a preliminary analysis and announce his finding of accountability (or non-accountability).

Finally, rumours of " pharmacological " interrogations in psychiatric institutions are not without some foundation. A method exists called the " amytal interview," in which you may be given an intra-venous injection of sodium amytal. Shortly after the injection (within seconds), the victim goes into a brief period of intoxication similar to an alcoholic state; he then passes into a deep sleep. The principle is the rather banal one of " drinking loosens the tongue." The " disinhibition " method, for so it is officially called, is used in cases when it is desired to bring to light the patient's concealed delusions, hallucinations and so forth. We can competently state that the method is ineffective; do not be afraid of it, stay in control of your condition (this *is* possible), and the effect of " loosening your tongue " will not be achieved.

Behaviour in the psychiatric hospital

The worst may happen: in spite of the fact that you have followed our advice in every respect, you are declared non-accountable and the court has ruled that you be sent for compulsory psychiatric treatment. The mental patient is totally deprived of his rights, and his situation is an unenviable one. But do not despair! Scores of your comrades have been undergoing compulsory treatment for long years without any serious injury to their health. Despite the whole arsenal of psycho-pharmacological methods and shock therapy, contemporary science has —fortunately—not yet reached the point where it can work irreversible changes in the human individual or destroy a man's personality.

Every six months, you are required by law to be presented to a regular psychiatric commission. Who knows, perhaps one of these commissions will find you " cured." There are grounds for relying on the conscience of doctors; and unfortunately, the pressure of world opinion has little effect either against the criminal use of psychiatry in the USSR.

Practice has shown that in order to create more or less tolerable living conditions for yourself in a psychiatric hospital (a less marked " regimen of oppression," permission to read books, milder " treatment," with

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longer intervals between courses), it is essential that you tell the doctors that you have "re-appraised your former unhealthy convictions." With all due respect for the courage of Leonid Plyushch, who is deliberately refusing to resort to any "tactical devices" in the Dnepropetrovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital, we strongly advise you to make use of them all the same. For they, and they alone, are your only hope of salvation.

Conclusion

Professor Ushakov, who diagnosed one of the authors of this manual, writes the following in his textbook for medical students: "Scientific ideas, which are dominant in the consciousness of the scholar, and the fanatical ideas of the religious believer are variants of the over-estimation of ideas (that is, of over-valued, pathological ideas)."

After that, can one wonder at the widespread use of the practice of exculpating dissidents?

Today, a knowledge of the elementary tenets of psychiatric practice and an ability to behave consciously and competently in the presence of a psychiatrist are essential requirements for many people. Certain circumstances in our life have prevented us until now from generalizing our experience in written form and offering it to readers.

Our manual is also designed to help in a situation in which you might have to appear as a witness during an investigation. Upon your evidence will depend the fate of other people.

Our concise format has prevented us from going into some questions of psychiatric theory and the interrelationship between psychiatry and the law as deeply and as seriously as we would have liked. For those of you who wish to acquaint yourselves in more detail with the problems we have touched upon in our work, we recommend the following reading.

Recommended reading

1. Criminal Code (commentaries).
2. Criminal-Procedural Code (commentaries).
3. Fundamentals of Public Health Legislation of USSR and Union Republics (p. 136).
4. RSFSR Law on Public Health (pp. 54–56).
5. Directive on the immediate hospitalization of mentally ill persons, USSR Ministry of Health.
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Together with this work, we earnestly ask you to publish Gluzman's " The forensic-psychiatric investigation *in absentia* of the case of P. G. Grigorenko."

If necessary, supply a glossary of terms at the end of the work.

V. Bukovsky, S. Gluzman,
Vladimir Prison—Perm Political Camp.

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

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